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Introduction
This thesis gathers papers on different subjects. In Part I, we study
several topics in the field of development economics. The first chapter
deals with the impacts of fairtrade from a theoretical point of view.
The second chapter is an empirical contribution on the role of external
monitoring in joint liability credit groups, while the third chapter is a
literature review on the demand for micro-insurance.
More concretely, in Chapter 1, titled “ ‘Made in Dignity’: the redis-
tributive impact of Fair Trade" and co-authored with Jean-Marie Baland
and Cedric Duprez, we develop a model of North-South trade to inves-
tigate the impact of Fair Trade. In the absence of a label, Southern
producers are exploited by monopsonisitic intermediaries who export to
Northern markets. The Fair Trade label certifies the adoption of high
labour standards and the payment of fair prices to producers in the
South. We first show that the label is never Pareto-improving: the wel-
fare of unlabeled producers in the South falls if and only if the welfare
of Northern consumers increases. This is more likely to occur when the
label only requires a price premium to be paid to producers or when it
certifies alternative production practices that do not entail too large pro-
ductivity losses. An expansion of Fair Trade tends to exacerbate those
effects. We also show that the consequences of fair trade on equilibrium
prices are systematically reduced in environments where traders enjoy
more market power.
In Chapter 2, titled “ ‘Let the punishment be proportionate to the
offense’: External monitoring and internal sanctioning in joint-liability
credit groups" and co-authored with Catherine Guirkinger, we study
joint-liability credit groups. Models of joint-liability credit typically in-
volve social sanctions and peer-monitoring by group members as means
to overcome moral-hazard problems. Interestingly, in practice joint-
liability credit often also involves monitoring by the lender (which is
usually depicted as prohibitively expensive in the theory literature). To
investigate the role of external monitoring, we conduct an experiment in
which we increased external monitoring in existing joint-liability credit
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groups for agricultural credit in Burkina Faso where the key incentive
problem is ex-ante moral hazard. We find that external monitoring
crowds out internal monitoring by the group’s leaders. Because of this
substitution, the overall probability to be monitored is not affected. De-
spite this, sanctioning is affected. The group moves towards more ef-
ficient state-dependent sanctioning. Furthermore, purely internal sanc-
tions are substituted for sanctions that also involve the external agent.
This suggests that internal and external monitoring are not perfect sub-
stitutes. We argue that a key difference lies in how effectively information
from monitoring can be used. Accusing group members of wrongdoing
is costly in these groups and a judgment by the external agent, based on
his own information, can be used more easily to sanction when needed,
and only when needed.
In Chapter 3, titled “The demand for micro-insurance: A littera-
ture review" and co-authored with Ombeline De Bock and Jean-Philippe
Platteau, we review the litterature on the demand for micro-insurance.
Micro-insurance has recently received much attention as a promising tool
to protect poor individuals from important shocks. Yet, voluntary de-
mand from people has been low, shedding doubt on the viability of micro-
insurance as a useful risk-management tool. To better understand this
puzzle, the paper reviews both the theoretical and empirical literature
on the demand for insurance. While peoples’ lack of understanding of
insurances does seem to limit the demand for insurance, several more
fundamental factors, such as the price, quality, limited trust in the in-
surer, and liquidity constraints also seem to have an important role in
explaining this puzzle.
Part II contains two papers in applied econometrics. The first paper
is a methodological contribution to the way people’s expectations can
be measured. The second paper discusses the Stata implementation of
different robust estimators.
More concretely, in Chapter 4, titled “Anchoring when measuring
expectations: A methodological experiment in Burkina Faso", we con-
duct an experiment in the methodology of measuring expectations. We
elicit income expectations of prospective migrants in Burkina Faso plan-
ning to go and work on a gold mine. To do so, we elicit probabilities
to earn different amounts of money, but we randomize these amounts:
Some respondents are asked about bigger amounts than others. This
seemingly irrelevant methodological change has an important effect on
the responses. Median expected incomes are up to 4 times higher when
expectations are elicited over big amounts instead of small amounts. We
argue that people anchor to the proposed amounts and adjust their re-
sponses accordingly. Moreover, this undesirable effect is bigger for people
with no previous experience in mining, who likely are less knowledgeable
about the income distribution. These results suggest caution is needed
when using measured expectations, in particular when respondents do
not know the distribution well.
Finally, Chapter 5, titled “Time efficient algorithms for robust esti-
mators of location, scale, symmetry and tail heaviness" and co-authored
with Vincenzo Verardi and Catherine Vermandele, considers the analy-
sis of the empirical distribution of univariate data, which often includes
the computation of some location, scale, skewness and tails heaviness
measures. These measures are estimates of specific parameters of the
underlying population distribution. Several measures are available but
they differ in terms of Gaussian efficiency, robustness with respect to out-
liers, and meaning in case of asymmetric distributions. We first briefly
compare, for each type of parameter (location, scale, skewness, and tail
heaviness), the "classical" estimator based on (centered) moments of the
empirical distribution, an estimator based on specific quantiles of the
distribution, and an estimator built on the basis of pairwise comparisons
of the observations. This last one always performs better than the other
estimators, namely in terms of robustness, but requires at first sight a
heavy computation time of an order of n2. Fortunately, as explained in
Croux and Rousseeuw (1992), the algorithm of Johnson and Mizoguchi
(1978) allows to substantially reduce the computation time to an or-
der of n log(n) and, hence, allows to use the robust estimators based on
pairwise comparisons even in very large datasets. This has motivated us
to program this algorithm and make it available in Stata: we describe
in this paper the sketch of the algorithm and the associated Stata com-
mands. Finally, we illustrate on real data the interest of the computation
of these robust estimators by involving them in a normality test of the
Jarque-Bera form (Jarque and Bera (1980); Brys et al. (2004a)).
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Part I
Development Economics
9

Chapter 1
‘Made in Dignity’: the
redistributive impact of Fair
Trade1
1This chapter is co-authored with Jean-Marie Baland and Cedric Duprez.
11
ESSAYS IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
Abstract
In this paper, we develop a model of North-South trade to investigate
the impact of Fair Trade. In the absence of a label, Southern producers
are exploited by monopsonisitic intermediaries who export to Northern
markets. The Fair Trade label certifies the adoption of high labour stan-
dards and the payment of fair prices to producers in the South. We
first show that the label is never Pareto-improving: the welfare of unla-
beled producers in the South falls if and only if the welfare of Northern
consumers increases. This is more likely to occur when the label only
requires a price premium to be paid to producers or when it certifies al-
ternative production practices that do not entail too large productivity
losses. An expansion of Fair Trade tends to exacerbate those effects. We
also show that the consequences of fair trade on equilibrium prices are
systematically reduced in environments where traders enjoy more market
power.
12
CHAPTER 1. THE REDISTRIBUTIVE IMPACT OF FAIR TRADE
1.1 Introduction
Over the recent years, consumers in the North have expressed an in-
creased concern about the working conditions prevailing in the produc-
tion of what they import from less developed economies.2 While this
movement probably reflects genuine concern about the welfare of poor
producers, fair trade restrictions can also be partly motivated by pro-
tectionist motives against ’unfair’ competition by countries applying low
labour standards.3 In practice, social labeling programs have developed
rapidly over the recent years. The sales of Fairtrade certified products
have been growing steadily over the last ten years, with double-digit lev-
els of an annual growth rate. In 2014, Fairtrade certified sales amounted
to approximately 5.9 billion Euro worldwide. In 2013, there were 1210
Fairtrade certified producer organizations in 74 producing countries, rep-
resenting over 1.5 million farmers and workers.4 Fairtrade products typi-
cally include coffee, cocoa, bananas, cane sugar, flowers, tea, cotton, fresh
fruits, wine grapes, sports balls, etc. Besides their commercial success,
most labeling programs are also actively supported by many interna-
tional organizations such as ILO, UNICEF and major NGOs (Oxfam,
Max Havelaar,...).
Fair trade labels can be seen as an effective way to solve informational
asymmetries. In many instances consumers are not well informed on the
social and economic conditions under which the good they consume has
been produced. Labeling by an independent third party provides them
with the appropriate information.5 Labels are also particularly attrac-
tive as they do not rely on coercion but simply provide information to
the consumers. The latter are then free to choose, by paying a higher
price, to support better production conditions, giving rise to a form of
2Various studies show that consumers have a preference for ’fair’ products and
are willing to pay a premium for fair trade products (e.g Prasad et al., 2004; Hiscox
& Smyth, 2011; De Pelsmacker et al., 2005; Loureiro & Lotade, 2005; Basu & Hicks,
2008; Poelman et al., 2008; Tagbata & Sirieix, 2008; Cranfield et al., 2010; Elfenbein
& McManus, 2010; Hainmueller et al., 2015; Sirieix et al., 2013).
3Numerous proposals have been put forward to incorporate minimum labour stan-
dards into international trade rules. See Rodrik (1996); Freeman (1998); Bhagwati
(1995) for a discussion on the pertinence of imposing labour standards, in line with
the debates on the WTO. See also Maskus (1997); Fischer & Serra (2000); Fung et al.
(2001); Brown (1999) for more details on labour standards and international trade.
4See www.fairtrade.net , Fairtrade International: "Annual report 2014, 2015" and
"Monitoring the scope and benefits of fairtrade, Sixth edition, 2014".
5Since Akerlof (1970), market failures due to the lack of information on product
quality are well known. Labour standards in the production process is a hidden
characteristic of goods which is not revealed to consumers even after consumption, a
’credence’ characteristic (Nelson, 1970; Darby & Karni, 1973).
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’democracy by the consumers’. One therefore expects labeling programs
to improve consumer welfare.6 The higher prices paid also reward com-
plying producers.7 Labels can therefore be viewed as a tool in the hands
of Southern producers that enables them to price discriminate between
different types of consumers.8 A priori, we can therefore expect social la-
beling to improve the welfare of both Northern consumers and Southern
producers.
This is precisely the question addressed in this paper. To this pur-
pose, we set up a simple North-South trade model and analyze the impact
of the introduction of a fair trade label in the export production of the
South. In the absence of the label, producers in the South sell their
output to competing monopsonist traders who have exclusive access to
markets. Their market power is modeled as arising from market frictions:
each producer has idiosyncratic preferences over the existing traders, who
exploit these preferences by under-pricing the output they purchase. If
labeled, a trader pays to producers a higher price and guarantees im-
proved production conditions. We also assume that (a) all consumers in
the North are willing to pay a price premium for labeled goods, and (b)
the label is perfectly implemented and monitored. Taken together, these
assumptions tend to bias the results of the model in favor of a positive
impact of labeling. Given the relatively limited scope of fair trade in
practice, we focus on situations under which the Northern market is not
fully covered by labeled goods, so that some Northern consumers also
consume unlabeled goods.
We first show that fair trade cannot be Pareto-improving as it always
generates losers among producers or consumers. The welfare of unlabeled
workers in the South increases if and only if the welfare of Northern
consumers decreases. The intuition behind this result is as follows: if
the equilibrium price of unlabeled goods rises, Southern workers in the
unlabeled sector are better off but consumers in the North are worse off
since, in equilibrium, they are indifferent between consuming the high
price labeled good and the low price unlabeled good. (The reverse holds
when the unlabeled price falls.) Unlabeled prices increase when the fair
trade label certifies working conditions that reduce substantially labour
productivity, labour hours or the effort levels of the labeled producers.
Finally, we show that the consequences of fair trade on equilibrium prices
6See e.g. Zago & Pick (2004); Baksi & Bose (2007); Roe & Sheldon (2007), and
Bonroy & Constantatos (2008).
7Unlike green or eco-friendly labeling, social labels seek first to directly benefit
producers instead of promoting a particular public good such as the environment.
8From the firm’s point of view, a label raising the demand for labeled goods can
be viewed as a form of informative advertising.
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are systematically reduced in environments where traders enjoy more
market power.
So far the literature has essentially proposed partial equilibrium anal-
yses of fair trade, pointing to the beneficial implications for qualifying
producers by reducing the intermediaries’ market power (Baumann et al.,
2012; Podhorsky, 2015). These benefits may however get dissipated un-
der free entry, as argued by De Janvry et al. (2012) in an interesting
empirical illustration from coffee cooperatives in Central America. Some
authors have also stressed that some producers in the South may di-
rectly suffer from the introduction of Fair Trade: "Ethical trading in
Bangladesh has both positive and negative consequences, (...). Working
conditions have improved in compliant factories, but workers in non-
compliant firms are worse-off." (Murshid et al. 2003, see also Valkila
& Nygren 2010; Dragusanu & Nunn 2014; Jaffee 2008). In the present
paper, we investigate the properties of fair trade as an instrument to
reduce the intermediaries’ market power in the South and focus on con-
sequences in terms of welfare. The general equilibrium perspective allows
us to also analyze more satisfactorily the demand for fair trade, as well
as to to identify among the different components of fair trade those that
are more conducive to welfare gains for the producers in the South.9
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we present the model.
In Section 3, we first characterize the welfare impacts of the label. We
then investigate the consequences of an expansion of fair trade as well as
of an increase in the monopsony power of intermediaries in the South.
Section 4 concludes.
1.2 The model
We consider an economy with two countries, North and South, denoted
by N and S respectively. In each country, there is a continuum of mea-
sure 1 of identical individuals, who have one unit of time that they supply
inelastically on the labour market. We assume complete specialization
in production, with the North producing clothes and the South produc-
ing food. The production functions are linear, with labour as the only
input. Productivity in the North is equal to γ, each worker producing
γ units of clothes. We let clothing be the numeraire so that its price is
normalized to 1. The income of a worker in the North is then equal to
9Some authors also raise doubts about the beneficial impact of a label ’child labor
free’ label (see e.g. Brown (1999); Davies (2005); Basu et al. (2006); Edmonds (2007);
Doepke & Zilibotti (2010)) and Baland & Duprez 2009) In contrast to the present
analysis which focusses on eploitative working conditions or pricing practices, being
underage is a fixed characteristic of the worker which cannot be changed by the label.
15
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γ. Productivity in the South is equal to 1, with each worker producing
one unit of food.
There are potentially two sectors in the South, the labeled and the
unlabeled one, respectively denoted by ` and u. We let p`, pu stand
for the price of labeled and unlabeled food respectively. A label on
a unit of food certifies that it has been produced under well defined
labour standards and fair wages. Monitoring is perfect so that there is
no uncertainty associated with the quality of the label.10
1.2.1 The North
In the North, individuals consume food and clothing, but also care about
the working conditions under which the Southern goods they consume
has been produced. The utility function of a Northern consumer is as
follows:
UN = (1 + λµ) c
α
N (f
`
N + f
u
N )
1−α (1.1)
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, cN represents the amount of clothing, f `N , the amount
of labeled food and fuN , the amount of unlabeled food consumed. λ, is a
dummy variable which takes the value 1 when consuming labeled food,
and 0 otherwise.11 He thus receives an extra utility benefit µ > 0 when
consuming labeled food instead of unlabeled food.
The budget constraint of a Northern household is given by:
cN + f
`
Np` + f
u
Npu = γ
1.2.2 The South
Southern producers care about the working conditions they face. As
consumers, however, they are not concerned about the labour conditions
involved in the food they consume.12 Their utility from consuming and
producing goods is as follows:
VS = (1 + δθ) c
α
S (f
`
S + f
u
S )
1−α (1.2)
10The introduction of uncertain quality, while making the analysis more complex,
yields essentially similar results as the ones presented in the paper, as long as con-
sumers are ready to pay a premium for labeled - of uncertain quality - over unlabeled
food.
11Without loss of generality, we implicitly consider that a particular Northern
consumer consumes only one type of food so that either f `N = 0 or fuN = 0.
12This assumption is by no way necessary for the validity of the results. It sim-
ply allows us to distinguish between concerned and unconcerned consumers without
additional notation. The model, and its results, can trivially be extended to the
case where some Southern consumers also care about labour standards, while some
Northern consumers are indifferent.
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where cS and f
j
S represent respectively the amount of clothes and food of
type j, j = `, u, consumed. When working under high labour standards,
the dummy variable δ takes the value 1 and the worker receives a utility
benefit of θ ≥ 0. δ is equal to 0 otherwize.13 The two types of food are
perfect substitutes, so that, as a consumer, he purchases the least costly
variety.
Unlike Northern producers, Southern producers do not sell their pro-
duction directly on the world markets. Instead, there is a large number
N of intermediaries or traders to whom they sell their output. The pro-
ducer trades with the intermediary he prefers and these traders differ
across several dimensions. First, a trader can either be labeled or un-
labeled. Producers can produce labeled food only if they trade with a
labeled intermediary. Second, different traders can offer different wages.
Let VS,i denote the utility derived from producing and consuming goods
when trading through intermediary i.
When a Southern producer trades with a particular intermediary i,
he also gets an idiosyncratic benefit i. His full utility when trading with
his preferred trader p is given by:
US = VS,p + p (1.3)
This idiosyncratic benefit i is driven by factors such as the distance
to the trader or the quality of their personalized relationship or other
(unmodelled here) side benefits he draws from selling to this particular
trader. The benefit i varies across each possible pair of producer and
trader, and is drawn from an i.i.d Gumbel distribution14 with mean zero
and standard deviation d (pi/
√
6). Here, d is a measure of dispersion of
the i: the larger d, the larger the differences in idiosyncratic benefits and
the stronger the preference of a producer for a particular intermediary.
Because of these benefits, traders enjoy market power over a particular
subset of producers.15
13The utility benefit θ enters the utility function of the Southern producers mul-
tiplicatively to mimic the utility benefit Northern consumers get when consuming
however fairtrade. However, the results of this paper also hold with an additive
utility benefit θ
14The Gumbel distribution, also known as the log Weibull distribution, is quite
similar to the normal distribution. But unlike the normal it is skewed to the right.
The choice for the Gumbel, as opposed to a normal or uniform distribution, is for
reasons of tractability. It allows to derive a closed form solution for the proportion
of producers who choose a given intermediary (see Equation 1.4), which is a non-
trivial problem as it requires comparing the idiosyncratic benefit for a particular
intermediary with the idiosyncratic benefits for all other intermediaries.
15It is clear that Southern ’producers’ can also be seen as workers employed by
a particular employer (called here the ’trader’). The analysis of this situation is
17
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1.2.3 Intermediaries in the South
All intermediaries sell food competitively on the world market and south-
ern producers freely choose which trader to sell their production to. As
shown in Thisse & Toulemonde (2010), the proportion of producers Pi
choosing to trade with intermediary i is given by:
Pi =
exp
(
VS,i
d
)
∑N
j=1 exp
(
VS,j
d
) (1.4)
Each unlabeled trader decides on the price at which he purchases
food (which is the wage earned by the workers he trades with) wu in
order to maximize his profits Πi:
Πi = Pi(pu − wu)
Profits depend on the number of producers the trader attracts when
announcing a purchase price wu, and on the profit generated by each
transaction (pu − wu). Maximizing profits, the optimal purchase price
wu is given by16:
wu = pu − d
V ′S,u(w)
= pu − d
αα(1− α)1−α p
1−α
u
As expected, traders in equilibrium make profits by offering producers
a lower price than the market price of food. They are able to do this be-
cause producers have idiosyncratic preferences over intermediaries: when
an intermediary reduces the price he pays for food, he looses some, but
not all, the producers he trades with. The size of this effect is captured
by the dispersion of idiosyncratic preferences d. The larger d, the more
"attached" producers are to their traders, and the larger the market
power the latter can exercise. In equilibrium, a larger d effectively leads
to lower prices paid to producers.
Under a fair trade label, a proportion η of traders within the existing
set of intermediaries are chosen randomly and given a label.17 The se-
lected traders have to comply with the fair trade standards. We assume
identical to the one developed here. To avoid confusion, we will stick in the following
to the interpretation of the model in terms of producers and traders.
16Here, we assume thatN is sufficiently large so that the intermediary does not take
into account how changes in the price he offers affects the denominator in Equation
1.4.
17In other words, the introduction of a label implies that some of the existing in-
termediaries become labeled intermediaries. Alternatively, one could also consider a
label that introduces additional labeled intermediaries and where all unlabeled inter-
18
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that η is small enough for the supply of labeled food not to cover the
entire market for food in the North. This assumption reflects the fact
that most labeling programs in the world are restricted, owing to the
limited monitoring capacities of labeling agencies. Thus, FLO, the um-
brella body for Fairtrade ensures compliance with Fair Trade standards
through a long and strict certification process, which involves a lengthy
initial inspection, followed by regular on-site visits. As a result, at the
end of 2013, FLO had certified only 1210 producer organizations.
When labeled, a trader can sell food on the world market at the
price p`. Under the label, he has to follow a particular wage rule which
requires that he offers a piece rate that is pi times higher than the one
unlabeled workers receive, wu.18 The label also implies costly labour
standards on producers: to qualify, a producer has to spend σ > 0
units of labour per unit of food produced and σc > 0 units of clothes.19
The first type of cost captures the idea that improved labour standards
imply higher production costs by resorting to less exploitative modes
of production, reducing working hours or spending more resources on
workers’ health and education. The second type of cost, σc, occurs if
Northern equipment, goods and expertise are involved in the adoption
of improved labour standard (and must be paid for at the going wage rate
in the North). As a result the net income earned by labeled producers
is given by:
w` = (1− σ)piwu − σc
In the following, we restrict attention to labels that are beneficial to
Southern producers, that is, where the utility of consuming and produc-
ing of a labeled producer, VS,`, is at least as big as that of an unlabeled
producer, VS,u.20
Both unlabeled and labeled intermediaries make profits, and have
preferences that are identical to the preferences of Southern workers.
mediaries remain unlabeled. However, adding intermediaries provides "free utility" to
some labeled producers associated to them because of the idiosyncratic benefits they
provide. Nonetheless, except for this effect on some labeled producers’ welfare, this
model is essentially identical to the one we consider: Effects on unlabeled producers
and intermediaries and on Northern consumers do not change.
18For example, for coffee FLO requires a price premium of 20 dollar cents per
pound with a minimum price of 1.4 dollar. In this paper, we model the fairtrade
premium as a price premium, but the results are essentially unchanged when using a
minimum price, with the exception of Proposition 5, which we discuss below.
19We study costly labels because these costs are an important aspect of fairtrade
schemes. However, the results of this paper also hold when the label involves only a
wage premium and no costs nor the associated utility benefit θ.
20For instance, this is always true when σc = 0 and (1 + θ)pi(1− σ) ≥ 1
19
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Their utility function is therefore given by:
UK = c
α
K (f
`
K + f
u
K)
1−α (1.5)
where cS and f
j
S represent respectively the amount of clothes and food
of type j, j = `, u, consumed. Given the Cobb-Douglas nature of these
preferences, the distribution of income between traders and workers does
not affect the aggregate demand for each type of good.
1.3 Equilibrium prices and welfare implications
We first describe the equilibrium that prevails before labels are intro-
duced. In the pre-label situation, there are no labeled intermediaries
(η = 0) and no labeled food. The equilibrium price for unlabeled food,
p∗, can easily be found by equalizing the supply and the demand for
clothes:
p∗ = (1− α)γ
α
(1.6)
In the labeling equilibrium, a fraction η > 0 of intermediaries are
labeled, which implies that all the producers who choose to sell food to
one of them is labeled. As said above, we assume that η is small, so that
the supply of labeled food does not cover the entire Northern market.
As a result, some consumers in the North consume unlabeled food. The
equilibrium prices of labeled and unlabeled food must be such as to leave
Northern consumers indifferent between the two types of food:
p` = (1 + µ)
1
1−α pu (1.7)
Again using the market clearing condition for clothing, the equilib-
rium price of unlabeled food is given by:
pu =
1− α
α
γ − ηSσc
1 + ηS [(1 + µ)1/(1−α)(1− σ)− 1]
(1.8)
where ηS is the proportion of labeled producers in the South. While the
proportion of labeled intermediaries η is exogenously given, the number
of labeled producers is endogenous since each producer chooses which
intermediary to trade with. This itself depends on the price of unlabeled
food, pu. Using Equation (1.4), we obtain the equilibrium proportion of
labeled producers in the South:
ηS =
[
1 +
1− η
η
/
Exp
(VS,` − VS,u
d
)]−1
, where
VS,` − VS,u = [Apαu − d][(1 + θ)(1− σ)pi − 1]− (1 + θ)A
σC
p1−αu
20
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where A = αα(1− α)1−α. If we consider the limit case under which the
labeled producers are as well off as the unlabeled ones (VS,` = VS,u), the
proportion of labeled producers, ηS , is exactly equal to the proportion of
labeled intermediaries, η: every producer trades with the intermediary
that gives him the highest idiosyncratic benefit i, and for η producers
this happens to be a labeled producer. As the gains from labeling in-
crease, for instance with a larger wage premium pi or higher utility gain
θ, more producers choose to sell to a labeled trader and the share of
labeled producers in the economy increases.
1.3.1 The welfare implications of fair trade
The introduction of the label creates a welfare differential between the
unlabeled and labeled producers in the South, the latter being relatively
better off. In the North, in equilibrium, consumers must be indifferent
between labeled and unlabeled food. Compared to the pre-label situa-
tion, Northern consumers are better off with the introduction of a label
if and only if the price of unlabeled food, pu, is smaller than the initial
price, p∗ (their budget set is strictly larger). However, this is exactly the
condition under which the welfare of unlabeled producers in the South
falls with the introduction of the label. We therefore have:
Proposition 1 The label is never Pareto improving, nor Pareto deteri-
orating. The North is better off iff unlabeled producers in the South are
worse off.
Proof. We have already discussed the fact that the North is better off
with the introduction of a label if and only if pu < p∗. The second
part of the proof requires that unlabeled workers are worse off if and
only if pu < p∗. When the price of unlabeled food falls, the price paid
to unlabeled producers by their traders, wu, also falls, but less than
proportionately because the market power of intermediaries is lower when
pu is lower. Moreover, unlabeled workers also consume unlabeled food,
which becomes cheaper when pu falls. In the appendix, we show formally
that the net effect of a lower pu on the welfare of unlabeled workers is
negative.
This proposition is general and applies to a large set of situations.
All we need is that 1) some Northern consumers are indifferent between
labeled and unlabeled food such that changes in pu translate into changes
in the utility of Northern consumers and 2) that wu = f(pu) with f ′ > 0
such that these changes in pu have the opposite effect on the utility of
unlabeled producers.
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We now investigate the conditions under which unlabeled producers
gain or loose with the introduction of a label. We have:
Proposition 2 With the introduction of the label, unlabeled workers are
better off and Northern consumers are worse off iff
σc
γ
+ (1 + µ)1/(1−α)(1− σ) < 1 (1.9)
Proof: see Appendix.
With the introduction of a label, unlabeled producers gain if the price
for unlabeled food increases. This can occur because labeling involves
some costs in terms of food or reduced productivity, σ, which lowers the
total supply of food on the markets. The introduction of a label also
reduces the demand for food, as each consumer of labeled food in the
North consumes less units of labeled food owing to their higher price.
This is due to the Cobb-Douglas utility functions, under which Northern
consumers of labeled food spend the same amount on food as before, but
pay a higher price. As a result, the quantity of food they purchase is
lower.
At the pre-label price, an excess demand for unlabeled food appears
when the former effect dominates the latter and the price of unlabelled
food increases. In condition 1.9, the term (1 + µ)1/(1−α) measures the
fall in the quantity of labeled food demanded while (1 − σ) measures
the decrease in the net supply of food by labeled producers. If the
latter is large (and σc is small enough), the condition is satisfied and
the price of unlabeled food increases. Proposition 2 also shows that
unlabeled workers are more likely to loose when σc is high. This is due
to the fact that costs in terms of clothes convert demand for labeled food
into demand for clothes (Northern consumers, by consuming labelled
food, indirectly ’consume’ more clothing through these costs), making
an excess supply of unlabelled food more likely.
In general however, condition 1.9 is relatively restrictive. To see this,
let us restrict attention to labels that involve an effective transfer from
Northern consumers to Southern producers. This is the case when the
price premium paid in the North for a labeled producer’s output is bigger
than the costs involved to implement the label:
(p` − pu)(1− σ) ≥ σpu + σC (1.10)
In other words, under a label with effective transfers, the price premium
paid by Northern consumers is not fully consumed by costs and can
(partially) be passed on to labeled producers in terms of higher wages.
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From Conditions 1.7 and 1.10, it follows that a necessary condition for
a label to involve effective transfers is that:
(1 + µ)1/(1−α)(1− σ) ≥ 1 (1.11)
Comparing this condition with Condition 1.9 it follows that unlabeled
producers always loose in this situation. Unlabeled intermediaries also
loose:
Proposition 3 With the introduction of a label with effective transfers,
unlabeled workers are always worse off and profits of unlabeled interme-
diaries decrease.
Proof: see Appendix.
Note that a label that only involves a pure price premium and no
costs always involves effective transfers, and so unlabeled producers and
intermediaries are worse off under such a label. There are however two
reasons why a label may not involve effective transfers. First, wages of
labeled producers may be increased, not by a transfer from Northern
consumers, but by a reduction of profits of the intermediaries. Second,
the price premium paid by Northern consumers may be fully consumed
by implementing better working conditions, reducing labeled producers’
wages but improving their working conditions. As labeled producers get
a utility benefit θ because of improved working conditions, they can be
better off despite a reduction in wages. Nonetheless, we feel that most
fair trade scheme aim to implement a label with effective transfers. We
will thus focus mainly on such labels while mentioning how results differ
when there are no effective transfers.
The impact of the label varies across labeled producers. This is due
to the fact that there is a non empty set of labeled producers who,
in equilibrium, are just indifferent between selling to a labeled or an
unlabeled trader. For these producers, the impact of a label in terms of
welfare is identical to that of unlabeled ones. By contrast, producers who
were selling to a trader who became labelled are ex post better off than
unlabeled producers, since they still sell to their best preferred trader,
and enjoy the gains brought by the label. While these ’non switching’
producers usually gain with the introduction of a label compared to the
pre-label situation, this is not always the case. These producers can loose
even with a label with effective transfers. For instance, in the case of a
pure price premium, which always has effective transfers, they loose when
the price premium is sufficiently small. In general, for a non-switching
labeled producer, the welfare gains are larger when the costs of labelling
(σ, σc) are low and when the gains from improved working conditions (θ)
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are large. As expected, a larger price premium (pi) also directly benefits
these producers at the expense of the labeled traders who make lower
profits.
Profits of unlabeled intermediaries decrease because of two reasons.
First, they loose on the extensive margin because labeled intermediaries
offer better conditions and in this way attract more producers. They
will thus have less units of food to sell. Second, they also loose on the
intensive margin - profits per unit sold - because prices of unlabeled
food fall with the introduction of the label. While, in reaction to this,
they reduce wages for unlabeled producers, they can not fully match the
reduction in prices because their bargaining power is smaller when prices
are lower.
Profits of labeled intermediaries’ profits can both increase or decrease
following the introduction of the label. They give a wage premium pi to
farmers and the higher this premium the lower their profits (up to the
point where they make no profits). Clearly, with a sufficiently high wage
premium, profits will be sufficiently low so that they are lower than their
profits before the introduction of the label. On the other hand, there are
also several mechanism that can potentially increase labeled intermedi-
aries’ profits. By offering better conditions they attract more producers
and gain on the extensive margin. The higher the utility benefits from
better working conditions, θ, the stronger this effect. Additionally, la-
beled products command a price premium in the North, determined by
the preferences over labeled goods µ, which allows them to gain on the
intensive margin. Whether or not labeled intermediaries’ gain depends
on the relative strength of these effects.
When the label does not provide effective transfers, unlabeled inter-
mediaries’ profits can also increase. This can happen when the label
causes prices of unlabeled food to increase (when Condition 1.9 is sat-
isfied). In this context, unlabeled intermediaries gain on the intensive
margin while still loosing on the extensive margin. If the former effect
dominates the latter, profits of unlabeled intermediaries increase.
We now investigate the effects of expanding the fairtrade sector by
increasing the number of labelled traders, η. We have:
Proposition 4 An expansion of a label with effective transfers (i) in-
creases the welfare of Northern consumers, (ii) decreases the welfare of
the unlabeled producers who remain ex post unlabeled and (iii) decreases
the welfare of producers who were already labeled before the expansion.
Proof: see Appendix
An expansion of Fair Trade leads to an increase in the number of
labeled producers, which magnifies the consequences in terms of welfare
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of the introduction of a label. Because overall demand for Southern
products decreases, both unlabeled producers in the South and produc-
ers who were already labeled are worse off. This result however does not
imply that expanding fair trade lowers the overall welfare of producers in
the South. Indeed, producers who were selling to a trader who became
labeled do gain by becoming labeled producers. In general, our simula-
tions over a large set of parameter values show that the overall welfare
of producers in the South (measured additively across all producers) can
both increase or decrease with an expansion of the label: Expanding a
label that has positive effects on aggregate welfare in the South further
increases this welfare. Expanding a label with negative effects further
decreases welfare in the South.
When a label does not involve effective transfers, these results may be
reversed, depending on whether or not unlabeled producers gain with the
introduction of the label (Condition 1.9). If this is the case, expanding
the label as before magnifies the welfare consequences of the introduction
of the label. When unlabeled producers gain, this implies that expanding
the label makes both unlabeled and labeled producers better off while
further decreasing welfare of Northern consumers.
Finally, we consider the effects of introducing fair trade in economies
with different levels of competitiveness. Recall that d, the dispersion in
idiosyncratic benefits for the producers, directly measures trade frictions
or the lack of competitiveness among traders in the South. When the
same label is introduced in a less competitive environment (higher d),
fewer producers become labeled because these frictions reduce the mobil-
ity of producers across traders.21 Since fewer producers become labelled
in a less competitive environment, the labeled sector is smaller which
weakens the effects of a label on the economy.
Proposition 5 In a less competitive environment, fewer producers switch
to the labeled sector. Following the introduction of a label with effective
transfers, the reduction in equilibrium prices of unlabeled food is also
smaller.
Proof: see Appendix
21Note also that, in our setting, the price premium is proportional to the price
offered to unlabeled producers. In a less competitive environment, unlabeled food
prices are lower, and so is the price premium that producers obtain from the labeled
trader. This is an additional reason why fewer producers become labeled. This would
not be true under another type of price premium, such as a minimum price which is
independent from the price offered to unlabeled producers. The price rule actually
implemented by most fairtrade programs is typically a combination of both systems,
with a minimum price when prices are too low and a price premium when prices are
high.
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This proposition suggests that, in a less competitive environment,
unlabeled workers are less negatively affected by the introduction of a
label. Indeed, a smaller reduction in the price of food leads to smaller
reductions in the wage of unlabeled producers. However, note that wages
(and welfare) were already lower in a less competitive environment be-
fore the introduction of the label. Hence, the introduction of the label
leads to a smaller reduction in wages (in absolute terms) for producers
who had lower wages to start with. This complicates welfare compar-
isons and it is difficult to say whether the introduction of the label has
less detrimental effects for unlabeled producers when there is less com-
petition. The same reasoning holds for labeled producers as well who,
just like unlabeled producers, are negatively affected by reductions in
unlabeled food prices.22
We thus show that the negative effects of the label can be smaller
when there is less competition. Could this imply that, in a world with
labeling, less competion is good for Southern producers? The answer is
no. Simulations over a wide range of parameter values show that for all
types of producers the first order effect of a reduction in competion (a
reduction in producers’ wages) always dominates any general equilibrium
effects due to the label. Less competition is thus unambiguously bad for
Southern producers.
1.4 Concluding comments
In this paper, we develop a model of North-South tradel to investigate
the impact of Fair Trade. In the absence of a label, Southern producers
are exploited by monopsonisitic intermediaries who export to Northern
markets. The Fair Trade label certifies the adoption of high labour stan-
dards and the payment of fair prices to producers in the South. We
first show that the label is never Pareto-improving: the welfare of unla-
beled producers in the South falls if and only if the welfare of Northern
consumers increases. This is more likely to occur when the label only
requires a price premium to be paid to producers or when it certifies
improved production practices that do not entail too large productivity
losses. In general, labelled producers benefit from the introduction of
Fair Trade, but these gains are lower when Fair Trade includes a larger
set of traders and producers. Finally we showed that the effects of Fair
22As mentioned above, the price premium of the label is also lower when competi-
tion is lower. This is because wages are lower in this setting and the price premium is
proportional to these wages. This is a reason why a label has smaller positive effects
on labeled producers when there is less competition. However, with a different type
of price premium, this would not be true.
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Trade on equilibrium prices are systematically reduced in environments
where traders enjoy more market power.
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Appendix
Proposition 1 The label is never Pareto improving, nor Pareto deteri-
orating. The North is better off iff unlabeled producers in the South are
worse off.
Proof (Continued). It remains to be shown that unlabeled producers
are worse off if and only if pu < p∗.
Consider the effect of a change in pu on unlabeled workers’ wages:
∂wu
∂pu
= 1− (1− α)d
αα(1− α)1−α p
−α
u (1.12)
Assuming an equilibrium exists, wu ≥ 0 must hold and, so, dp−αu /αα(1−
α)1−α ≤ 1. As a consequence, ∂wu∂pu > 0 and a decrease in pu always leads
to a decrease in wages for unlabeled producers.
Next, consider the utility of unlabeled workers:
US,u = α
α(1− α)1−αwαu (1−
d
αα(1− α)1−α p
−α
u ) + i
A decrease in pu leads to a decrease in wu as well as a decrease of
the second term in brackets, and has no other effects. Note that i does
not change as unlabeled workers do not change intermediaries when the
label is introduced. Hence, a decrease in pu leads to a decrease in welfare
for unlabeled workers, and vice versa.
Proposition 2 With the introduction of the label, unlabeled workers are
better off and Northern consumers are worse off iff
σc
γ
+ (1 + µ)1/(1−α)(1− σ) < 1
Proof. As shown in the Proof of Proposition 1, unlabeled workers are
better off and the North is worse off iff prices for unlabeled food rise:
pu > p
∗. It thus suffices to show that pu > p∗ iff Condition 1.9 in the
proposition is satisfied.
To do so, consider the ratio of pu over p∗:
pu
p∗
=
1− ηSσcγ
1 + ηS [(1 + µ)1/(1−α)(1− σ)− 1]
It follows immediately that
pu > p
∗ ⇐⇒ σc
γ
+ (1 + µ)1/(1−α)(1− σ) < 1 (1.13)
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Proposition 3 With the introduction of a label with effective transfers,
unlabeled workers are always worse off and profits of unlabeled interme-
diaries decrease.
Proof. As discussed in the text, the first part of the statement, that
unlabeled workers are worse off with the introduction of a label with
effective transfers, is an immediate corollary of Proposition 2. It thus
suffices to show that profits of unlabeled intermediaries decrease with
the introduction of a label with effective transfers.
To do so, consider the profits of unlabeled intermediaries:
Πu = Pu(pu − wu)
Profits are a function of two components: 1) The number of produc-
ers, Pu that choose the unlabeled intermediary (the extensive margin)
and 2) the profits made on every unit sold, pu−wu (the intensive margin).
We will show that, with the introduction of the label, both components
decrease and that profits thus decrease.
For the extensive margin, note that prior to the introduction of the
label all intermediaries offer the same conditions and attract the same
number of producers. When the label is introduced, the share of pro-
ducers choosing a given intermediary i is given by Equation 1.4. As one
would expect, the share of producers Pi is increasing in VS,i, the utility
of producing and consuming when trading with intermediary i. Since
this utility is higher when trading with labeled than with unlabeled in-
termediaries (VS,` ≥ VS,u), labeled intermediaries attract more producers
than unlabeled intermediaries (P` ≥ Pu). Since prior to the label they
attracted the same number of producers, and since the total number of
producers is fixed, this implies that the share of producers attracted by
an unlabeled intermediary, Pu, decreases.
As for the intensive margin, we have shown in the proof of Proposi-
tion 2 that, with the introduction of the label, prices for unlabeled food
pu fall when Condition 1.9 is not satisfied. When the label provides ef-
fective transfers, this is always true and thus pu decreases. Additionally,
Equation 1.12 in the proof of Proposition 1 shows how wages, wu, change
when pu changes. It follows that:
∂(pu − wu)
∂pu
= 1− ∂wu
∂pu
=
(1− α)d
αα(1− α)1−α p
−α
u
Since d ≥ 0, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and pu ≥ 0, this expression is always positive.
Hence, the reduction in pu following the introduction of the label leads
to a decrease in pu − wu, the profits per unit sold by the unlabeled
intermediary.
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Proposition 4 An expansion of a label with effective transfers (i) in-
creases the welfare of Northern consumers, (ii) decreases the welfare of
the unlabeled producers who remain ex post unlabeled and (iii) decreases
the welfare of producers who were already labeled before the expansion.
Proof. Since the discussion in the paper following this proposition goes
beyond the proposition, we prove a somewhat more general lemma below.
However, Lemma 1 immediately implies the proposition. Indeed, by
Condition 1.11 any label with effective transfers satisfies the condition
σc
γ + (1 + µ)
1/(1−α)(1− σ) > 1 in the lemma.
Lemma 1 If σcγ + (1 + µ)
1/(1−α)(1 − σ) > 1(< 1), an expansion of a
label (i) increases (decreases) the welfare of Northern consumers, (ii)
decreases (increases) the welfare of the unlabeled producers who remain
ex post unlabeled and (iii) decreases (increases) the welfare of producers
who were already labeled before the expansion.
Proof. We will show that an increase in the number of traders η leads to
a decrease (increase) in unlabeled food prices when σcγ +(1+µ)
1/(1−α)(1−
σ) > 1(< 1). This implies the lemma. Indeed, in the proof of Proposition
1 we have shown that a decrease (increase) in unlabeled food prices (1)
increases (decreases) the welfare of Northern consumers and (2) decreases
(increases) the welfare of Southern producers, provided that they do
not switch trader.23 Since the proposition involves unlabeled producers
who remain ex post unlabeled (case ii) and producers who were already
labeled (case iii), this suffices.
It thus remains to be shown that increasing η leads to a decrease in
unlabeled food prices when
σc
γ
+ (1 + µ)1/(1−α)(1− σ) > 1 (1.14)
is satisfied and leads to an increase in pu when it is not satisfied. Let
us first prove the first part, that an expansion of fairtrade leads to a
decrease in pu when Condition 1.14 is satisfied.
To this end, recall that apart from pu, also the share of labeled work-
ers in the South, ηS , is endogenous. To understand how prices change,
23In fact, we have only shown that welfare of unlabeled workers falls iff pu falls.
However, the same proof applies for labeled workers substituting the utility function
of unlabeled workers for the one of labeled workers.
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we thus also need to consider changes in ηS . A change in η has no
immediate effect on pu, but increases ηS :
∂pu
∂η
= 0 and
∂ηS
∂η
> 0 (1.15)
Moreover, under Condition 1.14, the immediate effect of an increase
in ηS is a decrease in pu while an increase in pu leads to an increase in
ηS :
∂pu
∂ηS
< 0 and
∂ηS
∂pu
> 0 (1.16)
The total effect of an increase in η is the following: It increases ηS ,
which has a negative effect pu. The latter has a negative effect on ηS ,
thus attenuating the original change. Despite this attenuation we will
show that the overall effect of an increase in η is an increase in ηS and a
decrease in pu.
To this end, consider the different possibilities following an increase
in η: (i) both ηS and pu increase; (ii) both ηS and pu decrease; (iii) ηS
decreases, pu increases; and (iiii) ηS increases, pu decreases. We need to
show that (i)-(iii) are impossible and hence (iiii) is the only possibility.
Statements (i) and (ii) are impossible because ∂pu∂ηS < 0 (Equation
1.16) and, moreover, η has no immediate effect on pu (Equation 1.15). It
is thus impossible that ηS and pu move in the same direction following
a change in η.
Finally, to show that (iii) is impossible, note that ∂ηS∂η > 0 and
∂ηS
∂pu
>
0. This implies that if both η and pu increase, so should ηS , which is in
contradiction with (iii).
Next, let us show that an increase in η leads to a decrease in pu when
Condition 1.14 is not satisfied. This is easier. Indeed, when Condition
1.14 is not satisfied, changes in pu and ηS go in the same direction:
∂pu
∂ηS
> 0 and
∂ηS
∂pu
> 0
It is thus immediate that an increase in η, whose immediate effect is to
increase ηS , leads to an increase in both ηS and pu.
Proposition 5 In a less competitive environment, fewer producers switch
to the labeled sector. Following the introduction of a label with effective
transfers, the reduction in equilibrium prices of unlabeled food is also
smaller.
Proof. We need to show that, in a less competitive environment (higher
d), the introduction of a label with effective transfers leads to fewer
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producers in the labeled sector (lower ηS) and a smaller reduction in
equilibrium prices (higher pu).
The proof is almost identical to the one of Proposition 4 where we
looked at the comparative statics of η. The direct effect of a change in
d on pu and ηS is:
∂pu
∂d
= 0 and
∂ηS
∂d
< 0 (1.17)
Just like for η, a change in d only has a direct effect on ηS and not on pu.
However, the direct effect of d on ηS is negative, while it was positive for
η.
Under a label with effective transfers, the price for unlabeled food,
pu, falls following the introduction of the label. Using the same argument
as in the proof of Proposition 4, we can show that an increase in d leads
to a decrease in ηS and an increase in pu. Since the original effect of the
label was a decrease in pu, the reduction in pu is indeed smaller in a less
competitive environment.
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Chapter 2
‘Let the punishment be
proportionate to the offense’:
External monitoring and
internal sanctioning in
joint-liability credit groups1
1This chapter is co-authored with Catherine Guirkinger
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Abstract
Models of joint-liability credit typically involve social sanctions and peer-
monitoring by group members as means to overcome moral-hazard prob-
lems. Interestingly, in practice joint-liability credit often also involves
monitoring by the lender (which is usually depicted as prohibitively ex-
pensive in the theory literature). To investigate the role of external
monitoring, we conduct an experiment in which we increased external
monitoring in existing joint-liability credit groups for agricultural credit
in Burkina Faso where the key incentive problem is ex-ante moral hazard.
We find that external monitoring crowds out internal monitoring by the
group’s leaders. Because of this substitution, the overall probability to
be monitored is not affected. Despite this, sanctioning is affected. The
group moves towards more efficient state-dependent sanctioning. Fur-
thermore, purely internal sanctions are substituted for sanctions that
also involve the external agent. This suggests that internal and external
monitoring are not perfect substitutes. We argue that a key difference
lies in how effectively information from monitoring can be used. Accusing
group members of wrongdoing is costly in these groups and a judgment
by the external agent, based on his own information, can be used more
easily to sanction when needed, and only when needed.
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2.1 Introduction
Microfinance has raised great hopes for poverty alleviation by providing
the poor with the capital necessary to undergo profitable projects. One
of the main elements of the innovating lending technologies of MFIs is
joint-liability, whereby individuals who do not possess the collateral nec-
essary to access a classic credit contract may be offered a joint-liability
contract in a credit group. Group members are then jointly responsi-
ble for each other’s debt. To avoid group default, if one member does
not pay back debt, other members have to pay it for him. In the ab-
sence of formal collateral, joint-liability lending is supposed to rely on
peer-monitoring and social capital to overcome informational problems
such as moral-hazard. First, group members should have incentives to
monitor each other because they bear the cost of each other’s default.
Second, monitoring should be relatively cheap for them because they are
geographically and socially close to each other. Third, group members
can use social sanctions to punish default as they interact with each
others in many different spheres. The key assumptions underlying joint-
liability are thus that this “internal monitoring” is sufficiently cheap, and
that group members can act upon the information they gather to sanc-
tion each other when needed (Stiglitz 1990; Ghatak & Guinnane 1999),
for instance by making use of “social collateral” (Besley & Coate 1995).
If these assumptions hold, the bank should delegate monitoring to
the group instead of engaging in expensive “external monitoring”. Yet,
in practice, joint-liability schemes often involve active external moni-
toring. Chowdhury (2005) gives the example of Grameen bank where
credit officers attend weekly credit meetings, instead of simply having
the group pool the money and directly reimburse him. Likewise, in the
joint-liability groups for agricultural credit we study here, external agents
actively visit individual farmers’ fields to detect moral hazard.
In the literature there is not much attention for the role of exter-
nal monitoring in joint-liability credit and its interactions with internal
monitoring. A notable exception is the theoretical work by Chowdhury
(2005), who shows that some expensive external monitoring can be nec-
essary to crowd-in sufficient levels of cheaper internal monitoring. This
result is driven by strategic complementarity in monitoring efforts: a
group member disciplined by monitoring has greater incentive to moni-
tor his peers because he has more at stake in case they default. To our
knowledge, this question has not been examined empirically.2
2Cason et al. (2012) compare joint-liability with internal monitoring with external
monitoring under individual-liability, but they do not consider external monitoring
under joint-liability.
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In this paper, we explicitly study the effect of external monitoring in
joint-liability through an experiment that randomly increases external
monitoring in some groups. We study groups of cotton farmers in Burk-
ina Faso who take joint-liability loans to acquire inputs for their cotton
production. Farmers have an incentive to deviate these inputs to other
crops and so a key problem in these groups is ex-ante moral hazard.
Both the group’s leaders and external agents already monitor farmers
and our experiment thus tests for the effect of an increased intensity of
the agent’s monitoring.
In contrast with Chowdhury’s theoretical prediction, we find that in-
creased external monitoring crowds out internal monitoring by the lead-
ers. Because of this substitution, the overall probability that a farmer is
monitored does not seem to be affected by our intervention. Nonetheless,
the sanctioning regime changes. The group substitutes purely internal
sanctions for sanctions decided in the presence of the agent. Moreover,
they move to more efficient state-dependent sanctioning, meaning that
they sanction more when defaults are caused by misbehavior and sanc-
tion less when they are not.
Perhaps the most important result is that a substitution of internal
for external monitoring leads to more state-dependency in sanctioning.
While there are multiple explanations for this, we argue, based on quali-
tative evidence, that the most plausible one is that information collected
by the external agent can be used more effectively for sanctioning. There
seems to be a high “cost of accusing” group members of wrongdoing, and
sanctioning only in case of misbehavior implies incurring this cost. In
contrast, when information is collected by the external agent, he can cast
an external judgment that can then be used to sanction when needed,
and only when needed.
Our results thus relate to the literature on the cost of using peer
sanctions. When peer sanctions are costly, they might not be sufficiently
effective for joint-liability to address moral hazard (Ghatak & Guinnane,
1999). As an example in another context, it is well understood that the
possibility of (costly) sanctioning increases cooperation in a public goods
game (Ostrom et al. 1992; Gächter & Fehr 2000), but sanctioning and
cooperation is reduced when allowing counter-punishment (Nikiforakis,
2008) or when groups contain many people prone to retaliate (Ones &
Putterman, 2007). Our results suggest a way to make peer sanctions
more acceptable and less costly: objectifying the sanctions by providing
external information.
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2.2 Data and experimental design
We collected first-hand data on 890 cotton farmers in 40 villages in the
area of Houndé in the South-West of Burkina Faso.3 These farmers
belong to 71 different joint-liability credit groups. In each group we
interviewed 13 randomly chosen farmers (or all group members if the
group has at most 13 members). Additionally, we interviewed the group’s
leaders (secretary and president). From the leaders we elicited the list of
all defaults (including of non-interviewed farmers) in their group based
on their bookkeeping records. Table 2.1 shows some descriptive statistics
about the farmers.
We collected two rounds of data (in 2013 and 2014), at the end
of the agricultural season just following harvests. Five of the original
890 households were not found during the second round and were not
interviewed again. The experiment took place in 2013 and we mainly
focus on outcomes of the 2013 campaign.4
Our experiment consisted in increasing the level of external moni-
toring in a random sample of credit groups. Randomization was done
at the village level with 20 monitored villages and 20 control villages.
In a monitored village all interviewed groups were monitored while in
a control village no groups were monitored. In these villages we ran-
domly selected the groups to be interviewed, and the sample consists of
31 monitored groups and 40 control groups. 5
The monitoring treatment involved an increase in monitoring by the
extension agent who is in charge of the group. As we extensively discuss
below, extension agents are involved in group monitoring already and
our intervention thus serves to increase the intensity of this monitoring.
Specifically, in treatment groups the agent was instructed to visit the
group every 10 days for three months, from the middle to the end of the
campaign. The intervention came as a surprise, both for agents and for
farmers. At every visit, he had to visit the fields of two farmers of the
group and to record some information (status of the crop, status of the
3The data collection was part of a research project, funded by USAID, to evaluate
a new insurance for these cotton farmers.
4Some information relative to the 2013 campaign - such as the settlement of
default - was collected in 2014.
5Concretely, in a small village with only one or two groups all groups were in-
terviewed. In a big village (holding at least 3 groups), three groups were chosen
at random in control villages and two groups were chosen at random in monitored
villages. This explains why there are fewer monitored groups than control groups.
Additionally, this implies that treatment is only random conditional on the type of
village (big or small). We control in all regressions for whether the group is in a big
village.
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Mean Sd Median N
Characteristics household head and Household
Age household head 43.61573 12.85161 42 890
Nr. years of education household head 1.204494 2.493362 0 890
Household head has some education .2404494 .4275967 0 890
Nr. years household head 15.5748 11.5828 12 889
Nr. years household head is part of credit group 10.05293 6.35288 10 888
Household head close family of a village leader .2157303 .4115593 0 890
HH size (nr. people at least 6) 8.505618 5.251651 7 890
Consumption proxy (Progress out of Poverty Index, PPI) 36.66854 12.53419 36 890
Self-sufficient in cereal production (last 3 years) .6115023 .487695 1 852
Agricultural production
Cotton area cultivated 2013 3.865618 3.405493 3 890
Cotton yield 2013 826.7994 344.363 800 890
Average cotton yield (2008-2012) 876.7581 255.4646 859.9 851
Cultivated GM cotton 2013 .5505618 .4977166 1 890
Cereal area cultivated 2013 4.512277 3.197328 4 887
Credit for cotton production
Took credit for cotton production 2013 .994382 .0747844 1 890
Total value of cotton production (in CFA) 808247.4 903720.4 520877.5 890
Cotton area for credit 4.049045 3.682221 3 890
Total credit for cotton production (in CFA) 399963 396861.6 275000 877
Defaulted (individual default) .1254276 .3313921 0 877
At risk of default (reduction of 1 sd in yield leads to default) .2827822 .4506084 0 877
Monitoring in credit group
Agent visited field .5112613 .5001549 1 888
Agent measured field .3617978 .4807909 0 890
President visited field .4208543 .4940066 0 796
President measured field .1559748 .3630599 0 795
President or agent visited field .7166247 .4509211 1 794
President or agent measured field .4402516 .4967298 0 795
Sample sizes differ across variables. Out of the 890 farmers interviewed, 38 were in newly formed households and
could not report historical cereal and cotton yields. 13 did not know their credit amount, which is also used to
calculate defaults, although they did know their credit area. Information about leader monitoring was obtained
from the leaders, who were only asked detailed questions for a random subsample of 796 farmers. All other
missing are due to individual farmers not knowing the reply (or not wanting to reply) to a particular question
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics
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field, recommendations given, ...). He could freely choose which farmers
to visit, but needed to visit different farmers every time. In control
groups no such instructions were given.6
The randomization appears to be well-balanced. Since there is no
baseline, we compare treatment and control on characteristics that are
pre-determined, that is, should not be affected by the treatment. Table
2.2 shows differences on measures of agricultural production (cotton area,
cotton yields, cereal area and cotton credit), different characteristics of
the household and its head as well as measures of household wealth
and food security. In this setting, measures of agricultural production
and credit are important and we see no significant differences on these
measures. The characteristics of the household heads are also similar
across control and treatment villages. The only significant differences we
can find are whether the household owns a motorbike and whether the
household was self-sufficient in cereal production for the last 3 years, that
is, produced enough cereals for its own consumption every year. Because
of these differences we also show different measures of wealth and food
security and find no other significant differences: Overall, treated farmers
appear slightly less food secure, while it is unclear whether treated are
wealthier or not. In any case, we control in all regressions for these
systematic differences.7
2.3 Functioning of cotton credit groups
Group structure
In Burkina Faso, cotton producers are typically organized in groups that
receive joint-liability loans, pool their input purchases and jointly sell
their cotton to the local parastatal cotton company that enjoys a com-
plete monopsony. These groups consist of 8 to 79 producers (34 on
6Note, however, that the agents who monitor treated groups might also be in
charge of some control groups. Since the monitoring intervention increases the work-
load of these agents, they might thus have reduced monitoring in the control groups.
Nonetheless, we believe that, if it exists, this effect is small. Agents were typically
asked to monitor (on average) 3 groups out of the 30 groups they follow, or 10%. The
workload for monitoring 3 groups was about 1 day every 10 days, that is, also 10% of
their total time available. While agents do not spend all their time visiting groups,
the total time required for the additional monitoring thus seems quite limited. Any
reduction in monitoring in the control groups should thus be small.
7Note that the variable “Self-sufficient in cereal production” is missing for 38
households. This is because these are newly formed households who have just started
their agricultural production and for whom this variable is undefined. We use these
households and additionally systematically control for this control being missing, that
is, for whether households are new.
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Control sd Diff: T - C se N
Characteristics household head and households
Age household head 44.16 (12.72) -0.437 (1.362) 890
Nr. years of education household head 1.000 (2.379) 0.237 (0.252) 890
Household head has some education 0.210 (0.413) 0.0508 (0.0496) 890
Nr. years household head 16.33 (11.86) -0.236 (0.897) 889
Nr. years household head is part of credit group 10.05 (6.512) -0.392 (0.641) 888
HH size (nr. people at least 6) 9.055 (5.422) -0.828 (0.519) 890
Wealth and food security HH
HH has television 0.209 (0.517) 0.0297 (0.0441) 890
HH has bed 0.647 (1.458) -0.0686 (0.136) 890
HH has moto 0.857 (1.195) -0.194∗∗ (0.0905) 890
HH has house with solid walls 0.105 (0.354) 0.0349 (0.0503) 890
Consumption proxy (PPI index) 37.35 (12.30) -0.380 (1.480) 890
Self-sufficient in cereal production (last 3 years) 0.632 (0.477) -0.0936∗ (0.0509) 852
Somebody reduced meal last year 0.186 (0.393) 0.0243 (0.0313) 890
Somebody skipped meal last year 0.104 (0.291) 0.0187 (0.0244) 890
Agricultural production
Cotton area cultivated 2013 3.798 (3.505) -0.218 (0.511) 890
Average cotton yield (2008-2012) 873.9 (260.9) -21.70 (31.83) 851
Cultivated GM cotton 2013 0.722 (0.498) 0.00686 (0.105) 890
Cereal area cultivated 2013 4.294 (3.126) -0.114 (0.362) 887
Credit for cotton production
Cotton area for credit 3.898 (3.764) -0.246 (0.548) 890
Total credit for cotton production (in CFA) 409708.9 (424258.6) -50054.6 (59749.1) 877
Sample sizes differ across variables. Out of the 890 farmers interviewed, 38 were in newly formed households and could not
report historical cereal and cotton yields. 13 did not know their credit amount, which is also used to calculate defaults,
although they did know their credit area. Information about leader monitoring was obtained from the leaders, who were
only asked detailed questions for a random subsample of 796 farmers. All other missing are due to individual farmers not
knowing the reply (or not wanting to reply) to a particular question
Table 2.2: Table of balance using pre-determined characteristics
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average in our sample) living in the same village. Some villages in our
area of study (32%) only count one group, the majority contains at most
3 groups (58%) but other, typically larger villages have multiple groups
(up to 12 in our sample).
Groups are headed by a president and a secretary. The president is
usually a respected elderly while the secretary is often the most educated
member of the group. These leaders are the group representatives and
spokesmen in front of the cotton company and they are in charge of
the group administration. In particular they supervise the admission of
new members, they control bookkeeping and manage the group’s loan.
They organize at least two plenary meetings per year. During the first
meeting they collect and discuss each producer’s credit demand in order
to prepare the group’s collective loan and input demand while during the
second meeting they distribute the cotton revenue and settle problems
of individual default.
Credit contracts
The group loans are granted by a bank in close relationship with the
cotton company. The loans are disbursed exclusively in kind, in the
form of cotton inputs delivered by the cotton company (seeds, fertilizers,
herbicides and pesticides). Loan sizes are proportional to cotton area:
the cotton company offers a standardized package of input per hectare
that largely determines loan size, though groups have the possibility
to give (some) members less than this standardized package. The loan
represents, on average, about 40% of gross cotton revenue.
The group loans are collateralized by the group’s future cotton pro-
duction. The joint-liability clause is strictly enforced since the cotton
company pays the group’s cotton revenue directly to the group’s bank
account and the group only has access to the revenue net of the group’s
debt.
The credit contract with the bank stipulates that group defaults are
sanctioned by the group’s exclusion from future loans, which would im-
ply that farmers would de facto be excluded from cotton production
(except if they are accepted in another group). Group defaults are in
fact extremely rare and in practice not immediately sanctioned by ex-
clusion. Defaulting groups are often offered “a second chance” and are
carefully monitored by the local agent of the cotton company. For in-
stance, one group in default in the study area was temporarily denied a
loan, after which they were required to follow a strict plan to reimburse
the outstanding debt.
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Individual default and moral hazard
While the group level default rate is very low, there are frequently indi-
vidual defaults, whereby the value of the cotton produced of one farmer
is lower than his share of the group loan.8 In our sample 12.5% of farm-
ers are in this situation following the 2013 campaign (which was not
particularly bad).
The high rate of individual default is in part related to the variability
of cotton yields in the context of the Soudano-Sahelian climate charac-
terized by erratic rains and very variable levels of pest infestation. In
fact when queried about the causes of all defaults they had dealt with
over the last year, group leaders reported that 13% of them were related
to either an excess or a deficit of rain. (See Table 2.10 in the Appendix
for an overview of the causes of default).
However, the most commonly mentioned reasons for default are re-
lated to elements under a farmer’s control, namely labour and chemical
inputs. Farmers do not have access to credit for their other crops (princi-
pally cereals) and have an incentive to use a part of each of their chemical
inputs (fertilizers, herbicides and pesticides) on these crops. The inputs
obtained through the cotton loan are also sometimes sold on the market,
but this is much less pervasive than diverting them to other crops. Di-
version of labour, where farmers are suspected to neglect working their
cotton field to the benefit of other crops, is also important. In fact,
"did not work enough" is cited twice as often (22% of cases) as "did not
use enough inputs" as cause of default. Overall, ex-ante moral hazard
appears to be a pervasive feature of these cotton loans.9
Sanctions
In a situation of individual default, the group total cotton revenue cov-
ers the individual defaulter’s deficit and it is the responsibility of the
group (and in particular of its leaders) to decide how the defaulter reim-
8Note that this definition implies that a farmer can default even when he uses
another source of income to reimburse the loan. We define defaults in this way
because any credit that is reimbursed using non-cotton revenue is still a concern for
the group. As we discuss below, having to reimbursing the credit immediately (using
another source of income) is generally considered as a sanction and imposing it can
create tensions in the group.
9There is very limited scope for ex-post moral hazard in this scheme, whereby
farmers would fail to reimburse their loan despite having produced sufficient amounts
of cotton. They could in principle do this by engaging in pirate sales, but this is
complicated by the fact that the cotton company is the only purchaser of cotton.
While such pirate sales do exist in the cotton systems of other countries, farmers say
it does not happen and leaders do not report it as a cause of default.
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Mean Sd Median N
Defaulters
Reimbursed immediately .3489583 .4778869 0 192
Change in credit for cotton production (in CFA) -49836.24 211133.1 -10200 59
Change in cotton area for credit -.1984127 1.389882 0 63
Abandoned cotton .0634921 .2458045 0 63
Non-defaulters
Change in credit for cotton production (in CFA) 10471.73 256540.5 7240 435
Change in cotton area for credit .100907 2.242353 0 441
Abandoned cotton .0612245 .2400139 0 441
Different samples are used for defaulters. The 192 observations come from the leader interview
covering all defaults. 63 of these defaulters were surveyed. Both for defaulters and non-defaulters
there are fewer observations on credit amount than on credit area because some respondents did
not know their exact credit amount
Table 2.3: Consequences of default in control groups
burses his debt towards other group members and to enforce this decision.
One sanction (applied in 34% of cases) is to request immediate repay-
ment which the defaulter typically finances by selling cereals or animals.
Sometimes the defaulter is given until the next harvest to pay back his
debt (without additional interest or financial penalties for the year of
delay), in which case group members who paid the deficit are penalized.
In some cases only part of the group covers the debt, typically producers
who are very close to the defaulter.
Another common sanction is to reduce the farmer’s loan size in the
year following default. Usually, this is done by reducing the cotton area,
though another option is to reduce the loan size per hectare cultivated.
Table 2.3 shows that, following the 2013 campaign, the credit area and
credit size decreased for defaulter while it slightly increased for other
farmers. Decisions on loan size and cotton area are taken during a group
meeting to which the agent of the cotton company is taking part. At
this meeting members declare which area of cotton they would like to
cultivate (and thus finance) and the group either validates or opposes the
demand. In practice, it is mainly the leaders and the agent who intervene
to limit members’ cotton area. In extreme cases, an individual can be
permanently or temporarily excluded from the credit group. However,
this is a sanction that is used only very rarely. In fact, there is about
the same proportion of defaulters and non-defaulters that stopped doing
cotton in 2014 in the control, suggesting it was not used as a sanction
for default.
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Leaders as well as group members’ interviews suggest that the man-
agement of default is the most challenging aspect of cotton production.
Applying sanctions is often difficult and individual defaults generate ten-
sions among group members who typically have close social ties. Agents
report that leaders often ask them to intervene at the credit meeting to
reduce someone’s credit because they cannot do it themselves. Inter-
estingly managers of the cotton company also indicate that individual
defaults are a continuous source of concern for them, even when it does
not cause group defaults. The reason is that individual defaults within
joint-liability credit groups may discourage investment in cotton pro-
duction as they decrease its profitability (and increase the variability),
in particular for “good producers” who are never defaulting.
Information and monitoring
The literature on joint-liability credit suggests that peer monitoring
should limit opportunistic behavior such as ex-ante moral hazard. At
first sight monitoring may appear particularly easy in the context of
cotton groups. First, group members all produce cotton and thus have
first-hand knowledge that should help them gauge the state of a crop
or detect under-application of inputs. Second, farmers live close to each
other and should therefore be able to visit each other’s field at low cost.
Direct peer-monitoring is however less widespread than we expected. It
appears difficult for a regular group member to make a courtesy visit to
a peer’s field, as those visits are perceived as intrusive. Our information
on field visits in the control group in 2014 indicate that only 33% of
farmers received a visit of any of their (non-leader) peers in their cotton
field.10
In contrast, the president and secretary are actively engaged in moni-
toring: in the control group and in the same year 59% of sampled farmers
have received the visit of a group leader. When visiting a field they al-
ways inspect the field, and often also measure its area. These two forms
of monitoring allow to detect different forms of input diversion. Inspect-
ing the field allows to detect under application of inputs on a given area
while measuring can detect a reduction in cotton area, which also frees
up inputs to apply on other crops. During interviews leaders indicate
that field visits help them dealing with defaulting farmers as it enables
10Qualitative information suggests that also sanctioning is mainly the responsi-
bility of the leaders. Nonetheless, there is some peer monitoring and it would be
interesting to also investigate the effect of the intervention on peer monitoring and
sanctioning. We can not do this because we did not collect data on peer monitoring
in 2013, the year in which the intervention was implemented.
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them identify the cause of default. However, even leaders do not feel
that their visits are welcome. Some of them mentioned that a strong
suspicion of default is necessary to justify a field visit. They explained
that the visits may offend the farmer who will interpret it as a sign that
the leader does not trust him anymore. Other leaders visit every farmer
in the group exactly once per campaign to avoid casting blame on anyone
in particular.
The cotton company also engages in direct monitoring of individual
farmers. Local extension agents of the cotton company (ATC) not only
meet with the group leaders but also visit and measure some farmers’
fields during the cotton campaign. Overall, over the campaign, extension
agents visit on average 37% of group members and measure the visited
fields of 24% of farmers, in line with the recommendation of the cotton
company. These visits have several objectives. They enable agents to
detect cases of credit diversion and also to adapt their global recommen-
dation in terms of pest management to the state of the crop. Cotton
agents thus engage in relatively costly monitoring. Managers of the cot-
ton company perceive this follow-up as necessary and feel that in its
absence there would be too many internal problems, eventually reduc-
ing cotton production. They are in fact steadily increasing the level of
monitoring: In the near future they aim at measuring every cotton field
every single year and to collect data on individual farmers, rather than
groups, to make a more individualized follow-up possible.
In our area of study, agents and group leaders are generally on good
terms. Leaders and group members show a lot of respect for the agent,
possibly because next to being credit officer he is also an extension agent.
While the agent is not a member of the rural community he works in,
he lives in a nearby village and leaders often go and talk to him about
practical matters or problems in managing the group. Both the agents
and the leaders speak of themselves as “jointly” managing the group.
In the specific case of our monitoring intervention, some agents for in-
stance mention they choose which farmers to visit together with the
leaders. This might stem from the fact that their incentives are quite
well aligned: Both see it as their goal to avoid defaults and conflicts in
the group. The agent additionally tries to maximize cotton production
(which determines the company’s profits), and so could be somewhat
tougher on input diversion. Nonetheless, both agents and leaders agree
that limited amounts of input diversion are acceptable and see it as their
goal to prevent excessive moral hazard.11
11The incentives of the extension agent are thus also quite similar to the incentives
of a typical credit officer. A credit officer should care about loan repayment and about
45
ESSAYS IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
2.4 Results
In this section, we present the impacts of the monitoring intervention.
All results are estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered at the
village level and controls for unbalanced characteristics.12
Field visits and measurements
Table 2.4 presents the impacts of the intervention on the probability that
a farmer’s field is visited or measured by the agent (columns (1) and
(2)), by the leader (columns (3) and (4)) or by either one or the other
(columns (5) and (6)). First, in line with the experimental design, agents’
visits are more frequent in treatment villages: the share of farmers who
received a visit of the extension agent over the campaign increases by
15.9 percentage points. Agents also increased field measurements by 13.6
percentage points. While this was not part of the experimental design, it
is not surprising that they took the opportunity of a monitoring visit to
measure the farmer’s cotton field. Indeed, the cotton company requests
that they measure a given number of fields over the campaign.
Second, leaders substantially reduced their visits and field measure-
ments, in almost the same proportion as agents increased monitoring:
leaders reduced their visits by 17.3 percentage points and their measure-
ments by 13.1 percentage points. External monitoring thus seems to
substitute for internal monitoring by the leaders. In fact, there is no
change in the overall probability to receive a field visit or measurement
by either the agent or a leader.
While the overall probability to be monitored has not changed, the
intervention may have changed the composition of the pool of farmers
who are visited. To explore this possibility, in Table 2.5 we compare the
characteristics of monitored farmers in control and in treatment villages.
Columns (1) and (2) suggest that farmers monitored by the agent are
slightly smaller (in terms of area cultivated) and less productive in treat-
ment villages, even though the differences are not statistically significant.
In any case, farmers monitored by either the agent or leader have similar
increasing credit sizes when possible. For the agent, avoiding problems in the group is
a way to ensure (long term) loan repayment of the group as well as to increase credit
area (loan sizes). The difference with a credit officer is that the agent has an interest
in increasing expected yields beyond levels at which default becomes impossible.
12Given the limited number of clusters, we have also done all these regressions
using wild bootstrap with the same level of clustering. This does not affect the results.
Additionally, since we sample 13 farmers in each group, the sampling probability of
an individual depends on the size of the group. For this reason, we control for the
group size in all regressions. (See Solon et al. (2015) for a discussion)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Agent Agent Leader Leader Agent or Agent or leader
visit measurement Visit measurement leader visit measurement
Monitored 0.159∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗ -0.173∗ -0.131∗∗ 0.0327 0.0378
(0.0566) (0.0558) (0.0982) (0.0635) (0.0556) (0.0700)
Constant 0.528∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗ 0.150∗ 0.644∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗
(0.0828) (0.0755) (0.125) (0.0871) (0.0614) (0.0931)
N 888 890 796 795 794 795
Standard errors, clustered at the village level, in parentheses. Regressions control for unbalanced charac-
teristics: Whether the HH has a moto, is self-sufficient in cereal production (last 3 years) and is a newly
formed HH. There are fewer observations about leader monitoring because this information comes from
the leader interview, who were asked only about a random subset of interviewed farmers. Other differences
in sample sizes are because of respondents not knowing the answer. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2.4: Effect of the experiment on external and internal monitoring
characteristics in treatment and control villages (columns (5) and (6))
and the frequency of default, risk of default and causes of default are
also similar for monitored farmers across treatment and control villages.
Taken together these results indicate that the intervention does not
increase the probability of a field visit or measurement (by either a leader
or an agent) nor does it affect the type of farmers that are visited. Mon-
itoring is however more likely to be undertaken by the agent rather than
by the president and we now investigate how this substitution of internal
for more external monitoring changes production and credit outcomes.
Production and default
Table 2.6 presents the impacts of the intervention on farmers’ production,
default, default risk and type of default in the year of the intervention.
As detailed above, the monitoring intervention came as a surprise half-
way the agricultural campaign at which point many input decisions were
already made (inputs purchased and part of them applied). Actual visits
then happened until the end of the campaign at which point almost all
decisions were made. The results in Table 2.6 confirm that the inter-
vention has no significant effects on farmer’s production behavior. Both
cotton yields and the probability that a farmer defaults - meaning that
his cotton revenue is smaller than his debt - are remarkably similar in
treatment and in control groups (columns (1) and (2)). Likewise, the
same proportion of farmers is at risk of default in both groups (a farmer
is defined to be at risk of default if a one standard deviation reduction
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Agent Leader Agent or
visited visited leader visited
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
C T-C (se) C T-C (se) C T-C (se)
Characteristics household head and HH
Age household head 42.90 -0.88 (1.56) 42.89 -0.16 (2.05) 42.67 -0.35 (1.47)
Nr. years of education household head 1.70 -0.12 (0.28) 1.17 0.03 (0.21) 1.47 0.21 (0.22)
Household head has some education 0.29 0.01 (0.05) 0.20 0.04 (0.05) 0.26 0.07 (0.05)
Nr. years household head 16.43 -0.83 (1.20) 18.25 0.34 (1.25) 16.91 -0.44 (0.96)
Nr. years household head is part of credit group 10.73 -0.50 (0.70) 8.82 0.16 (0.69) 9.62 0.03 (0.64)
HH size (nr. people at least 6) 8.70 -0.24 (0.56) 8.81 -1.30** (0.51) 8.09 -0.35 (0.51)
Wealth and food security HH
HH has television 0.16 -0.01 (0.05) 0.09 0.06 (0.05) 0.10 0.07* (0.04)
HH has bed 0.68 -0.02 (0.14) 0.40 -0.04 (0.16) 0.43 0.00 (0.12)
HH has moto -0.00 0.00 (0.00) -0.00 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 0.00 (0.00)
HH has house with solid walls 0.11 0.01 (0.05) 0.11 0.04 (0.08) 0.10 0.04 (0.05)
Consumption proxy (PPI index) 33.63 -0.59 (1.56) 33.25 0.58 (1.71) 32.51 0.64 (1.36)
Self-sufficient in cereal production (last 3 years) 0.00 -0.00 (0.00) 0.00 -0.00 (0.00) 0.00 -0.00 (0.00)
Somebody reduced meal last year 0.30 -0.01 (0.03) 0.39 -0.05 (0.04) 0.37 -0.02 (0.03)
Somebody skipped meal last year 0.18 -0.02 (0.03) 0.24 -0.02 (0.03) 0.23 -0.02 (0.02)
Agricultural production
Cotton area cultivated 2013 4.87 -0.61 (0.58) 3.16 0.08 (0.57) 3.78 0.08 (0.56)
Average cotton yield (2008-2012) 778.84 -31.75 ( 39.12) 851.70 -16.59 ( 39.64) 803.40 -16.82 ( 35.38)
Cultivated GM cotton 2013 0.75 -0.10 (0.12) 0.63 0.05 (0.11) 0.66 -0.01 (0.11)
Cereal area cultivated 2013 4.70 -0.05 (0.43) 3.44 0.19 (0.37) 3.91 0.27 (0.41)
Credit for cotton production
Cotton area for credit 4.35 -0.48 (0.65) 3.26 -0.12 (0.65) 3.54 0.10 (0.61)
Total credit for cotton production (in CFA) 436352 -84751 ( 66171) 340852 -13887 ( 69825) 354540 -22406 ( 64381)
Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
Table 2.5: Characteristics of monitored individuals
in his yield would have led to default).13 Finally, defaults have the same
probability to be caused by elements under a farmer’s control (columns
(4) to (6)). To construct the dependent variables of these last three re-
gressions, we use the leaders’ descriptions of the causes of default for all
310 defaults in our sample14 and call “own fault” defaults that might have
been avoided if the farmer had invested more time, attention or inputs
to its cotton production. Because this classification is disputable for sev-
eral causes of default, we construct three measures that are increasingly
stringent (70% of defaults are labeled “own fault” with the first defini-
tion, 42% with the second and 34% with the third). Table 2.10 in the
Appendix presents the frequency of each cause and their classification
using the three definitions.15
13Here, a one standard deviation reduction is based on estimates of farmers’ in-
dividual yield distribution, assuming farmers have different expected yields but the
same variance in yields.
14We exclude from these regressions defaults by the leaders since they are reporting
about the causes of their own defaults.
15In the Appendix we also compare the characteristics of people defaulting (Table
2.13) and of people defaulting because of their own fault (Table 2.15) across control
and treatment. They are very similar, again suggesting no change in behavior.
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Yield Default At risk Own fault Own fault Own fault
(kg/ha) of default (alt def 1) (alt def 2)
Monitored 6.321 -0.0293 -0.0134 0.0314 0.0218 0.0937
(40.07) (0.0277) (0.0459) (0.102) (0.0965) (0.0909)
Constant 736.8∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.415∗∗∗ 0.708∗∗∗ 0.438∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗
(57.27) (0.0473) (0.0704) (0.0901) (0.0923) (0.0731)
N 890 877 877 310 310 310
Standard errors, clustered at the village level, in parentheses. Regressions control for unbalanced
characteristics: Whether the HH has a moto, is self-sufficient in cereal production (last 3 years)
and is a newly formed HH. The measures own fault are only defined for the 310 defaulting farmers.
There are fewer observations for defaults than for yields because some farmers did not know their
exact credit amount.
Table 2.6: Effect of external monitoring on yields, defaults and behaviour
These estimates are however not sufficiently precise to rule out small
changes in behavior. For instance, the 95% confidence interval of the
effect on cotton yields ranges from -74 to 87 kg/ha. With an average
cotton yield of 736 kg/ha we can only reject a reduction or increase of
more than 10% in yields. We can thus only exclude that the intervention
had a large effect on moral hazard in the year of the intervention. More-
over, it may also affect moral hazard in the longer run, but we are not in
a position to investigate these effects. We now turn to the impact of the
increase of external monitoring on the settling of individual defaults.
Sanctioning of individual defaults
To investigate the consequences of defaults we focus on two subsam-
ples of defaulters: the sample of all farmers whose cotton revenue was
smaller than their debt in the control and treatment groups (309 farm-
ers) and the subsample of them who were part of our surveyed sample
(112 farmers). Information for the first sample is provided exclusively
by the leaders’ interviews. The advantage of using the second subsample
is that we also know how much credit they obtained the year following
the intervention. Clearly, both samples contain only defaulters and are
thus selected samples. We discuss the implications of this at the end of
this section.
In Panel A of Table 2.7 we see that, following a default, monitored
groups less frequently require the farmer to reimburse the debt immedi-
ately (as opposed to paying the debt with the next years’ cotton revenue):
the share of defaulters who repay immediately decreases by about 18 per-
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centage points from 40% in the control group to 22% in the treatment
group (column (1)). At the same time, there is a reduction in credit
sizes following default. Column (2) reports the change in credit area and
column (3) the change in credit size between the year of the intervention
and the following year. For defaulters, cotton area financed by credit
goes down by 0.5 hectare more in the treatment area. Credit amounts
decrease proportionally although the change is non-significant. As de-
tailed above, credit sizes are quite standardized per hectare financed and
so credit area and credit amount both capture credit size. In addition,
credit area is the more salient and less noisy measure of credit and a
significant reduction suggests that there is a reduction in credit for de-
faulters. Finally, stopping to do cotton is a very drastic change that
does not happen frequently. We see an increase in the probability to
stop, which is consistent with a reduction in credit, but we do not have
enough power to detect reasonably sized effects and will largely disregard
the effects on stopping throughout the paper.
An interesting contrast emerges when we investigate the correlation
between the type of sanction applied and the causes of defaults (Ta-
ble 5, Panel B). Results indicate that sanctioning becomes more state-
dependent, that is, become more dependent on whether or not the default
is related to elements under the farmer’s control.16 Column (1) indicates
that within monitored groups, the reduction in reimbursing immediately
is concentrated on defaults that are not classified as “own fault”. They
become 33 percentage points less likely to be sanctioned by immediate
reimbursement. This effect is significantly smaller for defaults classified
as “own fault”. Even if those farmers see a small reduction in reimbursing
immediately, this effect is far from significant. Similarly, the reduction
in credit seems to be mainly concentrated on people defaulting because
of their own fault (significant for credit amount, not significant for credit
area). The coefficient on stopping is again estimated too imprecisely to
draw conclusions. Tables 2.11 and 2.12 in the appendix confirm that
these results generally hold for the three classifications of defaults intro-
duced above.
In short, farmers who are responsible for their default are punished
more harshly in treatment villages: they only see a small (non-significant)
reduction in reimbursing immediately, but they are significantly more
likely to experience a reduction in their loan size (than similar farmers
16A possible problem with using a measure like “own fault” is ex-post rationaliza-
tion, in this case the possibility that the answer about whether or not the default was
the farmers’ own fault depends on the sanction that has been given. Nonetheless, for
this to explain these heterogeneous effects there would need to be differential ex-post
rationalization in control and treatment, which seems unlikely.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reimbursed Credit area Credit amount Stopped
Immediately (Change) (Change) (Year 2)
Panel A: Effect of monitoring on sanctioning
Monitored -0.185∗∗ -0.527∗ -19461.2 0.0688
(0.0787) (0.290) (31609.9) (0.0437)
Constant 0.406∗∗∗ -0.357 -91299.9 0.151∗
(0.106) (0.395) (79009.4) (0.0869)
Panel B: Effect of monitoring on state-dependent sanctioning
Monitored -0.339∗∗∗ -0.0952 89704.4 0.105∗∗
(0.114) (0.505) (58850.7) (0.0473)
Own fault -0.135 0.348 134988.3∗∗ 0.134∗∗
(0.130) (0.336) (63530.6) (0.0506)
Monitored X Own fault 0.233∗ -0.684 -172299.9∗∗∗ -0.0643
(0.136) (0.598) (59942.8) (0.0907)
Constant 0.487∗∗∗ -0.517 -170010.0 0.0431
(0.151) (0.553) (111489.1) (0.0848)
N 309 112 108 112
Standard errors, clustered at the village level, in parentheses. Regressions control for unbalanced
characteristics: Whether the HH has a moto, is self-sufficient in cereal production (last 3 years)
and is a newly formed HH. Reimbursed immediately is defined for all defaulting households, credit
measures only for the surveyed ones. Defaults of leaders are excluded from these regressions because
these leaders provided themselves the information on the cause of default. Different samples are
used for defaulters. The 309 observations come from the leader interview covering all defaults. 112
of these defaulters were surveyed. There are fewer observations on credit amount than on credit
area because some respondents did not know their exact credit amount ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2.7: Effect of increased external monitoring on sanctioning
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in control villages). In contrast, defaults for elements beyond farmers’
control are handled more leniently in treatment villages, leading less of-
ten to immediate repayment (while getting the same treatment in terms
of credit). The aggregated effect is thus an increase in state-dependency
and a shift in the type of sanction used: overall, imposing immediate
repayment is less frequent in treatment villages while reducing loan size
is more frequent.
The discussion has largely taken all results as causal, but there are
several potential identification problems. First, there may be a selection
problem since these regressions only involves farmers who defaulted. De-
faulters could be different in treatment and control because the interven-
tion could affect moral hazard, for instance because farmers anticipate
a change in sanctioning. However, we have argued above that the inter-
vention came largely as a surprise and left little time to change behavior.
Additionally, the effects we presented on moral hazard show point esti-
mates, though estimated imprecisely, that are very close to zero (Table
2.6). In Table 2.13 in the Appendix we also compare the characteristics
of defaulters in control and treatment and argued that they are very
similar. These results suggest that there is not much differential selec-
tion between control and treatment and we believe that we do identify
a causal effect of the monitoring on sanctioning for the subsample of
people who actually defaulted.17
The second implicit causal claim concerns state-dependency of sanc-
tioning (farmers are sanctioned differently because they misbehave). Here,
there are two potential problems. First, the treatment could have af-
fected the selection of who defaults because of misbehavior (or who is
classified as such). Again, moral hazard does not seem to be affected by
the treatment and additionally people defaulting because of their own
fault are quite similar in control and treatment (see Table 2.15 in the
Appendix). The second problem is that, while the monitoring is random-
ized, “own fault” is not. So, these heterogeneous effects can be generated
by any variable that (1) is correlated with “own fault” and (2) causes
heterogeneous effects in sanctioning as a result of treatment.18 While
17Since we are interested in sanctioning following default, this is the natural sub-
sample. We cannot rule out however that non-defaulters would have been affected
differently, had they defaulted.
18Consider this illustrative example. Suppose that educated farmers are more likely
both to divert inputs and to challenge the information collected by the group leader in
their field (which is used to decide of the sanction). They cannot however challenge
the information collected by the external agent, and thus the sanctioning regime
would change for them as a result of the intervention. In that case the interaction
terms in Table 5 would capture the heterogenous effect of education and not (strictly)
that of “own fault”. To control for this, we need to control for the interaction between
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there are many reasons to believe that those who default for reasons un-
der their control should be systematically different from other defaulters,
Table 2.16 in the Appendix suggests that these two groups are very sim-
ilar. Additionally, when we control for all observable differences, the
results remain very similar (Table 2.17 in the appendix). If we are will-
ing to accept that the observed similarity of these different subgroups
suggests that they are similar on unobservables, our results suggest a
causal effect of the intervention on state-dependency of sanctioning.
Future loans
The results above suggest that the intervention affects credit outcomes
for farmers who default on their loan. We now explore whether exter-
nal monitoring also changes other group members’ access to or demand
for credit. Several mechanisms may trigger a change in credit demand
and supply for individual group members. First, opportunistic behavior
might be sanctioned even if it did not lead to default. Second, the fear
of future sanctioning of opportunistic behavior may decrease credit de-
mand for farmers who planned to divert inputs. Finally, some farmers
may increase their credit demand if they believe that moral-hazard has
effectively decreased so that the probability that their revenue will serve
to reimburse other members’ debt has decreased.
Table 2.8 reports the impacts of the intervention for credit sizes for
all surveyed group members. In Panel A we see that there is an over-
all reduction in credit sizes in treatment villages. Compared to control
farmers, treated farmers decrease by an additional 0.27 hectare their
cotton area relative to the previous year. The distinction between de-
faulters and non-defaulters (Panel B) suggests that in monitored villages
non-defaulters also decrease their credit area but to a lesser extent than
defaulting farmers (non-significant).
As suggested above, both supply and demand factors may explain the
decrease in credit sizes. On the one hand, the group (or the leader helped
by the extension agent) may now be stricter with farmers suspected to
divert inputs away from cotton production. On the other hand, expec-
tations of increased monitoring by the extension agent in the future may
discourage input diversion and thereby decrease credit demand. To inves-
tigate these two possibilities we use a series of questions that help identify
whether farmers faced a binding supply constraint. These questions were
asked after the plenary meeting where farmers had introduced their new
loan demands. Specifically we ask respondents 1) whether they would
education and the treatment as we do in Table 2.17 in the Appendix.
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(1) (2) (3)
Credit area Credit amount Stopped
(Change) (Change) (Year 2)
Panel A: Effect of monitoring on credit size
Monitored -0.275∗ -5734.9 0.0144
(0.162) (20063.1) (0.0266)
Constant 0.401 13645.7 0.0905∗
(0.285) (25320.8) (0.0514)
Panel B: Effect of monitoring on credit size, by
defaulting status
Monitored -0.294∗ -6968.5 0.0197
(0.158) (21104.1) (0.0234)
Defaulted -0.408 -115009.4∗∗ 0.0817
(0.334) (55069.8) (0.0561)
Monitored X Defaulted -0.356 -20548.9 -0.0310
(0.443) (66263.2) (0.0726)
Constant 0.442 35471.6 0.0767∗
(0.272) (25440.7) (0.0429)
N 872 872 872
Standard errors, clustered at the village level, in parentheses. Regressions control
for unbalanced characteristics: Whether the HH has a moto, is self-sufficient in
cereal production (last 3 years) and is a newly formed HH. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2.8: Effect of external monitoring on credit sizes
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Defaulters Entire sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Supply Agent opposing Supply Agent opposing
constrained? increase constrained? increase
area? area?
Monitored 0.230∗ 0.203 0.0809 0.0753
(0.129) (0.172) (0.0680) (0.0874)
Constant 0.297∗ 0.667∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗ 0.704∗∗∗
(0.157) (0.245) (0.0913) (0.120)
N 119 45 890 290
Standard errors, clustered at the village level, in parentheses. Regressions control for unbal-
anced characteristics: Whether the HH has a moto, is self-sufficient in cereal production (last
3 years) and is a newly formed HH. Different samples are used for the different regressions.
Columns (2) and (4) are restricted to respondents that are supply constrained in Columns (1)
and (3), respectively. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2.9: Supply of credit
have liked to increase their credit area by one hectare and - if the answer
was negative - 2) whether they would have been allowed to increase their
cotton area by one hectare. We classify as supply constrained both those
who would have liked to increase their credit area by one hectare and
those who could not have increased their area even if they had wanted to
(the only difference is that the second group reveals no excess demand
for credit). For those who would have liked to increase their credit area
by one hectare we additionally asked whether the extension agent had,
or would have, opposed their demand.
The results reported in Table 2.9 indicate that the reduction in credit
sizes among the people defaulting is driven by a reduction in supply of
credit. Furthermore, farmers who were supply constrained are more
likely to blame the extension agent for opposing their demand in mon-
itored villages, suggesting that the agent has been more active in the
credit meetings.
2.5 Discussion
Two main conclusions emerge from our analysis of the impacts of an
increase in external monitoring. First, external monitoring crowds-out
internal monitoring by group leaders. Second both types of monitoring
are not perfect substitutes when it comes to sanctioning defaults: exter-
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nal monitoring appears to faciliate state-dependent sanctioning in case
of default.
In this section, we explore potential mechanisms for these two results
in light of the existing literature on the functioning of joint-liability credit
groups. We then briefly discuss the welfare implications of these changes.
Crowding out of leader monitoring
The first set of results suggests that the group leaders decrease both field
visits and measurements as the extension agent increases his monitoring
efforts. Our fieldwork suggests that agents and leaders acquire the same
type of information from field visits. If monitoring is costly it may thus
not be surprising that leaders would decrease their effort if extension
agents increase theirs. Moreover, as we mentioned before, the leaders and
agent generally have a good relationship and could to a certain extent
coordinate on who needs to be monitored and by whom. However, this
result stands at odds with the predictions of the model of joint-liability
lending with both peer and external monitoring proposed by Chowdhury
(2005), in which external monitoring crowds-in peer monitoring. The
theoretical result is driven by strategic complementarity in monitoring
efforts: a group member disciplined by monitoring has a greater incentive
to monitor his peers because he has more at stake in case they default.
We believe that our experimental design would not allow such strate-
gic complementarities to materialize (if they exist) mainly because the
timing of the intervention prevents large responses in terms of invest-
ment in cotton production and thus could not starkly reduce moral-
hazard. Our results confirm that the intervention has no big effect on
productivity or probability of default. Another notable difference with
Chowdhury’s setting is that we are considering leader monitoring and
not strictly peer-monitoring. While peers could theoretically delegate an
optimal level of monitoring to the president, in practice incentives may
not be perfectly aligned.
External monitoring and internal sanctioning
Our second set of results indicates that there is no perfect substitu-
tion between leaders’ and extension agents’ monitoring efforts: while the
overall probability of being monitored has not changed, defaults are han-
dled differently in treatment villages, where the monitoring is more likely
to have been undertaken by the extension agents. Specifically, sanction-
ing appears more state-dependent in treatment villages, whereby farmers
are sanctioned more severely when they defaulted for reasons under their
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control. Moreover, in aggregate, we observe a move away from imme-
diate repayment (less likely in case of “accidental” default in treatment
villages) towards greater reductions in loan sizes (more likely in case of
“avoidable” defaults in treatment villages).
What can explain this change in sanctioning? We explore two chan-
nels : i) a higher level of expertise of the external agent who is more
competent at identifying the causes of default and ii) an easier use of
the information about the cause of default when it has been collected by
an outsider. These explanations are not mutually exclusive. We argue
however that both our results and qualitative evidence from the field
lend more support to the second explanation.19
External monitoring and the type of information collected
Extension agents are agricultural experts who traveled extensively in the
cotton area in Burkina and have a deep knowledge of cotton production.
One may thus think that their field visits are more informative than a
leader’s field visit and that they are better at detecting input diversion or
predicting yields. If the information on the cause of default is more pre-
cise when stemming from the agent, sanctioning of default may become
more dependent on this information. However it is not clear why mon-
itoring should then have opposite effects on immediate reimbursement
(applied less) versus credit size reduction (applied more).
When we interviewed extension agents, they indicated that they do
not get more information from a field visit than the leader would. They
believe that the group leaders, who are experienced cotton farmers them-
selves, are just as competent at detecting signs of input diversion or lack
of labour application. In addition, the group leaders have the advantage
of knowing the historical record of individual farmers while the rapid
rotation of extension agents makes it very difficult for them to acquire
this knowledge.
External monitoring and the value of information collected
If the extension agent does not learn more from his visit to a given
field than the group leader, the fact that he did the visit (and not the
group leader) seems to make a difference. Specifically, it appears that
this information is easier to use to settle cases of individual default and
19The possibility that the intervention affected the composition of the group of
farmers who are monitored (by either the leader or the external agent) was discussed
in the result section. While we cannot formally rule this possibility out, we find no
indication of such a selection effect.
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to sanction when needed, and only when needed. This explanation is
supported by the qualitative material obtained during our systematic
interviews with group leaders and extension agents.
First, field visits are key to sanction defaults. Group leaders indicated
that blaming specific farmers for not investing enough in their cotton
production is a serious accusation that needs to be substantiated. To
this end, information gathered during a field visit is useful.
Second, using information gathered by agents appears easier than
relying on their own field visit. Revealingly, 77% of leaders said that a
field visit of a leader is necessary to deal with “moral hazardous” behavior
and this number increases to 88% for a visit by the extension agent.
When the agent has conducted a field visit and has reported concrete
facts, group leaders indicate that they can mention these facts when
decisions on sanctioning are taken. In fact, when agents are present
during the meeting (which is the case in the group meeting where loan
sizes are fixed), they can themselves comment on the production of a
given farmers. Our interviews with agents confirmed the importance of
their role in the internal settling of defaults. One agent thus mentioned
that leaders sometimes even ask him to intervene directly to sanction
a member. When doing so he needs to be prudent and motivate the
sanction on objective grounds because otherwise “there will be trouble
in the village the moment I leave”, since farmers will otherwise be well
aware that it was the leaders’ decision to sanction. A field visit could
provide the objective information he needs.
In short our interviews suggest that while the same type of infor-
mation is gathered by leaders and agents during a field visit, an agent
visit has more value when it comes to sanctioning. First it reduces the
cost of “pointing fingers” and second it is less disputable because they
are largely seen as neutral outsiders. This greater value of the agent’s
information can account for our results on state-dependent sanctioning
and also for the aggregate shift towards less immediate repayment and
lower credit size in case of default since the agent is more directly in-
volved with the latter sanction. Indeed the extension agent is present
during the meetings where decisions regarding individual credit sizes are
taken while he is generally absent of the meeting where debts are settled.
In practice, both the agent and the leaders may intervene to oppose a
farmers’ credit demand. In contrast, the decision regarding immediate
repayment is more of an internal affair and, except in exceptional cases
where the default leads to serious conflicts in the group, the agent does
not intervene. Note also that the meeting where credit demands are in-
troduced and discussed preceeds in time the meeting of debt settlement
where decisions regarding debt settlement are taken.
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In the credit groups we study here, the leader and all other group
members are closely linked by social or kinship ties. They live in the same
(small and isolated) village and interact with each other in several other
spheres than cotton production. In this context, it is hardly surprising
that an outsider (the agent) finds it easier to establish wrongdoing of
group members than the leader of the group. In fact, the literature on
joint-liability lending acknowledges that social ties have ambiguous im-
pacts on the overcoming of information asymmetries. On the one hand
they facilitate information flows and provide an opportunity to use so-
cial sanctions. On the other hand they may hinder sanctioning. Wydick
(1999) argues that when group members have strong social ties they may
be less eager to enforce repayment. Hermes et al. (2005) mention that
in joint-liability credit groups, family or friends may be reluctant to use
pressure for fear of losing family or friends. Karlan (2007) and Cassar
et al. (2007) find that the overall effect of social ties on repayment is pos-
itive. In contrast, Ahlin & Townsend (2007) provide some evidence that
social ties negatively affect repayment rates. Unfortunately, the precise
mechanisms through which social ties hinder or facilitate the functioning
of credit groups is not precisely elicited in the existing literature.
Our analysis of credit groups in Burkina Faso suggests that a key ob-
stacle in overcoming ex-ante moral hazard lies in the process of accusing
of wrongdoing. The imposition of harsher sanctions is facilitated when
the wrongdoing is established by an outsider. Otherwise it seems that
all defaults are more likely to be sanctioned in a standardized manner
(without distinguishing between accident and wrongdoing).
Welfare implications
What do our results suggest regarding the performance of these joint-
liability credit groups? The mix of sanctions changes as a consequence
of the monitoring intervention. Immediate repayment becomes less fre-
quent while reduction in credit size is more frequent. Moving away from
immediate reimbursement provides useful insurance for defaulters but
may be costly in the short-run for other group members as it de-facto
delays the full payment of the cotton revenue by at least one year. On
the other hand, decreasing the credit size of past-defaulters, especially in
the case of opportunistic behavior, may increase the net return from cot-
ton production for the group if these farmers are often at risk of default.
The welfare effect of this change in sanctioning regime is thus largely
indeterminate.
In contrast, the move towards more state-dependency in sanctioning
can be expected to have positive welfare implications. First, the ability
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to sanction more harshly wrong-doers who could have avoided to de-
fault should deter such behavior in the future and should thus decrease
the incidence of moral-hazard in the future (provided the intervention
would continue). This would decrease the incidence of default and bene-
fit to the group, both as the financial burden associated with individual
default lessens and as the tensions generated by the handling of these
types of default disappear. Theoretically a decrease in the risk of peer-
default may also increase the willingness to make profitable but risky
investments, which would further increase profit and income of group
members.
Second, the increase in state-dependency in our case also implies
that farmers who experience a negative shock and default for reasons
beyond their control are less likely to be sanctioned. This implies that
risk-sharing across group members de-facto increases. Again this might
increase the willingness to make profitable but risky investments. This
insurance aspect of jont-liability, and its impact on risk-taking has been
studied by Fischer (2013) and Giné et al. (2010) theoretically and using
experimental games. These papers indicate that risk-sharing through
joint-liability does not necessarily benefit all members (relatively risk-
averse borrowers may for example suffer from greater risk-taking by their
peers).
Overall the ability to impose state-dependent sanctioning is expected
to decrease moral-hazard and increase the insurance value of lending
scheme. Quantifying these benefits would require a longer-term inter-
vention to measure its impacts on moral-hazard and risk-taking. This is
outside the scope of the current analysis. The costs, on the other hand,
can be estimated and are relatively small: Implementing the intervention
would require an increase in the interest rate of about 0.23 percentage
points20. Costs are low because these loans are big (they finance the
entire cotton production of the group) and because the intervention is
small, requiring only a visit to some group members. It is thus conceiv-
able that the benefits outweigh the costs.
20We do not have precise information on the exact costs involved, but we can
provide some rough estimates. Agents need to visit each group 8 times. Visiting the
farmers (by motorbike) requires 1 litre of gas (750 CFA). The daily wage, including
maintenance of the motorbike, is about 5000 CFA and an agent can visit 2 groups
per day. The total cost to implement our monitoring intervention for one group is
thus about 26 000 CFA (or 40 Euro). By contrast, the average loan size of the groups
in our sample is about 11.3 million CFA. The cost of the intervention thus represents
an increase of 0.23 percentage points of the interest rate.
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2.6 Conclusion
We have argued that a substitution of internal for external monitoring
leads to more state-dependent sanctioning. Taking these results at face
value, this suggests that external monitoring can be more efficient than
internal monitoring. While it is impossible to do a cost-benefit analysis
comparing these forms of monitoring, this does suggest that external
monitoring in joint-liability groups can be valuable, even when it is more
expensive than internal monitoring. This could thus help to understand
why it is frequently, and increasingly, used in our context as well as in
other credit groups.
We thus make a case for the use of external monitoring in the con-
text of joint-liability loans. A legitimate question is then whether joint-
liability with external monitoring has any advantage over individual li-
ability. After all, if costly external monitoring needs to be implemented
anyway, it could perhaps also be used to overcome the informational
problems in individual liability loans. This is not necessarily the case
since joint-liability also makes use of social capital in sanctioning. Joint-
liability in combination with external monitoring may thus be needed
for group members to be in a position to adequately use these social
sanctions to enforce good behavior. This is all the more important as
high levels of social capital - which make social sanctions possible - are
likely to be positively correlated with high costs of applying punishment.
If our explanation is correct, our results also imply that simply in-
creasing information can not always solve the “informational problem”.
Even if the group leaders were perfectly informed about the actions of
the members, it would not solve moral hazard since they can not act
upon this information. A solution to the problem then requires both
information and a way to use the information, in this case provided by
the actions of the external agent.
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Appendix
Control sd Diff: T - C se N Own fault Own fault Own fault
(alt def 1) (alt def 2)
Did not use enough inputs 0.106 (0.264) 0.102 (0.0753) 310 X X X
Did not work enough 0.235 (0.382) 0.0218 (0.0611) 310 X X X
Area cultivated too small 0.0101 (0.162) -0.0299 (0.0207) 310 X X X
Bad inputs 0.0114 (0.103) -0.0106 (0.00709) 310 X X
Parasites 0.00548 (0.145) -0.0163 (0.0187) 310 X X
Planted late 0.0128 (0.145) -0.0149 (0.0201) 310 X X
Weeds 0.0548 (0.215) -0.0468∗∗ (0.0186) 310 X X
Bad land 0.0697 (0.177) 0.0483 (0.0347) 310 X
Not enough labour available 0.194 (0.403) -0.0181 (0.101) 310 X
Other 0.00915 (0.177) -0.00398 (0.0323) 310 X
Flooding or drought 0.133 (0.425) 0.0215 (0.107) 310
Lost livestock 0.0900 (0.236) -0.0122 (0.0422) 310
Sickness 0.0641 (0.226) -0.0514∗∗∗ (0.0182) 310
Fire 0.00422 (0.0731) 0.0107 (0.0114) 310
Table 2.10: Comparison of causes of default in treatment and control
and definition of own fault variables
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reimbursed Credit area Credit amount Stopped
Immediately (Change) (Change) (Year 2)
Monitored -0.257∗∗ -0.274 10820.5 0.101∗∗
(0.102) (0.369) (38141.5) (0.0461)
Own fault (alt def 1) -0.0656 0.236 145258.0∗∗∗ 0.0870
(0.0796) (0.341) (36763.8) (0.0638)
Monitored X Own fault (alt def 1) 0.182 -0.596 -78943.4 -0.0835
(0.129) (0.570) (53033.9) (0.0943)
Constant 0.424∗∗∗ -0.351 -195948.4∗ 0.100
(0.128) (0.493) (97386.1) (0.0834)
N 309 112 108 112
Standard errors, clustered at the village level, in parentheses. Regressions control for unbalanced
characteristics: Whether the HH has a moto, is self-sufficient in cereal production (last 3 years) and is
a newly formed HH. Reimbursed immediately is defined for all defaulting households, credit measures
only for the surveyed ones. Defaults of leaders are excluded from these regressions because these leaders
provided themselves the information on the cause of default. Different samples are used for defaulters.
The 309 observations come from the leader interview covering all defaults. 112 of these defaulters were
surveyed. There are fewer observations on credit amount than on credit area because some respondents
did not know their exact credit amount ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2.11: Effect of external monitoring on consequences of default, by
own fault (alt def 1)
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reimbursed Credit area Credit amount Stopped
Immediately (Change) (Change) (Year 2)
Monitored -0.236∗∗ -0.303 -19150.8 0.121∗
(0.0899) (0.368) (37788.4) (0.0644)
Own fault (alt def 2) 0.00579 0.135 85214.1∗ 0.0676
(0.0784) (0.328) (43061.8) (0.0673)
Monitored X Own fault (alt def 2) 0.138 -0.580 -33577.9 -0.151
(0.132) (0.565) (56242.7) (0.116)
Constant 0.396∗∗∗ -0.255 -145892.1 0.151
(0.119) (0.451) (98853.7) (0.0980)
N 309 112 108 112
Standard errors, clustered at the village level, in parentheses. Regressions control for unbalanced
characteristics: Whether the HH has a moto, is self-sufficient in cereal production (last 3 years) and is
a newly formed HH. Reimbursed immediately is defined for all defaulting households, credit measures
only for the surveyed ones. Defaults of leaders are excluded from these regressions because these leaders
provided themselves the information on the cause of default. Different samples are used for defaulters.
The 309 observations come from the leader interview covering all defaults. 112 of these defaulters were
surveyed. There are fewer observations on credit amount than on credit area because some respondents
did not know their exact credit amount ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2.12: Effect of external monitoring on consequences of default, by
own fault (alt def 2)
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Control sd Diff: T - C se N
Characteristics household head and households
Age household head 45.00 (12.32) -3.785∗∗ (1.685) 119
Nr. years of education household head 1.294 (2.275) 0.519 (0.566) 119
Household head has some education 0.193 (0.336) 0.0955 (0.0847) 119
Nr. years household head 15.39 (11.14) -0.987 (1.712) 119
Nr. years household head is part of credit group 9.255 (6.212) 0.112 (1.391) 118
HH size (nr. people at least 6) 8.090 (4.188) -0.882 (1.020) 119
Wealth and food security HH
HH has television 0.0663 (0.458) 0.00829 (0.0908) 119
HH has bed 0.428 (1.044) 0.0892 (0.200) 119
HH has moto 0.484 (0.840) -0.100 (0.186) 119
HH has house with solid walls 0.0308 (0.177) 0.0931 (0.0626) 119
Consumption proxy (PPI index) 33.27 (11.69) -0.413 (2.751) 119
Self-sufficient in cereal production (last 3 years) 0.439 (0.504) -0.0320 (0.0932) 115
Somebody reduced meal last year 0.244 (0.429) 0.0841 (0.0829) 119
Somebody skipped meal last year 0.148 (0.272) 0.0900 (0.0597) 119
Agricultural production
Cotton area cultivated 2013 2.229 (1.877) 0.480 (0.664) 119
Average cotton yield (2008-2012) 819.3 (255.1) -20.62 (48.08) 111
Cultivated GM cotton 2013 0.602 (0.502) -0.0497 (0.118) 119
Cereal area cultivated 2013 3.312 (2.279) 0.408 (0.650) 119
Credit for cotton production
Cotton area for credit 2.479 (2.955) 0.105 (0.830) 119
Total credit for cotton production (in CFA) 284730.1 (377866.7) -38674.6 (102273.4) 114
Monitoring by leader and agent
Agent visited field 0.232 (0.447) 0.279∗∗∗ (0.0940) 119
Agent measured field 0.172 (0.368) 0.200∗∗ (0.0914) 119
Leader visited field 0.317 (0.502) -0.129 (0.180) 105
Leader measured field 0.0283 (0.269) 0.120 (0.0969) 105
Leader or agent visited field 0.590 (0.486) 0.0353 (0.164) 105
Leader or agent measured field 0.271 (0.437) 0.169 (0.112) 105
See the note below Table 2.1 for an explanation of the missing variables. Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2.13: Comparison of defaulters in treatment and control.
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Non-defaulters sd Diff: Defaulters - se N
Non-defaulters
Characteristics household head and households
Age household head 44.03 (13.01) -0.518 (0.980) 890
Nr. years of education household head 1.128 (2.488) -0.264 (0.309) 890
Household head has some education 0.241 (0.434) -0.0854∗ (0.0432) 890
Nr. years household head 16.26 (11.70) -0.266 (1.116) 889
Nr. years household head is part of credit group 9.882 (6.354) 0.0293 (0.685) 888
HH size (nr. people at least 6) 8.836 (5.350) -1.156∗∗ (0.476) 890
Wealth and food security HH
HH has television 0.229 (0.529) -0.0709 (0.0478) 890
HH has bed 0.635 (1.338) -0.153∗ (0.0888) 890
HH has moto 0.813 (1.068) -0.339∗∗∗ (0.0897) 890
HH has house with solid walls 0.131 (0.381) -0.108∗∗∗ (0.0290) 890
Consumption proxy (PPI index) 37.66 (12.55) -4.232∗∗∗ (1.117) 890
Self-sufficient in cereal production (last 3 years) 0.607 (0.483) -0.139∗∗∗ (0.0456) 852
Somebody reduced meal last year 0.186 (0.392) 0.0874∗∗ (0.0393) 890
Somebody skipped meal last year 0.110 (0.298) 0.0210 (0.0311) 890
Agricultural production
Cotton area cultivated 2013 3.850 (3.506) -1.310∗∗∗ (0.277) 890
Average cotton yield (2008-2012) 872.8 (257.9) -80.12∗∗∗ (24.19) 851
Cultivated GM cotton 2013 0.737 (0.495) -0.112∗∗ (0.0542) 890
Cereal area cultivated 2013 4.319 (3.256) -0.660∗∗ (0.293) 887
Credit for cotton production
Cotton area for credit 3.922 (3.780) -1.156∗∗∗ (0.331) 890
Total credit for cotton production (in CFA) 399672.2 (404052.3) -100822.8∗∗ (37458.7) 877
Monitoring by leader and agent
Agent visited field 0.505 (0.500) -0.128∗∗ (0.0527) 888
Agent measured field 0.363 (0.485) -0.129∗∗ (0.0499) 890
Leader visited field 0.308 (0.495) -0.0546 (0.0726) 796
Leader measured field 0.116 (0.365) -0.0221 (0.0545) 795
Leader or agent visited field 0.642 (0.446) -0.0822 (0.0739) 794
Leader or agent measured field 0.427 (0.498) -0.128∗∗ (0.0588) 795
See the note below Table 2.1 for an explanation of the missing variables. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2.14: Comparison of defaulters and non-defaulters (in entire sam-
ple).
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Control sd Diff: T - C se N
Characteristics household head and households
Age household head 47.43 (12.99) -5.595∗∗ (2.522) 75
Nr. years of education household head 0.796 (1.767) 1.008 (0.604) 75
Household head has some education 0.105 (0.273) 0.191∗ (0.0972) 75
Nr. years household head 16.77 (12.10) -1.811 (2.460) 75
Nr. years household head is part of credit group 10.25 (6.189) -1.162 (1.760) 74
HH size (nr. people at least 6) 8.659 (4.759) -1.117 (1.200) 75
Wealth and food security HH
HH has television 0.110 (0.563) -0.0207 (0.117) 75
HH has bed 0.368 (0.847) 0.198 (0.234) 75
HH has moto 0.614 (0.887) -0.227 (0.215) 75
HH has house with solid walls 0.00577 (0.162) 0.0551 (0.0511) 75
Consumption proxy (PPI index) 32.94 (11.72) -1.277 (3.230) 75
Self-sufficient in cereal production (last 3 years) 0.357 (0.500) -0.0907 (0.117) 73
Somebody reduced meal last year 0.256 (0.446) 0.0883 (0.112) 75
Somebody skipped meal last year 0.179 (0.273) 0.108∗ (0.0622) 75
Agricultural production
Cotton area cultivated 2013 2.296 (2.063) 0.175 (0.780) 75
Average cotton yield (2008-2012) 810.9 (234.0) -2.943 (42.46) 71
Cultivated GM cotton 2013 0.623 (0.500) -0.0462 (0.144) 75
Cereal area cultivated 2013 3.607 (2.530) -0.0804 (0.722) 75
Credit for cotton production
Cotton area for credit 2.751 (3.538) -0.536 (1.069) 75
Total credit for cotton production (in CFA) 263957.7 (429868.0) -80647.3 (124020.0) 73
See the note below Table 2.1 for an explanation of the missing variables. Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2.15: Comparison of people defaulting because of their own fault
in treatment and control.
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Default sd Diff: Own fault se N
not own fault - Not own fault
Characteristics household head and households
Age household head 44.44 (10.61) -1.465 (2.173) 119
Nr. years of education household head 1.556 (2.715) -0.0631 (0.430) 119
Household head has some education 0.230 (0.370) 0.00373 (0.0749) 119
Nr. years household head 14.66 (8.986) 0.450 (1.916) 119
Nr. years household head is part of credit group 9.372 (6.560) -0.0994 (1.183) 118
HH size (nr. people at least 6) 7.696 (4.123) 0.0356 (0.751) 119
Wealth and food security HH
HH has television -0.0119 (0.255) 0.117 (0.0697) 119
HH has bed 0.553 (1.087) -0.126 (0.164) 119
HH has moto 0.350 (0.685) 0.132 (0.130) 119
HH has house with solid walls 0.112 (0.321) -0.0600 (0.0643) 119
Consumption proxy (PPI index) 31.12 (11.54) 2.834 (2.778) 119
Self-sufficient in cereal production (last 3 years) 0.669 (0.457) -0.336∗∗∗ (0.0948) 115
Somebody reduced meal last year 0.223 (0.424) 0.0800 (0.0837) 119
Somebody skipped meal last year 0.164 (0.291) 0.0316 (0.0510) 119
Agricultural production
Cotton area cultivated 2013 2.625 (2.882) -0.279 (0.540) 119
Average cotton yield (2008-2012) 807.9 (264.7) 2.951 (51.24) 111
Cultivated GM cotton 2013 0.654 (0.505) -0.103 (0.0947) 119
Cereal area cultivated 2013 3.619 (3.172) -0.195 (0.562) 119
Credit for cotton production
Cotton area for credit 2.563 (2.644) -0.0566 (0.695) 119
Total credit for cotton production (in CFA) 306941.9 (314010.6) -54301.3 (82017.0) 114
See the note below Table 2.1 for an explanation of the missing variables. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2.16: Table comparing people who default because of their own
fault and those who do not
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Table 2.17: The effect of external monitoring on state-dependent sanc-
tioning, with and without controls.
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Chapter 3
The demand for
micro-insurance: A literature
review1
1This chapter is co-authored with Ombeline De Bock and Jean-Philippe Platteau.
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Abstract
Micro-insurance has recently received much attention as a promising tool
to protect poor individuals from important shocks. Yet, voluntary de-
mand from people has been low, shedding doubt on the viability of micro-
insurance as a useful risk-management tool. To better understand this
puzzle, this paper reviews both the theoretical and empirical literature
on the demand for insurance. While people’s lack of understanding of in-
surance does seem to limit the demand for it, several more fundamental
factors, such as price, quality, limited trust in the insurer, and liquidity
constraints also seem to have an important role in explaining the puzzle.
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3.1 Introduction
Micro-insurance - or the insurance for the poor - has been considered as
"the next revolution" in addressing risks and vulnerability in low-income
countries (Morduch, 2006). In particular, huge investments have been
made in this revolutionary tool in the last decade by several development
agencies (among which USAID and the Gates foundation) in the hope
of breaking the circle of poverty and offering a reliable protection to the
poor.
Its name echoes the well-known micro-credit phenomenon, on pur-
pose. Both concepts have in common a specific attention to low-income
households in the developing world. They, moreover, try to solve a
market imperfection which is identified as a major cause perpetuating
poverty. However, micro-insurance is an even more complex concept
than micro-credit. First, it implies paying a regular premium in return
for an uncertain payout. Second, it is mostly conceived as a set of indi-
vidual, rather than group-based, contracts where some enrolees benefit
from a compensation while others do not. Finally, micro-insurance is far
from being homogeneous: It concerns a wide variety of risks and takes a
lot of different forms.
The focus of this review is on low-income countries, where adverse
shocks are frequent, and risk-pooling mechanisms and self-insurance strate-
gies are imperfect. As poor individuals also display a relatively high
level of risk aversion, the demand for micro-insurance products is thus
expected to be high. However, the evidence is disappointing: subscrip-
tion to the widely subsidized insurance schemes is low, rarely above 30%.
And while this could still be seen as a reasonable rate for a new prod-
uct, renewal rates are also low, ranging from 10 to 70%. At such rates,
insurances cannot be sustainable and will fail to deliver the benefits it
promises. The question of this paper is thus: Why is demand and re-
newal for micro-insurance so poor?
The present paper addresses this puzzle both from a theoretical point
of view and by reviewing the empirical evidence on the factors influencing
demand for insurance. Given the numerous number of studies published
on micro-insurance in the past ten years, and the diverging results ob-
tained, we believe this review is not only necessary, but also timely. We
will focus both on demand and renewal of micro-insurance. Renewal is a
topic that has received far less attention than demand despite its impor-
tance in promoting a sustainable insurance scheme. While demand and
renewal are, of course, related, the decisions to purchase an insurance
with or without having experienced it are not the same and we believe
that explaining low renewal rates is critical for a correct assessment of
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the potential of micro-insurance.
Our literature review is extensive, covering a wide range of topics
including behavioural models, supply deficiencies of insurances and the
role of existing substitutes of insurances2. It considers qualitative as well
as quantitative, and theoretical as well as empirical papers that study
the demand for insurance in developing countries. However, given the
extensive recent literature on this subject, we only present the papers
which bring the most robust evidence on the different aspects of demand.
For this reason, we do not rely much on studies investigating the hypo-
thetical willingness-to-pay (WTP) since the methodology used to elicit
hypothetical demand presents great challenges. In particular, these stud-
ies systematically produce overly optimistic estimates of the demand for
insurance and, in some cases, the WTP even fails to correlate with actual
demand (McIntosh et al., 2013).
Various types of insurance are considered, among which two main cat-
egories may be distinguished: contracts insuring the subscriber against
the risk of incurring medical expenses and insurance contracts against
harvest losses. Among crop insurance schemes, those based on an index
have recently received considerable attention. The fundamental differ-
ence with classical insurance lies in the nature of the event that triggers
the payment of compensation. The index insures against the occurrence
of an easily identified event that correlates with an expected decrease in
the incomes of the farmers in a given area. In weather index insurances,
for instance, it is the level of rainfall, rather than the observed damage,
that triggers the payout.
Although the evidence is far from decisive, several lessons can be
drawn from this review. Understanding the concept of insurance is not
an easy task for individuals but there exists a wide range of alternative
explanations as to why demand for conventional insurance schemes is so
low. A lack of trust in the institution delivering the insurance, or in the
specifics of the product may significantly decrease uptake. Similarly, the
frequency of payouts, the quality of the product and liquidity constraints
are pointed to as important factors affecting demand.
A major feature of the present review is the attention devoted to
2For other reviews on the topic of micro-insurance, see Miranda & Farrin (2012)
andCarter et al. (2014) on index-based insurances ; Ekman (2004) on community-
based health insurances ; De Bock & Ontiveros (2013) on the impact of micro-
insurance ; and Eling et al. (2014) on the demand for micro-insurance, with a par-
ticular focus on linking it to demand for insurance in developed countries. The main
difference of this paper with the latter one is a focus on economic theory and the
wide scope of the paper, extensively discussing topics such as behavioural models and
substitutes for insurance.
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economic theory in order to shed light on empirical findings. Therefore,
we start by presenting various theories, including behavioural ones, which
help to explain observed insurance demand. In the same section, we also
present the evidence on other characteristics of subscribers, such as their
understanding of insurance and risk aversion, which affect demand. Next
to demanders’ characteristics, supply deficiencies such as high prices or
basis risk matter. These are treated in Section 3. We then discuss how
a lack of trust in insurance affects uptake. Finally, in Section 5 we
consider different substitutes for insurance such as informal risk-sharing
and credit. Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Low demand arising from characteristics of
potential subscribers
3.2.1 Behavioural explanations
Before assessing which factors affect the demand for micro-insurance,
it is useful to discuss the available theories. The dominant one is the
expected utility theory, which is the standard theory of decision making
under uncertainty. However, in an attempt to explain the low demand for
insurances, researchers have increasingly resorted to behavioural models.
In this section, we first summarize the central point of the expected
utility theory, and then turn to the most important alternative setups
based on various behavioural assumptions.
To see why insurance can be valuable under expected utility theory,
we need to take a closer look at the level of satisfaction or utility each in-
dividual derives from subscribing to the policy. According to this theory,
people try to maximize their expected utility when deciding whether to
purchase the insurance product. If marginal utility is decreasing, that
is, if greater consumption leads to more utility but that the increase in
utility is smaller for each additional increase in consumption, the util-
ity function of the agent is concave. This specific feature of the utility
function gives rise to risk aversion. Indeed, as can be seen in the utility
function in Figure 3.1(a) (Patt et al., 2009), a risk averse farmer will
always prefer receiving a definite amount (the average of two possible
harvests) over a risky situation in which each possible harvest is equally
likely (in which case his utility is the average of the two levels of utility
that he could experience).
The readiness to pay for receiving a certain amount allows an insur-
ance market to emerge. Indeed, because of the aversion for uncertain
outcomes, risk averse individuals will be willing to pay more than the
75
ESSAYS IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
Figure 3.1: Utility, risk-aversion and willingness to pay for insurance
actuarially fair price of the insurance - the price which is equal to the
average amount the insurance will pay out - in order to receive a com-
pensation in case the harvest fails. A key concept is that of certainty
equivalent (c.e.) which measures the certain income that the individual
would consider equivalent (from a utility standpoint) to the lottery he
(she) wants to avoid (for example, 3 tons instead of 50 percent chance
of obtaining 0 tons and 50 percent chance of obtaining 10 tons, that is,
a lottery of which the average outcome is equal to 5 tons).
Figure 3.1(b), an example elaborated by Patt et al. (2009), depicts
the case in which each ton of production is worth USD 100. Without any
production shocks, the farmer may expect to harvest 10 tons of cereals
and get 1000 USD. However, in case of a drought, the farmer loses his
entire production and earns USD 0. When there is a 50% probability of
drought, the average loss is USD 500. If an insurance pays USD 1000 in
case of harvest failure, the figure shows that a risk averse individual will
be willing to pay up to the difference between USD 1000 and his certainty
equivalent for the insurance, which is more than the actuarially fair price
of the insurance.
From the tight framework of rational expected utility theory, a central
result is easily derived: the more risk-averse an individual, the higher
the risk premium he (she) is willing to pay to get insured against shocks.
It is thus readily checked from the figures that the more concave the
utility function (i.e., the stronger the aversion toward risk) the larger
the distance between the distance between the certainty equivalent level
and the maximum income.
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We can now consider alternative theories based upon behavioural as-
sumptions that differ from the conventional rationality assumption un-
derlying the canonical model described above. We focus on those that
are directly relevant to explain low demand for insurance among poor
people.
Ambiguity aversion
A first alternative approach is ambiguity aversion theory. Many people
appear to be ambiguity averse, that is, dislike being uncertain about
the likelihood with which events will occur (Ellsberg, 1961)3 . This is
different from typical risk aversion: Instead of disliking that outcomes
are uncertain, an ambiguity averse individual dislikes being uncertain
about the distribution of outcomes.
Both Elabed & Carter (2015) and Bryan (2013) argue that ambigu-
ity aversion might limit take-up of insurance. While people know what
to expect when not buying insurance, the choice to purchase insurance
comes with plenty of ambiguity, for example about the exact trustworthi-
ness of the insurer or the exact coverage of the contract. An ambiguity
averse individual would then evaluate the insurance contract by assum-
ing the least conceivable trustworthiness and coverage, and conclude that
insurance is not very valuable.
Elabed & Carter (2015) argue that ambiguity aversion has the effect
of discouraging demand for index insurances in particular, because this
type of insurance suffers from basis risk. Basis risk is the risk that an
insurance does not pay out, even though there are losses. For instance,
an index insurance based on rainfall will not pay out if there is a pest
problem. In this case, there are two levels of uncertainty - about having
losses, but also about receiving a payout in case of losses – and this
is particularly unappealing for an ambiguity averse individual. Since
almost 60% of the potential micro-insurance clients they have interviewed
revealed themselves to be ambiguity averse, they argue that high levels
of basis risk can substantially reduce demand.
3Ambiguity aversion is still best explained by the original experiment of Ellsberg
(1961): An individual faces two urns. The first contains 10 balls, 5 red and 5 blue; the
second also contains 10 red or blue balls, but in unknown proportions. The individual
can choose a color and an urn to draw a ball from, and wins if he draws the chosen
color. An individual following subjective expected utility theory should believe that
in the second urn, either for red or for blue, he has at least 50 percent probability
of drawing this color. Nonetheless, most individuals strictly prefer drawing from the
first urn because the odds are not ambiguous; they are ambiguity averse.
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Hyperbolic discounting
Every potential client has an intrinsic discount rate, that is, a degree
of preference for present consumption. Paying a premium today and
only receiving a payout in the future thus implies an opportunity cost of
not having used the money during the period in between. Thus, a risk-
neutral agent with a positive discount rate has no incentive to take-up an
actuarially fair insurance. When people exhibit hyperbolic discounting,
or time-inconsistent preferences, this effect is even stronger. On top of
preferring consumption sooner rather than later, hyperbolic discounting
implies a preference to consume today, simply because it is today. That
is, one might systematically prefer to receive 2 dollars in a week and one
day instead of 1 dollar in a week and at the same time prefer to receive 1
dollar today over 2 dollars tomorrow. Hyperbolic discounting can lead to
a low demand for insurance because the premium needs to be paid today,
but the potential benefits are experienced only in the future. It could
thus be seen as a lack of self-control. Indeed, even when an individual
with time-inconsistent preferences is willing to purchase insurance - and
would commit, if possible, to do so in the future - he might well decide
not to do so at the moment the payment needs to be made.
Nonetheless, Ito & Kono (2010) estimate the demand for insurance
for a small group of people exhibiting hyperbolic preferences and find
that they are more likely to purchase health insurance. They argue that
these people use the insurance as a commitment device: having time-
inconsistent preferences, they know they will have difficulties to save for
uncertain health expenditures. The insurance, which can be seen as a
prepayment of health expenditures, is thus especially valuable.
Loss-aversion and prospect theory
Kahneman & Tversky (1979) argue that people exhibit loss-aversion,
that is, they experience more disutility for a loss, than they experience
utility for a gain of the same amount. Thus, unlike in expected utility
theory, the framing of a change in wealth matters: feeling that a loss of a
certain amount has been avoided gives more utility than simply gaining
the same amount.
Such loss-aversion can influence insurance behaviour. Marketing in-
surance as preventing a loss ("don’t lose your property, buy insurance
to be covered in case of emergencies"), rather than allowing a gain ("in-
crease your peace of mind, buy insurance to be covered in case of emer-
gencies"), could increase people’s perception of the value of insurance
(Ganzach & Karsahi, 1995).
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Figure 3.2: Utility function under prospect theory
Loss aversion is, in fact, only one part of a more elaborate theory
of decision making under uncertainty, known as prospect theory (Kah-
neman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). On top of the
assumption of loss aversion, prospect theory is based on two additional
assumptions. First, the utility function for losses is convex, implying
risk-seeking, while the one for gains is concave (see Figure 3.2). Second,
the probability distribution with which expected utility is evaluated is
not the true one but is weighted such that the worst (low probability)
outcomes are overweighed and other outcomes are underweighted.
Together, these assumptions imply that in the domain of losses -
which is the relevant domain in the context of insurance - individuals are
risk-averse for the worst outcomes and risk-seeking otherwise. It is this
risk-aversion for the worst events which makes insurance valuable under
prospect theory. The reason for this is thus quite different than under
expected utility theory. Instead of the concavity of the utility function, it
is the overweighting of the worst events which makes insurance valuable
(Wakker et al., 1997).
If overweighing of the worst outcomes is indeed an important reason
for purchasing insurance, this could explain why certain insurances are
in low demand. Perceptions of what is covered by the insurance then
play a decisive role in the take-up. In particular, when an insurance can-
not guarantee full coverage, some of the worst events are not covered.
As these events are overweighed most, this lack of coverage gives a dis-
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proportional amount of disutility and the insurance is perceived as less
valuable. In a WTP study in the USA, Wakker et al. (1997) show that
people demand more than a 20% reduction in price when an insurance
has a 1% probability of non-payout. The implication is that insurance is
valued more if, instead of simply reducing a risk, it gives the impression
of removing it completely.
The evidence for prospect theory is mixed. Ito & Kono (2010) assess
the attitudes of individuals vis-a-vis risk and find that a large number
of them are risk-loving in the domain of losses. These loss risk-lovers
also seem to be somewhat less likely to purchase insurance. On the
other hand, Dercon et al. (2011) find that people are risk-averse in the
domain of losses, and actually even more than in the domain of gains.
As prospect theory assumes that people are risk-averse for big losses
and risk-seeking for smaller ones, it is however debatable whether these
results support or contradict prospect theory. Concerning the weighting
of probabilities under prospect theory, Clarke & Kalani (2011) actually
find that insurance take-up decisions in a game are better explained by
the underweighting of extreme events than by the overweighting assumed
by prospect theory.
Discontinuity of preferences at certainty
We argued above that a strong dislike of an insurance that has a small
probability of non-payout can be explained by prospect theory. How-
ever, another explanation is provided by the theory of discontinuity of
preferences at certainty, which posits that people dislike uncertainty be-
yond what is predicted by expected utility theory (Andreoni et al., 2010;
2012). That is, when comparing an insurance with either 0%, 1% or
2% probability of non-payout, an individual with discontinuous prefer-
ences might strongly prefer the insurance with 0% non-payout, and be
quite indifferent between 1% and 2% non-payout. This is impossible
for an expected utility maximizer: being almost indifferent between 1%
and 2% non-payout implies being almost indifferent between 0% and 1%
as well. An individual with discontinuous preferences can thus have a
special preference for certain outcomes.
Serfilippi et al. (2015) show that such discontinuous preferences at
certainty can matter for insurance demand. In an insurance game with
farmers in Burkina Faso they frame the insurance either with or without
the certainty of having to pay the premium: in the uncertain frame, the
premium does not need to be paid when there is a payout. Individuals
who reveal themselves to have discontinuous preferences (29% of the
sample) are willing to pay substantially more when the premium payment
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is framed as uncertain, while others are not. These individuals therefore
seem to dislike the certainty of paying the premium.
Demand could thus be potentially increased by stating that the pre-
mium only needs to be paid when there is no payout, but this is only
rarely possible. However, discontinuity of preferences can also affect de-
mand in other ways. Most importantly, the insurance should give the
impression that it is sure to yield a payout when needed. An insurance
that is not trusted or that has high levels of basis risk could be in low
demand among people with discontinuous preferences.
3.2.2 Education and the understanding of insurance
Understanding of insurance
A huge challenge for micro-insurance schemes is that they must be prop-
erly understood by potential and actual clients. The core concept of
insurance - spending money in return for an uncertain payout covering
a hypothetical event – is, indeed, not straightforward. This is perhaps
best illustrated by the demand of many newly insured to receive their
premium back in case no payout occurs (Platteau, 1997; Basaza et al.,
2008). Even in the United States, it has been argued that consumers
of insurance treat insurance as a short-term investment so that, if they
have not collected on their policy over several years, they feel that the
premiums paid have been wasted (Kunreuther et al., 2013, pp. 104-
5, 117-118). Such misunderstandings can threaten the sustainability of
the insurance: Platteau & Ontiveros (2013) find that a lack of payouts
leads people to drop out of the insurance, except if they have a good
understanding of insurance.
Platteau (1997) gives a plausible explanation for the lack of under-
standing of the insurance concept. He argues that in traditional risk-
sharing arrangements members of traditional rural communities "are
guided by a principle of balanced reciprocity (they expect a return from
any contribution or payment they make) rather than by a true logic of
mutual insurance. More precisely, they do not conceive of insurance as
a game where there are winners and losers and where income is redis-
tributed between lucky and unlucky individuals." If micro-insurance is
evaluated with such a logic of balanced reciprocity, the demand to be re-
imbursed when there is no payout appears fair rather than extravagant.
However, even if people evaluate insurance in a framework of bal-
anced reciprocity, this does not make it impossible for an insurance
scheme to be successful. Most importantly, an insurance needs to pay
out often enough to ensure a feeling of some reciprocity, which does not
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necessarily need to be perfectly balanced. By mixing different risks, and
thus covering many of them, an insurance could achieve such frequent
payouts. In another way, a life insurance, by guaranteeing a payout at
some point, guarantees reciprocity. However, other types of insurance,
such as agricultural insurance, often rely on the principles of spreading
(big) risks among many clients and redistributing money from lucky to
unlucky individuals through infrequent payouts. For these, one needs
to accept the logic of insurance to purchase it over extended periods of
time.
Beyond the basic concept of insurance, other features of insurance
operations, such as the pooling of contributions, the presence of a de-
ductible, or the exact perils covered by the contract can also raise mixed
understanding among the beneficiaries. From this perspective, index-
based insurance poses most problems. First, one needs to understand
the basic principles of insurance. Second, one can easily be deceived by
the absence of a payout in case of a loss because of basis risk. Indeed, to
fully understand basis risk one typically needs a grasp of concepts such
as the average and have an idea of the amount of correlation between the
index and individual outcomes, which is not evident. Finally, the index
itself can pose serious problems. This may happen when, for instance, it
is expressed in millimetres or computed based on satellite imagery.
The logic of insurance does not therefore seem easy to internalize. In
the following, we discuss various aspects on which to focus in order to
improve the understanding of insurance.
Education
Various empirical studies conclude that the more years of schooling re-
spondents have completed, the more likely they are to enrol in the in-
surance scheme (Giesbert et al., 2011; Giné et al., 2008; Jehu-Appiah
et al., 2012; Jowett, 2003; Schneider & Diop, 2004). This is consistent
with the idea that better educated people may have a better understand-
ing of the insurance product and are therefore more likely to purchase
it. More specifically, Giesbert et al. (2011) note that education might
stimulate demand by increasing financial literacy, and that the effect of
education on demand may thus vanish once financial literacy is controlled
for. When controlling for financial literacy, Giné et al. (2008) indeed do
not find a significant impact of years of school attendance on take-up.
Platteau & Ontiveros (2013), on the other hand, when controlling for
the level of understanding of insurance, find a non-monotonous effect of
schooling on renewal: It is negative in the first years and becomes posi-
tive only when a sufficient level of education is reached. They argue that
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this is caused by the fact that more educated people tend to be more
frustrated when confronted with a dysfunctional insurance, whereas at
relatively high levels of education reduced transaction costs for renew-
ing the contract for literate people may outweigh this effect. Education
could thus affect demand and renewal in different ways.
For this reason, education should not be simply seen as a proxy for
understanding of insurance or financial literacy. Thus, Platteau & On-
tiveros (2013) find almost no correlation between education and the level
of understanding of insurance. Similarly, Gaurav et al. (2011) find no
correlation between education and financial literacy. They moreover
bring evidence that low financial awareness of the respondents lowers
the probability of adopting the rainfall insurance. Interestingly, Cole
et al. (2013) isolate the understanding of probabilities when testing the
respondents’ financial awareness. The authors observe that financial lit-
eracy per se has no effect on insurance demand, but being comfortable
with the probabilistic concept seems to be strongly correlated with the
decision to purchase insurance.
Improving knowledge through training in financial literacy
Given the apparent problems people meet in getting a proper grasp of
the concept of insurance, and the often positive correlation between fi-
nancial literacy and demand, financial literacy trainings are widely ex-
pected to substantially increase demand. However, many studies have
now tested the impact of different types of trainings, and the evidence is
mixed. While financial literacy training for complex index-based insur-
ances generally seems to have some positive impact on demand, studies
for health insurance have not found any significant impact. As financial
literacy training programs vary substantially in terms of approach and
intensity, it is worth discussing the different projects in more detail.
While training in insurance literacy can increase the knowledge of
the product specificities, its impact on the purchase of insurance is un-
clear. For instance, Gaurav et al. (2011) find a positive effect of general
training in financial literacy but only for people with low initial levels
of financial literacy. Moreover, carrying out a demonstration of how the
millimetre threshold triggers a payout of their weather index-insurance
had no effect. As another example of the complexity and diversity of
factors to take into account when assessing the effectiveness of literacy
training, a study by Giné et al. (2014), who distributed comics as a way
to provide financial literacy training, find a substantial effect on demand
only when enough people in the village received the comics.
As mentioned before, the studies on financial literacy training for
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health insurance find no effect. Neither a three-hour training session
about the insurance and general financial management (Bonan et al.,
2012), nor several educational modules varying in intensity (Schultz
et al., 2013) appear to have had an impact on the demand for insur-
ance. Adopting another approach, Dercon et al. (2011) randomly assign
people to so called "study circles" which consist in regular meetings of
a study group in which written materials about insurance are discussed.
This kind of participative training session too did not have any significant
impact on the purchase of health insurance either.
Finally, the perception of participants about different kinds of train-
ing seems to differ. Patt et al. (2010) argue that playing games does
not improve understanding more than what a traditional training would
achieve, but they do find that those who played a game perceived the
insurance as fairer. Panda et al. (2015) explicitly compare different kinds
of training. They find that a game, called treasure-pot, in which expo-
sure to risk is simulated and players can protect against risk by pooling
resources, was most successful as judged by the participants. A high
proportion of participants enjoyed the activity and found it useful.
How can we explain this mixed evidence regarding the effect of fi-
nancial literacy training? Since the effect varies depending on whether
we deal with complex index-based insurances or with simpler health in-
surance schemes, training programs do seem to succeed in improving the
understanding of the technicalities of insurance. None the less, three
important points deserve to be made here. First, knowledge is not nec-
essarily sufficient to translate into an effective purchase of the insurance
product. For instance, a lack of trust in the insurer or cultural be-
liefs may interfere with the benefits of financial training. Second, the
aforementioned studies measure the short run effects on demand. Yet,
Platteau & Ontiveros (2013) show that understanding is also a crucial
factor in contract renewal. Training in financial literacy, possibly cou-
pled with a good follow-up, could therefore have substantial effects in
the longer run. Third, a deeper understanding about the logic and the
concept of insurance might be necessary, and it is possible that current
training methods do not succeed in raising this kind of understanding.
While it is unclear whether training in financial literacy can achieve its
purpose, there is definitely scope for current training methods to focus
less on the technicalities of the insurance product and more on a broader
understanding of the underlying concept or mechanism. The absence of
effect of training in financial literacy on the demand for simpler (health)
insurance contracts might however indicate that understanding is not a
main barrier to demand for those types of insurances. It is nevertheless
noteworthy that Platteau & Ontiveros (2013) have studied a microinsur-
84
CHAPTER 3. THE DEMAND FOR MICRO-INSURANCE
ance program in India and, yet, they are able to conclude that lack of
understanding is one of the key factors impeding insurance renewal.
3.2.3 Influence from peers
Peers do have an important influence on the decision to purchase in-
surance. This is suggested by Patankar (2011) and Giné et al. (2008)
in whose studies insurance purchases by people close to each other are
positively correlated. Similarly, Platteau & Ontiveros (2013) find that
members of self-help groups are more likely to renew insurances, even
after controlling for the level of information which these group mem-
bers have. Such correlations should however be interpreted cautiously
as it can perhaps be expected that friends and members of the same
group, who can be "similar" in some unobserved ways, exhibit similar
purchasing behaviour.
Three randomized control trials provide stronger evidence that, by
spreading information about the insurance, peers can increase the like-
lihood that insurance is purchased. Karlan et al. (2014) and Cole et al.
(2014) note that take-up is strongly influenced by the payout experi-
ence of peers. Similarly, Giné et al. (2014), find that the comics they
distributed for financial literacy training only have a substantial effect
when many in the village receive them. While this could be explained by
the spreading of information among peers, it could also be that uptake
decisions are spread among peers. However, belonging to a village where
many discount vouchers have been distributed and take-up is thus higher,
seems to have only a modest effect on individual uptake decisions. As
such, the information hypothesis seems the most likely.
The results of Cai et al. (2015) corroborate this finding. They con-
ducted an experiment in which people are assigned to an intensive or a
simple training session. Moreover, this is done in two phases, a few days
apart, with different individuals in each phase. They find that people
who have friends participating in the intensive sessions are more likely
to buy the insurance and more informed about it. Moreover, only 9%
of people are aware of their friends’ uptake decisions. It seems therefore
that it is the increased knowledge through peers that causes increased
take-up. Nonetheless, when participants in the second phase are explic-
itly informed about their friends’ take-up decisions in the first phase,
they are more likely to purchase when their friends purchased. Hence,
the actual decision to purchase insurance might also influence the de-
cision of others, although, at least in the short run, information about
purchasing decisions might not spread as easily as information about the
insurance itself.
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Aware of the importance of this peer effect, insurance providers may
also pay attention to the agents whom they put in charge of the distri-
bution of the product. In this respect, Giné et al. (2008) used the vil-
lage networks to disseminate the information about the product. They
performed a more intensive marketing of the insurance product in the
direction of selected village opinion leaders and asked them to help pub-
licize the insurance product. They later came back to sell the policy.
Participation is 8 percentage points higher among members of the lo-
cal council (Gram Panchayat) and somewhat superior for those who are
connected to other village networks. Thus, a network effect seems to be
at play. The authors, however, acknowledge that, since marketing inten-
sity is omitted in their regression estimates, the strength of the results
is dampened. Networks have also been exploited by Dercon et al. (2011)
who curiously find that a peer referral treatment has counterproductive
effects in the sense that the tea centres in which this intervention was
implemented were less likely to purchase the insurance policy. Indeed,
take-up dropped from 13% to 6%, presumably because of its similarity
to a pyramid scheme that broke trust.
Finally, going beyond the simple fact that peer effects may increase
(or decrease) demand, Platteau & Ontiveros (2013), find that peers may
substitute for a poor understanding of insurance. As we mentioned be-
fore, people in their study drop out of the insurance following a lack of
payouts except if they understand the insurance. The same conditional
effect is actually observed when they have a peer who renewed the in-
surance. In other words, both the presence of peers who renewed their
insurance and a good grasp of the insurance concept have the effect of
mitigating the negative impact of a lack of payouts on renewal behaviour.
It is as though trust in peers acts as a substitute for a solid understand-
ing of insurance. Even if one does not understand the insurance, having
a peer that does is sufficient to make correct decisions.
3.2.4 Attitudes towards risk
Risk aversion
Under expected utility theory, risk aversion is the reason why insurance
is valuable: a risk-neutral or risk-seeking individual should not purchase
insurance, even when it is actuarially fair. As a consequence, demand for
insurance should be higher for the more risk-averse individuals. Several
studies, however, have found that risk-aversion can be negatively, and
quite strongly, correlated with the demand for insurance (Cole et al.,
2013; Giné et al., 2008; Giné & Yang, 2009; Dercon et al., 2011).
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One explanation for this rather counter-intuitive result can be de-
tected by looking more closely at the possibility that the insurance may
fail to payout in case of a loss. This can happen if the insurer defaults
(Doherty & Schlesinger, 1990), if the client distrusts the insurer to payout
when required (Dercon et al., 2011), or, in fact, in about any insurance
scheme to the extent that contracts almost never perfectly cover the
client for every potential loss. The latter problem is especially impor-
tant for index-based insurances (Clarke, 2011a). Indeed, when insurance
payouts are based on an index such as the weather for an agricultural
insurance, there is always the risk, called basis risk, that a farmer suffers
a loss even though the weather was good, so that no payout is given.
In a situation where an insurance might fail to payout, the insurance
becomes risky in itself. As a matter of fact, someone who purchased
an insurance can end up in a situation in which he paid the insurance
premium, suffers a loss and does not receive a payout. This scenario is
worse than any attainable situation had he not purchased insurance and
is therefore particularly unattractive for very risk-averse people. For this
reason, when risk aversion increases, demand for insurance might first
increase but it will eventually decrease (Clarke, 2011a; Dercon et al.,
2011; Doherty & Schlesinger, 1990). A lack of trust in the insurance,
in which case the insured also believes that he might not get a payout
when needed, is thus one way in which insurance can become unattrac-
tive for the most risk averse individuals. Dercon et al. (2011) look in
detail at the interaction between trust and risk aversion. They find
that, controlling for trust, slightly increasing risk aversion for risk-loving
individuals seems to have a positive effect on demand, but this effect
becomes negative as agents become more and more risk averse, that is,
extreme risk-aversion seems to decrease the likelihood to purchase the
insurance. In line with these findings, Giné et al. (2008) find that the
negative effect of risk-aversion on demand is mostly concentrated among
people who do not know the micro-finance institution selling the insur-
ance, and these are exactly the individuals who are expected to trust
the insurer the least. Ambiguity aversion provides another explanation
as to why risk aversion can decrease demand for insurance. Ambiguity
about the insurance, and aversion to this ambiguity, can make the most
risk averse individuals dislike the insurance. Bryan (2013), revisiting
the data of Giné & Yang (2009), finds that the negative effect of risk
aversion on demand is driven by ambiguity-averse individuals; demand
from non-ambiguity averse individuals is increasing with risk aversion,
as standard theory would suggest. In conclusion, there is evidence that
risk aversion can limit the demand for insurance, which is a source of
concern. When insurance is considered risky in itself, its usefulness as
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a risk-coping instrument is limited, and the most risk averse individ-
uals who should benefit most from insurance do not even purchase it.
Nonetheless, by reducing ambiguity about the product and increasing
trust in the insurer, it seems possible to retrieve the basic result that
insurance is most valued, and most often purchased, by individuals with
relatively strong risk aversion.
The effect of past shocks
An individual’s evaluation of an insurance contract does not only depend
on his level of risk-aversion, but also on his perception of the risks he
faces. In this sense, the frequency and intensity of past shocks may
have a strong influence on the perceptions of risks, and hence, affect
the demand for insurance products. Nonetheless, Cole et al. (2014) and
Stein (2014) do not find any clear evidence that having experienced a
weather shock increases the uptake of weather-based insurance.
In many instances, it is actually difficult to disentangle the exact rea-
sons why the experience of a shock might change demand for insurance.
Both a change in the perception of risk as well as the consequences of
the shock could have an influence on demand. Cai & Song (2013) pro-
vide a perhaps surprising result: the experience of hypothetical shocks
in a repeated insurance game has a strong positive effect on the demand
for real insurance. In fact, this effect is even stronger than the effect
of actually experiencing adverse events. On the other hand, Galarza &
Carter (2011) suspect a judgement bias leading to the opposite effect in
the project choices made by farmers in their Indian sample. When one
of them suffers a loss several times in a row, he seems to be tempted to
believe that chance will turn and that bad luck will not happen again
in the next cropping season. He would thus underestimate the auto-
correlation in the series of bad covariate shocks. A so-called "hot-hand
effect"4 might thus be at play in their sample, which drives farmers who
experienced many shocks to opt for riskier projects.
In short, the experience of past hazards does not always have a clear
impact on people’s perception of risk, which remains a quite subjective
matter.
4This "hot-hand effect" was first identified by Gilovich et al. (1985) who observed
that basketball fans judged that a player’s chances of hitting a shot was greater
following a successful shot than a miss.
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3.3 Low demand arising from supply deficiencies
When explaining low demand for insurance, the focus is usually on the
characteristics of people that we discussed in the previous section: lack of
education and understanding, particular behavioural patterns and other
cognitive problems – hence the focus on trainings in financial literacy to
improve demand. However, providing high quality insurance in develop-
ing countries, where transaction costs are high and good data is sparse,
is difficult. In this section, we discuss the different supply deficiencies
that might reduce demand.
3.3.1 Price
A first, commonly heard, explanation of low demand is that insurance
is simply too expensive for the poor. To recover transaction costs on
these small insurances, the commercial price of a micro-insurance is in-
deed substantially above the actuarially fair price (a mark-up of 50% is
no exception). In fact, Clarke (2011a) argues that the price of many un-
subsidized index-based insurances is so high that many expected utility
maximizers are better off not purchasing insurance (this is also because
of basis risk, see Section 3.3). Moreover, several studies which random-
ized the price of the insurance find a reasonably big price elasticity of
demand, ranging from 0.44 to 1.1 (Cole et al., 2013; Dercon et al., 2011;
Karlan et al., 2014). That prices are high is not the only explanation for
low demand. Even when prices are significantly below actuarially fair
prices, and any risk-averse expected utility maximizer should in princi-
ple buy it, bothCole et al. (2013) and Karlan et al. (2014) still observe
less than 50% take-up rates. Likewise, although Bonan et al. (2012) and
Thornton et al. (2010) offer health insurance for free during an initial
period, only around 30% take-up was achieved in their experiments.
We may therefore conclude that, while the price seems to have a
substantial impact on the willingness to buy insurance, in itself, a low
price is not enough to obtain a high demand.
3.3.2 Transaction costs for the client
In addition to transaction costs borne by the insurer, there are also trans-
action costs on the side of the insured which often implicitly increase the
price of the insurance substantially. Examples are the difficulty of pur-
chasing or renewing the insurance, the complexity of filing a claim, and
the difficulty with which premiums can be paid and payouts received.
The evidence suggests that these seemingly small costs can have im-
portant effects on demand. In Thornton et al. (2010), the enrolment
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procedure for the health insurance they offer in Nicaragua normally re-
quires about a day of work to complete. When, instead, they allow
market vendors to sign-up directly at their market stall, uptake is about
30 percentage points higher. Similarly, Capuno et al. (2014) show that a
comprehensive package of measures (including a 50% discount, SMS re-
minders to enrol and an information package) to boost health insurance
demand in the Philippines, had only a small effect (5 percentage points)
on demand. When, instead, they reduced transaction costs by offering
help to fill in the forms and bring them to the agency’s office, demand
increased by 36 percentage points. These are very significant increases.
3.3.3 Basis risk
As mentioned before, many insurance contracts, and in particular index-
insurance, come with basis-risk. For instance, a weather-index insurance
may fail to indemnify a farmer’s drought because the weather station,
which is not located on the farmer’s field, did not detect the drought.
We mentioned above Clarke’s point that many unsubsidized weather-
index insurances should not be purchased by any expected utility max-
imizer, and the reason for this is the high level of basis risk in these
products. In another setting, Jensen et al. (2014a) investigate the level
of basis risk of a well-designed and well-functioning index-insurance to
cover lifestock mortality in Kenya, in a setting were most risk is per-
ceived to be covariate and in principle insurable by an index insurance.
The insurance reduces exposure to covariate risk by 62 percent, but to
overall risk only by about 30 percent because idiosyncratic risk was un-
expectedly high. Nonetheless, they find that a majority of pastoralists,
but by no means all of them, would be better off buying the insurance at
commercial rates. Whether the level of basis risk is low enough to jus-
tify selling the insurance thus depends on the insurance. What is clear,
however, is that basis risk, by reducing the value of the insurance, can
also reduce demand for it.
Several studies provide evidence about the importance of basis risk.
Giné et al. (2008), studying demand for an index-insurance, argue that
those farmers who produce the crops for which the policy is designed
suffer from less basis risk. As these farmers are more likely to adopt the
insurance, they interpret this as a negative effect of basis risk on demand.
An arguably cleaner test is done by using the distance to a weather
station as a measure of basis risk in weather-index insurances. Mobarak
& Rosenzweig (2013), who randomly locate such weather stations, find a
negative effect of basis risk on demand. Finally, instead of such proxies,
Jensen et al. (2014b) use the actual level of basis risk faced by purchasers
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of the aforementioned livestock insurance. They find that areas where
there is more insurable covariate risk (and thus less basis risk) are about
30 percent more likely to purchase the insurance.
There are different explanations for the reduced demand when basis
risk is high. Clearly, basis risk reduces the value of the insurance and
should thus negatively affect demand. However, as discussed before,
different behavioural models that seem to explain insurance demand -
including ambiguity aversion, prospect theory and uncertainty aversion
– also point to a negative effect of basis risk on demand. For this reason,
Carter et al. (2015) argue that reducing basis risk should be a key concern
when developing insurance: It increases its value while improving the
chances that it is actually bought.
In order to minimize basis risk, it is important to ensure a high corre-
lation between the index and the losses suffered (Molini et al., 2008). In
this respect, Leblois & Quirion (2013) show that different indices have
widely different performances. For instance, Elabed et al. (2013) and
Carter et al. (2007) argue that, for a given area, the use of area yields
rather than weather data for agricultural index-insurances can signifi-
cantly reduce basis risk. While an area yield insurance is very effective
in reducing basis risk, it is not without problems. Ideally, payouts should
be based on average yields of a small area, such as the village of the
farmer. This might however introduce moral hazard: what if farmers
in the village collude to reduce yields to obtain payouts? For this rea-
son, Elabed et al. (2013) propose a multi-scale insurance contract where
payouts are based on average yields at multiple levels, for instance at
the village and the regional levels. They show that such a contract can
address concerns about moral hazard, while still substantially reducing
basis risk.
3.3.4 Contract design
Even if insuring a particular risk (health problems, failed harvest) is very
valuable to people, the actual value of the insurance will still depend, to
a large extent, on the contract design. When an agricultural insurance
comes with a lot of basis risk or a health insurance only provides access
to bad health services, the insurance will not be valuable. Similarly,
many specifics of the contract, such as its simplicity or the frequency of
payouts, also matter. We now discuss these different aspects of contract
design.
A first aspect of the contract design is the frequency with which the
insurance pays out. For instance, a health insurance can cover many or
only few health problems and an agricultural insurance can cover small
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or only catastrophic losses. If frequency of payments is too low, a lack
of payouts may jeopardize peoples’ trust in the new insurance product.
Yet, more frequent payouts imply a higher cost of the premiums which,
in turn, may reduce demand for the insurance product. Nonetheless,
Norton et al. (2014) find strong evidence that people prefer a contract
with more frequent payouts. Another possibility is to incorporate dif-
ferent levels of payout Elabed et al. (2013). One would then obtain a
partial compensation quite frequently whereas full compensation would
only be triggered when losses are very big. Moreover, individuals re-
ceiving a payout are also universally more likely to renew their contract
(Cole et al., 2014; Fitzpatrick et al., 2011; Dong et al., 2009; Platteau
& Ontiveros, 2013; Stein, 2014), which gives an additional reason for
preferring contracts with frequent payouts.
Another important challenge of the contract design is to find a subtle
mix between simplicity and flexibility. On the one hand, a complex
contract, even when perfectly tailored to the clients’ needs, may be badly
understood and therefore reduce the take-up or renewal rate. On the
other hand, a simple but rigid contract may fail to meet the needs of the
subscribers. Hill et al. (2011) offer an interesting alternative by tailoring
the insurance to the client’s specific needs through a combination of
several simple contracts. They offer different weather securities that pay
out a fixed amount if a specified event comes true. More specifically,
the events may be monthly rainfall deficits with the farmers choosing
for which months they want to insure against deficit rainfall. These
"mini-contracts" offer them the ability to choose the type and number
of securities, depending on their crop portfolio and production practices
in a given year. Each contract is thus personalized. At the same time,
the complexity of the product is increased. Nonetheless, as take-up in
their study was quite reasonable, the complexity did not seem to be a
substantial barrier to adoption.
Finally, the modalities of premium payments can be important. This
is an issue for health insurances especially since, in an effort to limit
adverse selection, the entire family is often required to enrol at once.
In such cases, the total premium can be high. People therefore seem
to prefer paying the premium in different instalments and paying bigger
parts of the premium when more money is available, for instance just
after the harvest (De Allegri et al., 2006).
3.3.5 Quality of services
When the insurance provides services rather than money, the quality of
these services obviously affects the value of the insurance. For health
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insurance, the package mostly covers services in a designated health cen-
tre, and the (perceived) lack of quality of this centre is often identified
as one of the most important impediments to the take-up of health in-
surance (Criel & Waelkens, 2003; Basaza et al., 2008; De Allegri et al.,
2006). Additionally, the distance to the health facility can also matter
(Schneider & Diop, 2004). De Allegri et al. (2006) warn, however, that
people have heterogeneous preferences over health centres and do not
necessarily prefer to be assigned to the closest one.
The quality of the services is a factor which people can better evaluate
after having experienced the insurance and should thus affect renewal
more than initial demand. Dong et al. (2009) indeed find that perception
about the quality of the health centre is an important factor underlying
the decision to renew. The authors report that disliking the behaviour
of the medical staff is the second most cited reason for not renewing
the insurance, only preceded by a concern about affordability. Yet, as
with all factors affecting demand, also using high quality health centres
is not, in itself, enough to ensure a high demand and renewal: Platteau
& Ontiveros (2013) argue that in the dysfunctional insurance they study
the health centres were actually carefully selected by the NGO which
organized the micro-insurance scheme.
3.3.6 Information
A more basic lack of information about the necessary procedures and the
administrative burden is another reason for clients not to buy or renew
their insurance. Both Fitzpatrick et al. (2011) and Platteau & Ontiveros
(2013) observe that many individuals who dropped out of a health insur-
ance scheme reported not knowing where to make payments. While these
examples may only point at ill-managed schemes, they do indicate that
the effective transmission of information should not be overlooked in im-
plementing an insurance scheme. More generally, Platteau & Ontiveros
(2013) also find that a lack of information has an important negative
effect on renewal. Making people well-informed is therefore crucial if one
wishes to build a sustainable insurance scheme.
However, being informed about the insurance is, in itself, not suffi-
cient for a sustained demand. An approach that is sometimes advocated
is to subsidize insurance for an initial period and hope for a sustained
demand after the removal of the subsidy. The idea is that the insured
will then have acquired experience and knowledge about the insurance.
Fitzpatrick et al. (2011) test this intuition with a health insurance prod-
uct in Nicaragua. They find that, while a strong subsidy significantly
increases initial take-up, many of the clients drop out after its expiration.
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This confirms the intuition that those who purchase the insurance only
because it is subsidized are least enthusiastic about the product. Even
though overall take-up once all subsidies are ended is somewhat higher
among those who initially received the subsidies than among those who
did not, the results do not support the idea of using initial subsidies as a
cost-effective way of increasing coverage. This finding is consistent with
the work of Thornton et al. (2010), also conducted in Nicaragua, where
less than 10% of the enrolled clients decided to renew their subscription
after one year and after the expiration of the subsidies. Their results
also indicate that the clients who received the highest subsidies were
least likely to renew their contract.
3.4 Trust
By purchasing an insurance, an individual accepts to disburse a regular
premium in return for an uncertain future payout. In contrast to micro-
credit, one gives money first and receives it only later. One therefore
needs to trust the insurer to actually payout when required, and the
level of trust is expected to have an influence on demand. Following
Patt et al. (2009), let us distinguish between three levels of trust: trust
in the product itself, trust in the institution involved, and the degree of
interpersonal trust among individuals.
First, trust in the product itself is closely related to the understand-
ing of the product. In order to maintain trust in the product, a potential
client must clearly see that by paying a premium, he (she) will be able
to make choices free from the fear of losing his (her) investment in case
of an adverse shock. Platteau & Ontiveros (2013) indeed find that in-
surance understanding and trust in the insurer are highly correlated and
often difficult to disentangle from each other. In this respect, Patt et al.
(2009) discuss the ability of experimental research to build trust in the
product. They assemble considerable evidence from case studies to show
that, through participatory methods, farmers are able to learn how the
insurance contract works, and how to explain it accurately to others. In
addition to enhancing understanding of insurance, they argue that such
games are also valuable in building trust in the product. Another key
property of the insurance that may affect trust is basis risk. The insur-
ance might be considered of low quality and not trustworthy when losses
are frequently incurred while no indemnity payment is received from the
index insurance.
The second dimension of trust - trust in the institutions involved - is
the dimension of trust most discussed in the literature. Several factors
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which influence trust in the institution can be identified: experience with
the institution, the involvement of known and trusted individuals, trust
in the management of the institution, and other external factors. The
potential trust-building role of experience with the institution that de-
livers the insurance is highlighted by the fact that experiencing a payout
seems to be an important factor in the decision to renew: receiving a pay-
out is systematically associated with substantially higher renewal rates
(Cole et al., 2014; Fitzpatrick et al., 2011; Dong et al., 2009; Platteau
& Ontiveros, 2013; Stein, 2014). A difficulty in assessing whether these
payouts actually cause higher renewal rates, is that they might correlate
with other factors influencing renewal. The shock that triggers the pay-
out can indeed in itself influence the decision to renew. Similarly, less
healthy individuals receive more payouts from a health insurance (now
and in the future) and should therefore value insurance more. However,
Platteau & Ontiveros (2013) find that, even when controlling for indi-
viduals’ current health status, the effective use of a health insurance in
case of illness increases the likelihood of renewal. Similarly, Stein (2014)
and Cole et al. (2014) provide evidence that weather shocks do not drive
take-up decisions, and it is therefore the actual occurrence of payouts
which increases contract renewal.
The most likely explanation of the positive effect of payouts on re-
newals is that they enhance trust in the insurer, but other explanations
have also been proposed. Stein (2014) argues that increased renewal can
be ascribed to loss-aversion: without payout, the payment of the pre-
mium is seen as a loss, while with a payout, the premium payment is
seen as reducing the payout, and thus reducing a gain. As the loss is felt
more strongly than the reduced gain, a payout thus makes the payment
of the premium less painful and increases the probability of renewing the
contract. Cole et al. (2014) as well as Karlan et al. (2014) however find
that uptake also increases when one’s peers receive a payout, which is
not consistent with this explanation, but rather points to increased trust
following the payout. Moreover, Cole et al (2013a) find direct evidence
for the trust explanation: people who have received a payout report to
have substantially (though not significantly) more trust in the insurer.
Payouts thus seem to increase renewal by increasing trust in the insurer.
Additionally, it is important to note that a general distrust in finan-
cial institutions, or a bad experience with other institutions, can decrease
trust in new insurers. Basaza et al. (2008), for instance, claim that it
took two years to overcome distrust, caused by bad previous experience,
thanks to positive experience with a new insurance. Finally, Patt et al.
(2009) report that farmers say that they put their greatest trust in or-
ganizations that they themselves are members of and that, in general,
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trust increases with experience with the organization. Similarly, mem-
bers of self-help groups have been found by Platteau & Ontiveros (2013)
to be more likely not only to subscribe but also to renew their health
micro-insurance contract.
The involvement of known and trusted individuals in the insurance is
also shown to have a substantial influence on the demand for insurance.
Giné et al. (2008) find that members of borewell user associations in
India, who are more likely to know the insurance vendor personally, are
37 percentage points more likely to buy the insurance contract, or 7
percentage points more likely when they restrict the sample to existing
customers of the MFI. Those figures are however to be considered with
caution since the authors could not control for the marketing intensity
of the insurance product in the direction of village opinion leaders and
existing customers, which may partly account for this effect. Similarly,
Cole et al. (2013) find a strong and significant effect of introducing an
insurance educator into the visited households by a local trusted agent
from BASIX. The interpretation that such an agent enhances trust is
strengthened by the fact that, amongst households familiar with the
BASIX microfinance institution there is a 10 percentage point increase
when a BASIX agent does the introduction, while there is no significant
effect for those who are not familiar with BASIX. Indeed, for the latter,
an unknown agent would not be expected to enhance trust.
Dong et al. (2009) identify trust in the management of the community
health scheme as an important factor influencing households’ probability
of enrolling. The involvement of known and trusted individuals in such
a scheme could thus have a positive effect on demand. De Allegri et al.
(2006), however, note that although people like to have representatives of
the community-health scheme at the local level, they prefer the money
to be managed outside of the community (such concerns can be well-
founded; see Vanderwalle (2015) for an example of elite capture of local
resources). When there is a lack of trust in the community management,
the involvement of people representing it can thus have a negative effect
on take-up.
Finally, external factors can have an influence on trust placed in
the insurer. Schneider & Diop (2004) and Patankar (2011) point at the
potential trust-building role of legal and institutional support. More-
over, Patankar (2011), studying an index-insurance, indicates that people
would place more trust in the measurement of the index if it is certified
by the government.
The last aspect of trust which can have an influence on insurance
uptake is interpersonal trust. If an individual does not trust his circle
of friends and neighbours, he may be, in general, less trusting in others.
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Therefore, he may be suspicious when requested to take part in a formal
risk pooling organization. Patt et al. (2009) argue that trust in other
people responds to various social and cultural factors. This aspect of
trust is often measured through variants of the trust game initiated by
Berg et al. (1995). Here again, one should be aware of what is captured
by the trust measure. Some games try not to confound the trust effect
with altruistic motivations, by first playing a dictator game5. It is also
possible to distinguish trust from fairness considerations. When com-
paring empirical studies that probe into the issue of trust, we therefore
need to be precise about the content of the trust measure. The trust
game is, for instance, used in the study of Dercon et al. (2011) regarding
a composite health insurance product in Kenya, and the authors show
that low interpersonal trust levels correlate negatively with insurance
uptake.
3.5 Insurance substitutes
Micro-insurance is not the only option to mitigate and cope with risks.
Other tools such as credit, precautionary savings, informal risk-sharing
agreements, and self-insurance strategies also offer (partial) protection
against risks. By providing a substitute for insurance, the availability of
these tools can reduce the demand for micro-insurance.
The aim of the present section is therefore to investigate how these
alternative strategies perform in insuring poor people against adverse
shocks. In particular, it will point at the benefits and limitations of
these tools as risk-coping devices. Moreover, as they can affect demand
for insurance beyond providing a simple substitute, this section will also
highlight the different interactions between these risk-coping tools and
the demand for insurance.
3.5.1 Credit and savings
Liquidity constraints
Access to credit can affect insurance demand in several ways. First, im-
perfect credit markets may prevent those who face liquidity constraints
from taking up insurance. Most evidence is consistent with the fact that
liquidity constraints are a significant barrier to the take-up of insurance.
5In this game (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), players receive a monetary endow-
ment and are asked to send all, part or nothing of it to another player, whose identity
is not revealed. The higher the amount sent, the more altruistic the agent is consid-
ered.
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Wealthier individuals are typically more likely to buy insurance(Cole
et al., 2013; Gaurav et al., 2011; Giné & Yang, 2009). Additionally,
handing out money right before the purchase decision, which relaxes po-
tential liquidity constraints, significantly increases take-up (Cole et al.,
2013). Of course, take-up might increase simply because money is given
and people reciprocate by doing the perceived right thing: buying in-
surance. Cole et al. (2013), however, argue that liquidity constraints
matter because they observe that the big endowment has a larger effect
on poorer individuals, for whom liquidity constraints are more likely to
be binding.
Karlan et al. (2014), however, reach opposite conclusions. They find
that giving cash grants increase insurance take-up (irrespective of its
price) in a credit constrained environment. They argue that the main
mechanism driving the higher take-up is the signal cash grants give to
the recipients (and their peers) rather than the alleviation of a liquidity
problem. Indeed, they bring evidence to discard the wealth effect and
conclude that people either reciprocate the benefit of a grant by buying
the insurance or that they have increased trust in the insurance when
they have received a cash grant.
Remittances are another way of relaxing liquidity constraints. Yet,
their impact on the decision to purchase the insurance is ambiguous. In-
deed, beyond increasing income, remittances also provide self-insurance,
and thereby, substitute for micro-insurance. Crayen et al. (2013) show
that remittances, after controlling for income, act as a substitute with
respect to formal funeral insurance in a context where the budget con-
straint is binding. Likewise, Giesbert et al. (2011) show that those who
have received remittances in the past, and could thus potentially receive
remittances in the future to cope with a shock, are less likely to take up
insurance.
Credit as substitute for insurance
An additional way in which credit can affect insurance demand is through
its role of consumption smoothing, thus allowing to cope partially with
the consequences of an adverse shock. Nonetheless, credit is a highly
imperfect insurance instrument for several reasons. First, although credit
allows to spread the effects of a shock over time, a big shock will still
leave one worse off than in the case the shock had not occurred. Since a
risk-averse individual prefers to perfectly smooth consumption, both over
time and over states of nature, this is suboptimal. Second, the likelihood
to be granted a loan for insurance purposes could actually be lower than
normal, precisely because it is requested when the individual is most
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vulnerable and thus least likely to be able to repay. Finally, the serious
consequences in case of default increase the risk faced by resourceless
individuals.
A more hybrid transaction, half-way between credit and insurance,
has been identified by Platteau & Abraham (1987) as "quasi-credit".
Incidentally, by letting repayment depend on the situation of both bor-
rower and lender - transactions are personalized with the possibility to
renegotiate reimbursement following shocks and loans are often made
without interests - quasi-credit suffers less from the aforementioned lim-
itations. It is even debatable whether it is best described as credit or as
risk-sharing agreement (Platteau & Abraham, 1987; Udry, 1990).
Whether access to credit is positively or negatively correlated with
the demand for insurance is unclear. Giné et al. (2008) find that those
who are credit-rationed, that is, those who want a loan but are not able
to get one, are significantly less likely to purchase insurance. As for Hill
et al. (2013), they observe that those who deem themselves capable of
gathering a certain sum of money in a week if necessary, are less likely
to purchase insurance. The evidence is therefore rather inconclusive.
Savings
Savings, in cash or in the form of marketable assets, allow to cope with
the consequences of risk in a way very similar to credit. As a (self-
)insurance device, savings also face the limitation that shocks are spread
over time rather than over states of nature. In addition, the size of the
shock which savings can help to overcome is bounded by the amount of
the available savings. This is a major limitation, especially when several
shocks occur in a short period of time. Another drawback of precau-
tionary savings is that it has a cost, namely the investments potentially
forgone.
Interlinking of insurance, credit and savings
Besides the potential of credit and savings to substitute for insurance in
coping with risks, there may also exist complementarities, for example
by interlinking credit and insurance. Indeed, the possibility of default
on a loan creates risk for both the bank, who might lose part of its
money, and the customer, who might lose his (her) collateral. In this
case, offering credit together with an insurance has several advantages
(Carter et al., 2011): the bank, facing a lower default rate, can charge a
lower interest rate and the customer, facing less risk and a lower interest
rate, has two reasons to demand more credit. Moreover, as the credit
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is linked to insurance, a higher demand for credit will automatically
increase insurance take-up. However, this may be dangerous if clients are
not aware of what they actually buy and are, somehow, forced to take the
insurance along with the loan. This approach would then go against all
efforts to make the product understandable. Nonetheless, when a farmer
faces a profitable but risky investment opportunity - such as the purchase
of high-yielding seeds - an interlinked credit and insurance contract could
be the only tool available to make the investment attractive, and would
thus be especially valuable (Carter et al., 2011).
Several studies investigate the effect of jointly offering credit and in-
surance. Giné & Yang (2009), when offering credit to finance investment
for new seeds, randomly oblige one group of customers to jointly take-up
an index-based insurance (at market price) to mitigate the risk inher-
ent in taking a credit for the adoption of a new technology. Similarly,
Banerjee et al. (2014) study a situation where a micro-credit organisa-
tion obliges clients to take an obligatory health insurance when taking a
loan. Although the expectation is that insurance makes the adoption of
credit less risky and thus more attractive, both papers find the opposite
effect: Giné & Yang (2009) find that the take-up decreases by 13 percent-
age points while Banerjee et al. (2014) find a decrease of 16 percentage
points. These results are driven by a low demand for insurance, which
was well warranted given its low quality. In the case of Giné & Yang
(2009), there was limited liability for reimbursing the credit and clients
were thus asked to insure against a risk for which they were already par-
tially insured. In the case of Banerjee et al. (2014), clients did not receive
information about the insurance and very few actually ended up using
it. In the light of these circumstances, a low demand for insurance may
not be surprising, but it does teach us another important lesson: Making
insurance mandatory should only be considered when it has proven to
be well-functioning and provide effective protection so that it is truly
valuable.
Using a lab experiment, which allows to simulate a situation with
a well-functioning and voluntary insurance, Galarza & Carter (2011)
arrive at a more optimistic conclusion about the interlinking of credit
and insurance. They find that 60% of people who do not take up credit
in the absence of insurance, do take credit when it is secured by an
insurance. This indicates that demand for insurance in such a setting
can be high, and that interlinking credit and insurance can increase
demand for credit and motivate the purchase of insurance. This study
therefore goes against the conclusions reached by Giné & Yang (2009).
There can also be complementarities between savings and insurance.
As we know, when insurance comes with much basis risk - as is the
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case for many index insurances - its value decreases substantially. In
this situation, savings are especially useful to cope with situations in
which a shock occurs but the insurance fails to payout. For this reason,
savings limit the negative effects of insurance and improved access to
savings could effectively increase demand for insurance with much basis
risk (Clarke et al., 2012). In an experiment to assess whether linking
savings and insurance could increase uptake, Stein & Tobacman (2012)
find that people in fact prefer a pure insurance or pure savings product
over a mixture of the two. In another experiment, Clarke et al. (2012)
offer people the opportunity to allocate money to different index and
health insurances. When a "group savings" scheme is added to the op-
tions available, demand for index-insurance could increase due to the
complementarities between savings and insurance with basis risk. They
nevertheless find that the introduction of savings does not significantly
change demand for index-insurance, suggesting that these complemen-
tarities are not very important. Yet, people do indicate that savings are
an important part of their risk-management strategy since they allocate
a good part of their money to the group savings scheme.
3.5.2 Informal risk-sharing networks
Besides the aforementioned individual risk-coping strategies, people can
also engage in informal insurance mechanisms in which they mutually
provide help to each other in times of need. Such informal arrange-
ments allow to cope with unexpected health or schooling expenses, nec-
essary disbursements for funerals or other important ceremonies, among
other things. They can take the form of actual risk-sharing groups, such
as funeral societies, or of flexible transfers between family and friends
(Fafchamps & Lund, 2003). When efficient, such informal risk-pooling
agreements can crowd-out insurance (Arnott & Stiglitz, 1991). Com-
pared to micro-insurance they present informational advantages since
members can monitor each other more efficiently, but they have the draw-
back to represent only a limited pool of risks. An “insurance dilemma”
thus arises (Platteau, 1991). The limited pool of risk not only weakens
their ability to deal with large covariate shocks, but also threatens their
stability if multiple idiosyncratic shocks occur in a short period of time.
Informal risk-sharing agreements can therefore influence demand for
insurance in different ways. On the one hand, insurance and informal
risk-sharing can be considered as substitutes. Yet, if people start leaving
informal groups because of the offer of micro-insurance, the risk pool
of the risk-sharing group is reduced, which makes them less effective in
coping with risk (Fafchamps, 1992). For this reason, participation in for-
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mal micro-insurance schemes might be discouraged by group members.
Moreover, membership of a risk-sharing group could delay the adoption
of insurance when the group cannot be left immediately. When, for in-
stance, one has received or be given more than the others in a funeral
society, it might not be permitted or desirable to leave right away.
On the other hand, one can also consider the take-up of insurance as
the adoption of an innovation. Here, it is typically the more educated,
wealthier, and less risk-averse individuals who are early adopters (Rogers,
1995). However, those who are more accustomed to similar technologies
are more likely to adopt the innovation. In this case, informal risk-
sharing agreements might be such a similar technology and membership
might thus encourage adoption.
Complementarities may exist between informal risk-sharing and in-
surance in much the same way as they exist between savings and in-
surance. First, risk-sharing groups can be an especially efficient way of
spreading information about insurance, thereby promoting its uptake.
In addition, because an insured individual is better protected against
shocks and is more able to help other members of the group, he is of
more value to them. On this count, insurance participation should be
encouraged by group members. Conversely, when an insurance comes
with much basis risk and a risk-sharing agreement succeeds in provid-
ing coverage when the insurance fails to pay out, improved risk-sharing
attenuates the negative effect of the basis risk and can thereby increase
demand for insurance. Mobarak & Rosenzweig (2013) find that when
they cover similar types of risks, informal risk-sharing is a substitute for
micro-insurance. Such substitution effects should not be at play when
the informal insurance covers other risks, and indeed they do not find
an effect of the extent of informal coverage of idiosyncratic risks on the
demand for insurance when there is little basis risk. However, when basis
risk is high, more informal coverage of idiosyncratic risks has a positive
effect on demand, confirming the idea that informal coverage can attenu-
ate the negative effects of basis risk present in micro-insurance contracts.
These results thus confirm that, by exploiting complementarities with ex-
isting risk-coping strategies in the design of insurance, both the value of,
and demand for, micro-insurance can increase (Clarke, 2011b).
One way to exploit such complementarities is proposed by Clarke
& Dercon (2009) and (Clarke, 2011b). Instead of offering insurance to
individuals, they propose to offer insurance to groups to pre-existing
risk-sharing groups. These groups have many advantages over micro-
insurance, such as lower transaction costs and less asymmetric informa-
tion. However, their stability is also continuously threatened by a big
covariate shock, or multiple idiosyncratic ones. By, for instance, pro-
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viding an index-based insurance to a pre-existing risk-pooling group or
by re-insuring those informal groups when multiple adverse shocks occur
over a short period of time, an insurance can significantly strengthen such
groups. Conversely, the group has the necessary information to spread
the benefits of the insurance payouts to the members who are most in
need, and it can thereby increase the value of insurance. In this way,
informal risk-sharing groups and micro-insurance, instead of competing,
could strengthen each other.
In a study by Dercon et al. (2014), a first attempt is made at under-
standing whether such complementarities can be exploited by offering
insurance to pre-existing risk-sharing groups. In particular, the prod-
uct sold is still an individual index-based insurance, but a group-focused
training is provided to some group leaders which emphasizes the benefits
of the insurance to the group and explains how basis risk can be atten-
uated through side-payments inside the group. As the group-focused
training of the leaders leads to a 15 percentage points higher take-up
than the ordinary training, people seem to be at least receptive to the
idea of combining informal and formal risk-sharing, which is promising
with respect to its potential to increase demand.
3.5.3 Other substitutes for insurance
In order to reduce the risk they face, and, for instance, protect them-
selves against a harvest failure, individuals may prefer to opt for a low
return, low risk production strategy instead of a high return, high risk
one. When comparing such self-insurance strategies to micro-insurance,
it is important to realize that, as argued by Carter et al. (2011), these
strategies are "neither actuarially fair, nor free of basis risk". Indeed, the
reduction in average productivity makes self-insurance strategies costly
while their failure to remove all risks amounts to the presence of basis
risk. Thus, when micro-insurance allows to relax certain self-insurance
strategies, the question is not whether it is too costly or carries too much
basis risk, but whether it is more efficient in dealing with risk than the
self-insurance strategies it replaces (Carter et al., 2011).
Finally, depending on the context, several other risk-coping instru-
ments are available. As pointed out above, family members informally
share risk through flexible transfers. Jowett (2003) thus finds that where
private transfers among people are important, people are less likely to
purchase health insurance.
To sum up, micro-insurance is developed in an environment where
people have access to a variety of tools to cope with risk. When de-
veloping an insurance, it is thus critical to understand which risks are
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least covered by existing arrangements since micro-insurance is likely to
be most valuable, and in highest demand, when it complements rather
than substitutes for existing arrangements. As we have seen, the differ-
ent existing risk-coping strategies are generally least effective for large
shocks, and even more so when covariant risks are at stake. These risks
are therefore the main source of the comparative advantage of micro-
insurance (Clarke & Dercon, 2009). For smaller, idiosyncratic risks,
micro-insurances schemes are not necessarily the best instrument to the
extent that their effectiveness may be hampered by informational prob-
lems and high transaction costs. Nonetheless, since even those specific
risks are only incompletely covered by existing methods, even here micro-
insurance could potentially offer some additional protection.
3.6 Conclusion
Perhaps the most puzzling question regarding micro-insurance is the fol-
lowing: why are take-up and renewal rates so low while micro-insurance
may significantly increase the protection of the poor against adverse
shocks?
Paradoxically, demand seems to be negatively correlated with risk
aversion whereas it should be valued as a risk-coping instrument. This
observation emphasizes the current limitations of micro-insurance. Var-
ious theories offer possible explanations for the paradox. Yet, evidence
is far from decisive. In particular, lack of knowledge about the nature
and technical characteristics of micro-insurance products is not sufficient
to account for low demand. Indeed, although literacy training appears
to significantly enhance knowledge by shedding light on the specificities
of complex insurance products, it is less efficient when it comes to en-
hancing demand. An important reason may be that people need to have
a good grasp of the very notion of insurance, and not only of techni-
cal characteristics, to be able to correctly perceive its benefits. In this
respect, it is revealing that many demand-related problems discussed in
this paper have also been observed in the context of developed economies,
the United States in particular. Kunreuther et al. (2013) have labelled
these problems the “underpurchase demand-side anomaly”.
Moreover, several other factors also influence the purchase decisions
of individuals. As expected, demand responds to changes in the price
of the product, with a higher take-up when the premium becomes more
affordable. However, a low price is not enough to obtain a high demand.
Thus, a wide range of evidence illustrates how a lack of trust, which may
itself be caused by a lack of understanding of the insurance concept,
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may also constrain demand. Poor quality of the product is unanimously
regarded in the empirical literature as another factor that contributes
to lower demand. The evidence is, however, much more divided when
it comes to the availability of credit. It is not clear whether individuals
who have easy access to loans are more likely to subscribe, or not.
In the light of these considerations, what can be done to enhance de-
mand? In which field is further research needed? In the current context,
two options are conceivable. The first is to rethink the insurance con-
tracts in order to mitigate the various problems highlighted above. One
could, for instance, imagine a double-trigger contract for index insur-
ance, which would offer frequent payouts, and, at the same time, cover
big shocks. Further research in this direction is desirable. Adapting
the modalities by spreading the premium payments over several months,
in order to relax liquidity constraints, is another possibility. We also
discussed the potential of interlinking insurance with credit or savings.
However, this may also imply negative consequences if, for instance, peo-
ple are not aware or do not understand the product they buy. Moreover,
we need to think about reliable ways to reduce the basis risk inherent
to an insurance contract. To overcome the many other factors limit-
ing demand, innovations in micro-insurance are necessary and should be
imagined. Many of the conceivable ideas, however, give rise to trade-
offs between the necessary simplicity of the contract and the flexibility
it offers to the client. For this reason, they are unlikely to dramatically
increase demand.
Therefore, we explored the potential of informal risk-sharing arrange-
ments as an alternative way of increasing the attractiveness of micro-
insurance. We believe that more research could help better understand
the possible complementarities between formal and informal practices,
for instance by offering insurance via the vehicle of a pre-existing, infor-
mal group. In addition, trust in the insurance can be built in several
ways: involving trusted organizations or individuals; ensuring sufficient
payouts to create a positive experience; or adding government certifi-
cation and regulation to avoid that defaulting insurers break trust in
others. These are some promising ideas but more work is required to
identify the most effective ways to enhance trust in the product itself
and in the institution delivering the insurance. Finally, more attention
ought to be given to the problem of low renewal rates, which has been
largely disregarded so far. One useful direction for research would be to
look at the long term impact of literacy training on renewal rates. Are
those who attended a training session less prone to be disappointed in
the absence of payout and, therefore, more likely to renew? What is the
scope and is there value added in a potential follow-up of the clients?
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Finally, mandatory state-directed insurance may appear as the ulti-
mate solution to the failures of micro-insurance. But there are two major
problems with state insurance. First, it may not reach people in the in-
formal sector because the payment of the premium is not enforceable.
Second, it may give rise to severe management or governance problems
akin to state failure. In the end, comparing the effectiveness of manda-
tory state-directed insurance with that of micro-insurance comes down
to assessing state versus market failures. Interest in micro-insurance was
actually caused by state failure as attested by the disappointing perfor-
mances and insufficient outreach of state insurance schemes. The fact
that micro-insurance has not proven as effective as initially hoped for
shows that the question of the respective roles of state and private in-
surance should be squarely put back on the research agenda.
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Anchoring when measuring
expectations: A
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Abstract
We conduct an experiment on the methodology of measuring expecta-
tions. We elicit income expectations of prospective migrants in Burkina
Faso planning to go and work on a gold mine. To do so, we elicit prob-
abilities to earn different amounts of money, but we randomize these
amounts: Some respondents are asked about bigger amounts than oth-
ers. This seemingly irrelevant methodological change has an important
effect on the responses. Median expected incomes are up to four times
higher when expectations are elicited over big amounts instead of small
amounts. We argue that people anchor to the proposed amounts and
adjust their responses accordingly. Moreover, this undesirable effect is
bigger for people with no previous experience in mining, who likely are
less knowledgeable about the income distribution. These results suggest
caution is needed when eliciting and using expectations data, in partic-
ular when respondents do not know the distribution well.
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4.1 Introduction
Expectations are a key ingredient in many economic decisions. Indeed,
many decisions involve uncertainty, and expectations about this uncer-
tainty shape the decisions people make. As a consequence, much theo-
retical work in economics incorporate expectations.
Empirical work, however, has not followed suit and only very rarely
addresses expectations directly. For instance, while rational expecta-
tions are an important assumption in many models, there is very little
empirical work that sheds light on the validity of this assumption. Un-
doubtedly, the main reason for this lacuna is that expectations are only
rarely measured in surveys. This, in turn, is probably a consequence of
a general skepticism among economists about the ability to accurately
measure people’s expectations.
Recent work suggests however that this skepticism is not necessarily
warranted. In a review paper on measuring expectations, Manski (2004)
argues that measured expectations are generally coherent, accurate and
meaningful and recommends that more surveys incorporate the measure-
ment of expectations. Delavande et al. (2011b) argue that the same is
true even in developing countries where low levels of education could
complicate measuring expectations. Moreover, when comparing differ-
ent elicitation methodologies, Delavande et al. (2011a) find remarkably
similar results, increasing further still our confidence in these measure-
ments.
Yet, while measured expectations usually accurately predict actual
outcomes, this is not always the case when respondents are badly in-
formed (Jensen 2010; Delavande & Kohler 2009; McKenzie et al. 2013).
These badly informed people could, of course, have wrong expectations.
But these result could also suggest that measured expectations are not
reliable when respondents are uniformed. For this reason, Delavande
et al. (2011a) call for more methodological experiments involving less
well informed respondents.
In this paper, we do exactly that. We elicit income expectations
of prospective migrants in Burkina Faso planning to go and work on
a gold mine and randomly vary the way these expectations are elicited.
Concretely, we elicit probabilities to earn different amounts of money, but
we randomize these amounts: Some respondents are asked about bigger
amounts than others. Testing whether responses change following this
seemingly irrelevant methodological change allows to test how reliable
answers are. Moreover, since some respondents have experience in mining
while others do not, we can also compare the reliability of answers based
on how well informed people are.
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We find that answers depend strongly on the way the question is
asked. Median expected incomes are up to four times higher when expec-
tations are elicited over big amounts instead of small amounts. Moreover,
this undesirable effect is bigger for people with no previous experience in
mining, suggesting that less informed individuals indeed give less reliable
answers.
These results thus suggest caution is needed when using these data.
Clearly, we can not infer whether expectations are, for instance, too
optimistic. Moreover, the biases we find are big and heterogeneous (ex-
perienced people are less affected). As such, the data measure as much
experience in mining as they do expectations, and even using the data
as a simple proxy for expectations can be problematic.
We argue that these results are driven by “anchoring", a psycholog-
ical phenomenon by which people’s answers are affected by a seemingly
irrelevant number that is presented. For instance, people’s answers to a
factual questions are affected by the outcome of spinning a wheel (Tver-
sky & Kahneman 1974). This phenomenon has been studied extensively
in psychology (see Furnham & Boo (2011) for a review). Likewise, the
inconsistency of answers in contingent valuation tasks (Diamond & Haus-
man 1994) has been repeatedly linked to anchoring effects (Green et al.
1998; O’Conor et al. 1999; Van Exel et al. 2006; Luchini & Watson 2013).
Our results are perfectly in line with these literatures. As usual, we find
that anchoring effects are big and that they are most pronounced on peo-
ple with less knowledge about the subject. Our main contribution with
respect to these literatures is that we confirm these results in a setting
where multiple anchors are presented instead of just one, as is typically
done in contingent valuation and psychological studies on anchoring.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next
section we describe the experiment and show the main results. In Sec-
tion 4.4 we argue that the most likely explanation of these results are
anchoring effects and in Section 4.5 we address the problems that such
anchoring effects create. To understand when anchoring effects might
arise, and what can be done to avoid them, Section 4.6 discusses the
factors affecting anchoring effects. The last section concludes.
4.2 Experiment
4.2.1 Setting
The experiment was done with a sample of 112 coton farmers in South-
West Burkina Faso. The experiment was part of a larger-scale project
studying insurance for cotton farmers.
112
CHAPTER 4. MEASURING EXPECTATIONS
While the main occupation of the respondents is farming, expecta-
tions were elicited on the returns to artisinal gold mining. Following
big increases in gold prices over the last decade, artisanal gold mining
is a widespread activity in most of Burkina Faso. As opposed to indus-
trial gold mining, artisanal gold mining is mainly done manually on sites
(ranging from a few workers to several thousand ones) all across Burkina
Faso. Throughout the study area there are active gold mines close to the
villages (at a distance of a few up to 50 km) of the respondents. Work
on the gold mines is mostly done during the dry, lean season when there
is little agricultural work.
The sample consists of farmers who are household head and who in
the month following the harvest season (the moment of the interview)
were considering to go and work on a gold mine. Out of 1014 farmers
interviewed, 112 were considering to go and work on a gold mine1. We
elicited expectations about the income they were expecting to earn on
the gold mine.
Income from gold mining is highly uncertain. Once arrived on a
mining site, people group in small groups of about 6 and work in one
pit. Gold found in the pit is shared among the group members and is
converted to cash on the site itself. Most sites are illegal and all the
income is kept by the team members2. As can be expected, returns from
mining is very uncertain. Figure 4.1 shows the historical distribution of
earnings for 1 month of work on the mines. The distribution is heavily
skewed to the right: Few people earn big amounts, while many earn little
(and about 25% earn nothing at all).
The respondents are all cotton farmers who are also prospective min-
ers. Table 4.1 shows some of their characteristics. About 62 % had
experience in mining at the moment of the interview, the others were
expecting to leave for the first time. The ones with experience typically
have a recent experience: 84 % of them has worked on a mine during the
last year. The respondents are all household heads and are on average 38
years old. The general level of education is low: 80 % has no education,
and the average number of years of education is 4.3 for the ones who did
get education. 32 % can read and write in at least one language.
1About 28 % of these farmers actually ended up leaving for the mines. For
comparison, about 5% of the other respondents ended up going to the mines.
2In a small number of legal sites, a “mining company" is present. However, the
only role of the mining company is to guard the site, prevent conflicts and collect a
small part of the miner’s revenues in return. Miners are never in wage labour and
their income is a direct function of the gold they find.
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Figure 4.1: Historical distribution of earnings on a gold mine for a month
of work. Total yearly earnings of miners (who worked at most 2 months
on the mines in that year) are transformed in monthly earnings. We use
data from the three years preceding the moment of the interview.
N Mean SD Median Min Max
Age 112 38.60 10.46 37.00 19.00 82.00
Has experience mining (=1 if yes) 112 0.62 0.49 1.00 0.00 1.00
Has any education (=1 if yes) 112 0.20 0.40 0.00 0.00 1.00
Nr. years education (if has education) 22 4.36 2.11 4.50 1.00 9.00
Can read and write (=1 if yes) 112 0.32 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics for the 112 cotton farmers participating
in the experiment.
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4.2.2 Description of the experiment
Eliciting expectations from farmers with a low level of education is a
challenge.3 The concept of probability, and the hypothetical question it
implies, are particularly difficult. As advised by Delavande et al. (2011b),
we use graphical aids, which are known to work well. More concretely, we
use 20 stones which must be distributed over different outcomes. Here,
every stone reflects a probability mass of 5% and so the stones allow to
respond to probabilistic questions by rounding to the nearest 5%4.
Concretely, we pose the following question to elicit preferences:
I would like you to imagine that there are 20 gold miners
like you who will leave for the mining site this dry season to
go and work in the pits. These stones represent the miners.
[Show 20 stones] Every stone reprents one miner. I imagine
that some of them will be lucky and others not. I would like
to ask you what income they will have (the income does not
include gifts from others). Can you distribute the stones to
indicate how many of them will have a revenue of 0, 400,
1000, 4000 and 20000 (or more) after one month of work?5
Following this question, the enumerator would spend time with the
respondent to make sure that he understood, including verifying that the
answer given corresponds to his expectations (e.g., if somebody puts all
stones on one amount, asking whether everybody will earn that amount
and nobody the other amounts).
3A simple way to elicit expectations is simply to ask “how much do you expect to
earn?" instead of eliciting the full income distribution as we will do. However, it is
unclear what the simple expectations question actually measures: the mean, median,
mode or a combination of these? Additionally, Delavande et al. (2011b) show that the
answers to this question have less predictive power than the ones obtained by eliciting
the entire income distribution. For these reasons, we try to elicit respondent’s full
income distributions.
4See Delavande et al. (2011a) for experiments and a discussion on the optimal
number of stones to use. We followed their advice of using 20 stones.
5This question allows respondents to report the distribution of incomes they ex-
pect to earn. However, respondents could be very uncertain about the exact form of
this income distribution. In this paper, we do not elicit such uncertainty. Indeed, this
is very challenging since it combines two levels of uncertainty: the distribution itself
and the uncertainty about this distribution. It could for instance be done by asking
for the minimum and maximum probability to earn a certain amount. Nonetheless,
the anchoring effects we will study are likely caused by uncertainty about the distri-
bution and eliciting this uncertainty in a simple way could give useful insights into
anchoring problems (see Luchini & Watson (2013) for an example in the context of
contingent valuation).
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Category Amounts N
Very low amounts 0 400 1000 4000 20000 (or more) 31
Low amounts 0 1000 2500 10000 50000 (or more) 24
High amounts 0 2000 5000 20000 100000 (or more) 33
Very high amounts 0 10000 25000 100000 500000 (or more) 24
Table 4.2: Amounts used to elicit expectations and the number of re-
spondents for which each set of amounts was used.
To elicit the individual’s expectations about his own returns, we talk
about 20 gold miners like you who will leave this dry season. Here, the
key is that they are 20 miners like you and should thus have similar
earnings. The alternative to ask about (hypothetical) realizations over
the last 20 year would not have been appropriate: Gold prices as well as
profitability of sites fluctuate too much over time for the past to be an
accurate prediction of the future.
The experiment we conduct is to randomly vary the amounts pre-
sented in the question to elicit expectations. The amounts shown in the
question are the set of “very low amounts", but we also use different
sets of amounts (presented in Table 4.2). The amounts scale up linearly,
with the low amounts being approximately double the very low ones,
the high double the low ones and the very high amounts about 5 times
the high ones. With respect to the “true" (average) distribution, the low
and high amounts allow to accurately describe expectations over most
of the distribution, while the very low (resp. very high) amounts allow
for most precision in the left (resp. right) half of the distribution. Ran-
domization happened at the individual level and the randomization is
well-balanced.6
4.3 Results
The goal of the empirical analysis is to study the framing effect: When
expectations are elicited over higher amounts, do people report higher ex-
pectations? Clearly, when the question is asked differently, people should
give different answers. However, their answers should always reflect the
same underlying distribution of their expectations. To show that there
is a framing effect, we need to show that the underlying distribution that
6We tested equality of averages of respondents presented higher (high and very
high) amounts against the ones presented lower (low and very low) amounts. We
tested variables related to education, wealth and agriculture (productivity and area
cultivated) and there are no significant differences.
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is reported changes when the expectation question changes.
However, before addressing this question, we first need to clarify how
the expectation question has been interpreted by respondents (Section
4.3.1). Based on this, we will use two methods to assess whether there
are framing effects: through a simple comparison of respondents’ an-
swers (Section 4.3.2) and by fitting and comparing income distributions
reported by respondents (Section 4.3.3).
4.3.1 Interpretation of the expectation question
Before analyzing the data, we need to clarify how respondents might
have interpreted the expectation question. We ask for the probability to
earn, for example, 0, 400, 1000, 4000 or 20000 (or more). Clearly, these
are not the only amounts the respondent can earn. He could equally
well earn 150. However, by forcing the respondent to distribute the 20
stones (100% probability mass) over the five outcomes, we force him to
consider only those outcomes. He thus needs to report probabilities to
earn “about 0", “about 400", and so on.
However, there is some room for interpretation when judging what
“about 0" and “about 400" exactly mean. This is illustrated in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2(a) shows the answers of a respondent: He gives a probability
of 25% to earn about 0 and a probability of 30% to earn about 400.
Figures 4.2 (b) and (c) show two possible interpretations of the ques-
tion. In Figure (b) he assigns the probability to earn a certain amount to
the proposed amount that is closest to it. For instance, the cutoff point
between 0 and 400 is at 200. This implies that 150 is considered “about
0" and not “about 400", while earning 250 would be considered “about
400". Adopting this interpretation, the answers are well-defined: A 25%
probability to earn “about 0" actually means a 25% probability to earn
between 0 and 200.
We will later adopt the interpretation shown in Figure (b), however
as illustrated in Figure (c) other interpretations are also possible. Here,
the cutoff point between 0 and 400 is at 100. This implies that only
amounts up to 100 would be considered “about 0" and the answer reveals
a probability of 25% to earn between 0 and 100. More generally, the
cutoff point can fall at any point in the interval between these amounts,
each cutoff point giving rise to a different interpretation of the data.
The difficulty in analyzing the data lies in the fact that different
interpretations are possible, and that it is impossible to know which is
correct. We address this issue in different ways. First, we conduct a
simple test of anchoring that does not force us to assume a particular
interpretation of the question (Section 4.3.2). Second, to be able to make
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(a) Respondent’s answers
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(b) Possible interpretation
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(c) Alternative interpretation
Figure 4.2: Answers and interpretations of the expectation question.
Figure (a) shows the respondents’ answer to the expectations question.
Figures (b) and (c) show two different interpretations of the answers with
different cutoff points (in bold) between the amounts.
more general comparisons of the elicited distributions we do impose one
particular interpretation (Section 4.3.3). However, in the Appendix we
show that the results are robust to varying this assumption and that
they also withstand introducing a fair amount of bias against the result.
4.3.2 A simple test of anchoring
In this section, we will do a test of anchoring that does not force us to
make an assumption about the interpretation of the expectation ques-
tion. For this, consider the sets of very low amounts and of high amounts
(see Table 4.2). The high amounts are substantially higher than the very
low amounts. However, the amounts almost coincide at one point. Under
the very low amounts we ask the probabilities to earn 4000 and 20000
(or more), while under the high amounts we ask the probabilities to earn
5000 and 20000.
By comparing the reported probabilities to earn 4000 and 5000 or
less when using these different sets of amounts, we will be able to test
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4000 10000 20000 4000 10000 20000 4000 12000 20000
5000 12000 20000 500010000 20000 500010000 20000
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4.3: Three examples of cutoff points when eliciting expectations
at amounts 4000 and 20000 and at 5000 and 20000. The cutoff points
in Figures (a) and (b) satisfy the monotonicity assumption, while the
cutoff points in Figure (c) do not.
for anchoring. To see why, consider how respondents should report their
expectations if they are not affected by anchoring. As discussed before,
they should give the probability to earn “about 4000" and “about 5000".
Doing so requires setting a cutoff-point between 4000 and 20000 in the
case of the very low amounts, and between 5000 and 20000 in the case
of the high amounts.
Figure 4.3 gives some examples of how these cutoff points might be
set. For instance, in Figure (a) the cutoff point between 4000 and 20000
is 10000 implying that “about 4000" includes amounts up to 10000. The
cutoff-point for the between 5000 and 20000 is 12000. So the cutoff point
for the interval 5000-20000 is the highest. In Figure (b) the cutoff points
are the same for both intervals while in Figure (c) the cutoff point for
the interval 4000-20000 is the highest.
Note that the pattern in Figure (c) is odd. While “about 4000"
includes any amount up to 12000, “about 5000" only includes amounts up
to 10000. Hence, increasing the amount asked about, leads to a decrease
in the cut-off considered. We will assume that such situations can not
exist by imposing the followingmonotonicity assumption: When eliciting
expectations over amounts x, y and over x′, y, where x ≥ x′, the cutoff
point between x and y is at least as big as the cutoff point between x′ and
y. Hence, increasing the amount asked about, while leaving the following
amount unchanged, can not decrease the amount at which expectations
are reported. This seems like a reasonable assumption and we will impose
it in what follows.
If the monotonicity assumption is satisfied, and there is no anchoring,
how should the answers to the different questions compare? For this let
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us compare cumulative probabilities at 4000 and 5000. In the case of the
very low amounts, the cumulative probability at 4000 is the sum of the
probabilities to earn 0, 400, 1000 or 4000. With a cutoff point c between
4000 and 20000, this cumulative probability is the probability to earn at
most c. Similarly, for the high amounts the cumulative probability to
earn 5000 (the sum of the probabilities to earn 0, 2000 or 5000) is the
probability to earn at most c′, where c′ is the cutoff point between 5000
and 20000. If the monotonicity assumption is satisfied, c′ ≥ c and, so,
the probability to earn at most c′ is at least as high as the probability to
earn at most c. So, if there is no anchoring, the cumulative probability
at 5000 (elicited using the high amounts) should be at least as big as the
cumulative probability at 4000 (using the very low amounts).
On the other hand, if there is anchoring we should see the oppo-
site. Indeed, the cumulative probability at 5000 is elicited when using
the high amounts while the one at 4000 is elicited using the very low
amounts. Anchoring implies that when expectations are elicited over
bigger amounts, people would report higher expectations. This means
that they should report a lower cumulative probability to earn at most
a given amount. Hence, if there is anchoring we expect that the cumu-
lative probability at 5000 using the high amounts to be smaller than the
one at 4000 when using the very low amounts.
In Table 4.3(1) we compare the reported cumulative probability at
4000 using the high amounts and at 5000 using the very low amounts.
The cumulative probability at 4000 is significantly lower (12 percentage
points) than the one at 5000. As discussed, assuming monotonicity these
answers are not consistent, but they are compatible with anchoring.
A very similar test can be done at one other place:7 We elicit ex-
pectations at 20000 and 100000 in the set of high amounts and at 25000
and 100000 for the very high amounts. As before, by monotonicity the
cumulative probability at 25000 (very high amounts) should be bigger
than the cumulative probability at 20000 (high amounts). Table 4.3(2)
reports the differences and shows that the cumulative probability when
using the bigger amounts is again smaller, although the difference is
small and far from significant. This might be because the high and very
high amounts are both quite big and lead to smaller framing effects.8
7Doing this test requires finding two similar intervals. For all other possible
combinations of intervals, one of the two amounts of the interval is at least twice the
corresponding amount in the other interval. The only exception is 1000-4000 (very
low amounts) and 1000-2500 (low amounts). However, while the other comparisons
we do are biased against finding a framing effect, this would be biased in favour of
it. So, while we do see higher expectations at the bigger set of amounts using this
comparison, this is not necessarily a sign of anchoring.
8In the next section we compare reported expectations under all four sets of
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(1) (2) (3)
Cumulative Cumulative Combination
probability probability of comparisons
at 4000 or at 20000 (1) and (2)
5000 or 25000
Bigger amounts -0.122∗ -0.0214 -0.0750∗∗
(0.0625) (0.0500) (0.0314)
Comp. (1): Cum -0.124∗∗∗
Prob at 4000/5000 (0.0305)
Constant 0.705∗∗∗ 0.782∗∗∗ 0.804∗∗∗
(0.0418) (0.0369) (0.0244)
N 64 57 121
Standard errors in parenthesis. In col (3) standard errors are clustered at the
level of the respondent. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 4.3: A test of anchoring: comparing respondents’ reported expec-
tations at a particular point in the distribution.
Nonetheless, note that the test is biased against finding an effect and in
the absence of any anchoring we would expect the cumulative probabil-
ity at 25000 to be bigger. Not seeing this is also somewhat suggestive of
anchoring.
Finally, to maximize power, we also combine the two previous tests in
Table 4.3 (3). Here, we pool all observations of columns (1) and (2). The
dummy “bigger amounts" captures whether the cumulative probability is
elicited using the bigger set of amounts of the comparison at hand (high
amounts at 5000 and very high amounts at 25000). We also control
for which of the two comparisons the observation is coming from. As
expected, using the bigger amounts again leads to smaller cumulative
probabilities (implying higher expectations), this time significant at the
95% level.
In conclusion, we see that there is a framing effect: respondents re-
port significantly higher expectations when they are elicited over higher
amounts. This result does not require a particular assumption on how
amounts (see Figure 4.6). We will see that reported expectations increase systemati-
cally as the amounts increase, as one would expect under anchoring. However, differ-
ences between two subsequent sets of amounts (such as the high amounts and very
high amounts) are not big. Significant differences appear when comparing amounts
further apart, such as the very low amounts and the high amounts or the low and the
very high amounts.
121
ESSAYS IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
respondents interpret the questions and, instead, only relies on mono-
tonicity of responses. However, the downside of this analysis is that it
compares responses only at one particular point in the distribution, does
not exploit all data, and does not allow to quantify the magnitude of the
framing effect across the distribution. In the next section, we impose
stronger assumptions to be able to make such comparisons.
4.3.3 Comparing elicited distributions
In this section, we will again study whether there is a framing effect:
When expectations are elicited over higher amounts, do people report
higher expectations? However, we will now do this by estimating the full
distributions that are reported and we will compare respondents’ answers
by comparing these distributions. To do this, we proceed in three steps.
First, we impose an assumption on the interpretation of the expectation
question (that is, on the position of the cut-off points). Second, we fit
distributions that model the reported expectations. Finally, we compare
these distributions. Note, however, that while we impose an assumption,
the results are robust to alternative assumptions and they also withstand
a fair amount of bias against the results (see the Appendix).
The interpretation of the expectation question we will assume is il-
lustrated in Figure 4.2(b): We assume that the respondent assigns the
probability to earn a certain amount to the proposed amount that is
closest to it. For instance, earning 150 is considered “about 0" and not
“about 400", while earning 250 would be considered “about 400". This
implies that the cut-off point between two subsequent amounts is ex-
actly in the middle between two subsequent amounts: For the very low
amounts, the cut-off point between 0 and 400 is at 200 and the cut-off
point between 400 and 1000 is at 700. The same assumption is made for
the other sets of amounts. For instance, for the high amounts the first
two amounts are 0 and 2000 and, so, the cut-off point is in the middle,
at 1000. Table 4.8 shows all cut-off points for all sets of amounts under
this assumption.
Having imposed this assumption, we can now interpret the responses
as probabilities to earn at most a certain amount. This is illustrated
in Figure 4.4. The respondent reports 25% probability to earn “about
0", which implies that he has a probability of 25% to earn at most 200,
the cut-off point. Next, he reports 30% probability to earn “about 400".
Hence, the cumulative probability to earn at most 700, the next cutoff
point, is 55% (25 + 30).
More generally, for every cut-off point we can calculate the proba-
bility to earn at most that amount. As illustrated in Figure 4.4, this
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Figure 4.4: Translating answers to the expectations question into points
in the cumulative density function.
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gives us four points in the cumulative density function (CDF) of the re-
spondent. This, however, does not suffice to compare responses. Indeed,
respondents who are presented different sets of amounts have different
cutoff points and thus reveal different points in their CDF: When using
the lowest amounts, we get the cumulative density at points 200, 700,
2500 and 12000; when using the high amounts, we get the density at
points 1000, 3500, 12500 and 60000.
To be able to compare responses across sets of amounts we fit distri-
butions. More precisely, we consider all respondents that are presented
a given set of amounts and fit a lognormal distribution reflecting the av-
erage distribution for these respondents. To do this, we find for each set
of amounts the parameters µ (median) and σ (shape) of the distribution
that minimizes the squared errors:
∑
i
4∑
p=1
[Cum-densi,p − CDFLOGN(Amounti,p;µ;σ)]2 (4.1)
where for each of the four points p, Cum-densi,p is the cumulative density
that respondent i associates to the Amounti,p and CDFLOGN is the CDF
of the lognormal distribution. Figure 4.5(b) shows the fitted distribution
for the very low amounts. The dots show the individual responses, while
the crosses give the average of these responses at each amount. As one
would expect, the fitted distribution fits the average cumulative densities
quite tightly.
The methodology outlined here - fit a lognormal distribution for each
set of amounts and compare these distributions - begs several questions.
First, why use a lognormal distribution? There are several reasons. First,
the lognormal distribution fits the data very well (see Figure 4.6). Sec-
ond, also the actual returns of those migrants (the empirical counterpart
of the fitted distributions, assuming rational expectations) seem to fol-
low a lognormal distribution9. Finally, lognormal distributions are often
used when studying (skewed) income distributions. Dominitz & Manski
(1997), for instance, use it to model measured income expectations in
the United States.
The second methodological question is why to fit only one distribu-
tion per set of amounts, as opposed to fitting a distribution for every
individual. Here, the reason is that some respondents give degenerate
answers. For instance, one respondent put all the stones on the first
9Diagnostic plots reveal that the lognormal fits these data quite well. The fit
is similar or somewhat better than a 2-parameter Weibull and much better than a
standard normal distribution
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Figure 4.5: Left: Data points given by a single respondent showing the
elicited probability to earn at most a given amount. Right: All answers
for the group of respondents presented the “very low amounts". Crosses
show the averages of the answers and the line is the fitted lognormal
distribution for these respondents.
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Figure 4.6: Fitted lognormal distributions (CDFs) for the four groups of
amounts. The crosses indicate the average responses for each amount
amount. This is not an “irrational" answer. Unsurprisingly, this hap-
pened for the set of very high amounts where this answer implies that
there is a 100% probability to earn less than 5000. This respondent
might simply have very low expectations that are not captured by the
amounts proposed to him. However, fitting a distribution just for this
respondent is problematic: The distribution with median 0 and shape
parameter 0 actually fits the data points perfectly but surely underes-
timates the true expectations of this person. Dropping the observation
is equally problematic: We would systematically drop people with very
low expectations from the group of very high amounts (this person would
probably not be dropped when using lower amounts which would allow
him to properly specify his low expectations). So, in analyzing this
person’s data at an individual level we would always need to make an
arbitrary assumption about his actual expectations. However, this per-
son’s responses can perfectly be used when “grouping" observations the
way we propose to do.
To study the framing effect, we compare the distributions we fitted for
each set of amounts. Figure 4.6 shows the four fitted distributions. Ad-
ditionally, it shows average cumulative densities for each set of amounts.
This graph strongly suggests that there is a framing effect: the higher
the amounts presented to the respondents, the higher the expectations.
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First, we see that higher amounts lead to a consistent rightward shift of
the CDFs, which implies that expectations are higher. The graph illus-
trates this with the example of the median (i.e., the amount associated
to the probability of 50% to earn that amount or less). For the very low
and low amounts, the median is about 2000, while it is 6200 and 8500 for
the high and very high amounts. The same pattern holds true at other
percentiles of the distribution.
At some points in the graph, the same pattern also emerges without
having to resort to the fitted distributions. At about the 60th percentile
we see that there are true data points for the low, high and very high
amounts: The 60th percentile is about 8000 for the low amounts; 13000
for the high amounts; and 18000 for the very high amounts. Again, the
higher the amounts, the higher the expectations.
To test whether these differences are statistically significant, we jointly
estimate the distributions and compare their parameters. To simplify
the exposition we regroup answers in 2 groups: The “lower amounts"
(low and very low amounts) and “higher amounts" (high and very high
amounts)10. The next graph shows the distributions fitted for each of
these groups.
Table 4.4 reports the difference between these distributions. We com-
pare the distributions in different ways. First, we look at differences in
percentiles (median, first quartile and third quartile) of the distributions.
The median, when using the higher amounts is about 3 times higher than
when using the lower amounts. All these differences are significant.
The second comparison is through a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Here,
the test statistic is the maximal vertical distance between the two CDFs.
(Note that the differences in percentiles look at horizontal differences). In
the appendix we explain in more detail how we execute the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test. The difference between the distributions is highly signifi-
cant.
In choosing the test statistics to compare the distributions, we aim to
rely as little as possible on the distributional assumption we make. While
we could compare, for instance, the means and standard deviations of
the fitted distributions, this comparison would be affected by the exact
fit of the extreme tail (for which there is no data available). For this
reason, we restrict to direct comparisons of points in the CDF, which
10Though increasing power, the result in this paper do not rely on regrouping
answers in this way. Significant differences also arise when comparing different sub-
groups one by one. When comparing subsequent sets of amounts (very low vs low,
low vs high and high vs very high) differences are not significant. However, significant
differences arise for all other comparisons (very low vs high, very low vs very high
and low vs very high) for both the median and the KS-test.
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Figure 4.7: Fitted lognormal distributions (CDFs) for the lower and
higher amounts. Here, the “low amounts" regroup the low and very low
amounts, and the “higher amounts" the high and very high amounts.
The crosses indicate the average responses for each amount.
Lower Higher Difference (p-value):
amounts amounts Framing effect
Median 2406 6862 0.020
First Quartile 306 903 0.081
Third Quartile 18928 52145 0.020
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 0.014
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the respondent. The p-value of the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is based on simulated critical values.
Table 4.4: Comparison of fitted distribution for lower amounts and higher
amounts.
128
CHAPTER 4. MEASURING EXPECTATIONS
Lower Higher Difference (p-value):
amounts amounts Framing effect
Has Median 2198 4047 0.259
experience First Quartile 286 462 0.500
mining Third Quartile 16888 35486 0.138
(N=69) Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 0.276
No Median 2837 13288 0.037
experience First Quartile 344 2166 0.070
mining Third Quartile 23418 81541 0.103
(N=43) Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 0.020
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the respondent. The p-value of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test is based on simulated critical values. When comparing the framing effects for respondents with
and without experience (the relevant “interaction"), the results are significant for the median and first
quartile (p-values of 0.04 and 0.1, resp.) and insignificant for the third quartile (p-value 0.27).
Table 4.5: Comparison of fitted distributions, separating respondents
with and without experience mining.
have been directly elicited from the respondents. In the same logic, we
restrict all comparisons to places of “common support" in the distribution
and do not compare, for instance, responses at the 90th percentile of the
distribution.
We next consider heterogeneous effects. In particular, we separate
people who have experience in working on the mines (who have worked
at least once on a mine) and people who have no experience. Table 4.5
shows the same analysis as before while separating these two groups.
We see that the framing effects are biggest on people who do not
have experience in mining. The median is almost 5 times higher (13288
vs 2837) when presented the higher amounts and these differences are
significant. For people who have experience mining, the data suggests
that there are framing effects, but these effects are much smaller and
far from significant. In the appendix we show that these heterogeneous
effects are robust to controlling for the respondent’s level of education,
age and wealth.
The most natural interpretation of these heterogeneous effects is that
people who have experience working in the mines are more knowledgeable
about the income distribution, and as a consequence are less affected by
the framing.
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4.4 Interpretation: Anchoring
4.4.1 Anchoring
The most likely explanation for the framing effects we find is anchor-
ing: “the disproportionate influence on decision makers to adjust to an
initially presented value" (Furnham & Boo 2011). This phenomenon
is, according to Kahneman (2011), “one of the most reliable and robust
results in experimental psychology".
In a classical experiment, Tversky & Kahneman (1974) found, for
instance, that a number that results from spinning a wheel strongly in-
fluences answers to the subsequent question: “What is the percentage
of African countries in the United Nations?". In another study, En-
glich et al. (2006) find that experienced judges give substantially higher
fictitious prison terms when the roll of a die comes up 6 instead of 1.
In our case, respondents might anchor on the amounts we presented
to them and report higher expectations when they are presented with
higher amounts. This interpretation is particularly appealing since we
find that people least knowledgeable about the distribution are most
affected - and least knowledgeable people are typically most affected by
anchoring (Furnham & Boo 2011; Wilson et al. 1996; Northcraft & Neale
1987; Luchini & Watson 2013).
However, from this we should not conclude that anchoring is not an
issue when measuring expectations among people who know the distribu-
tion well. Anchoring is typically also found among knowledgeable people,
only less so. Suggestive examples are real-estate agents on housing prices
(Northcraft & Neale 1987) or, as mentioned before, experienced judges
on prison terms (Englich et al. 2006).
More generally, the anchoring effect has been extensively studied in
psychology and provides important insights in the phenomenon. (See
Furnham & Boo (2011) for a recent literature review and Kahneman
(2011) for an excellent layman’s introduction.) For instance, it is com-
monly believed that people with little knowledge try to extract infor-
mation from the anchor, and display anchoring effects for this reason.
However, it has been shown that anchoring effects are equally strong
when the anchor is deliberatively uninformative and people are told that
they will suffer from anchoring problems. Anchoring effects thus arise
for other reasons. In Section 5 we will come back to this literature to
understand when anchoring effects might arise and what can be done
about them.
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4.4.2 Alternative explanation: Noise
An alternative explanation that needs to be addressed is noise: The pos-
sibility that the results are generated by people failing to understand
the expectations questions. What would happen in our case if some re-
spondents would fail to understand the questions and would randomly
spread out the stones (probability masses) across different amounts? Re-
spondents presented high amounts would put probability mass on these
amounts and would seem to have high expectations. This would be co-
herent with the basic framing effect we find.
It is clear that the answers we get are not “pure noise", i.e., a com-
pletely random allocation of stones. Answers are influenced by the
amounts that are proposed. For instance, when the highest amount
is 20 000 (or more) respondents allocate a probability of about 30 %;
when it is 500 000 (or more), they allocate about 10 %. Nonetheless,
this does not suffice to rule out the noise explanation: If part of the
respondents would give useful answers, but others random answers, we
would see such patterns in the data, as well as framing effects.
It is however also unlikely that the results are generated by such
“partial noise". First, the framing effect is not correlated with levels
of education - and one would expect uneducated farmers to have more
problems understanding the questions. Likewise, one might worry that
the people who claimed that they might leave for the mines, but did not
end up doing so, were not replying to the questions seriously. However,
also this variable is not correlated with the framing effect11.
Most importantly, the framing effect is correlated with having expe-
rience, exactly as we would expect if anchoring is at play.12 All in all,
anchoring seems to be a much more likely explanation than noise for the
pattern of results we see.13
11Concretely, we redid the analysis of heteregenous effects (Table 4.4) using the
variables “Has formal education", “Can read and write" and “Actually left" and looked
at the differences in framing effects (the “interaction") for the different parameters.
The smallest p-value across all these specications is 0.27 and almost all p-values are
well above 0.5
12Additionally, restricting the sample to only the respondents interviewed by the
most diligent enumerators (as judged by the author) yields essentially the same re-
sults.
13Another way to assess the quality of the data is to assess the accuracy of the
measured expectations, but this is fraught with difficulties in our case. The framing
effects of inexperienced respondents is so big that it is impossible to say what their
expectations are, so we should restrict to experienced respondents. Additionally,
we observe returns over an entire year (which can involve a few days up to several
months of work) and have to compare it to expectations over a month of work.
Finally, outcomes depend on the price of gold and the quality of the sites which
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4.5 Do anchoring effects really cause problems?
So far we have argued that anchoring effects can substantially affect
reported expectations. But does this really matter? Will anchoring lead
to problems when analyzing expectations data? In short, our answer is
yes. In particular the fact that anchoring effects can be heterogeneous
can create problems in many types of analysis.
The answer this question more precisely, let us distinguish three typ-
ical uses of expectations data: 1) To measure the level of expectations
per se, 2) as an explanatory variable of interest and 3) as a control.
First, anchoring effects are most problematic when trying to mea-
sure the actual level of expectations. Measuring the level of expecta-
tions would allow to tell whether rational expectations hold or whether
expectations are too optimistic or pessimistic (see, e.g., McKenzie et al.
(2013)). Clearly, data that suffers from important anchoring effects -
which can arbitrarily increase or decrease expectations - can not be used
to answer such a question.
Second, expectations can be the explanatory variable of interest, for
instance, when studying whether expectations about returns to migra-
tion affect the decision to migrate. While the measured expectations
could serve as a proxy for “true" expectations, problems arise when an-
choring effects are heterogeneous. In our case, less experienced miners
have bigger anchoring effects and so the measured expectations capture
both experience and expectations, and results should be interpreted ac-
cordingly. A correlation between measured expectations and the decision
to migrate could very well be driven by the fact that more experienced
miners are more likely to migrate.
Finally, the measured expectations might be used to control for con-
founding factors in a regression. This is probably the least problematic
case, but we should still be aware of the fact that the measured expec-
tations capture other factors when anchoring effects are heterogeneous
and the measured expectations are only an imperfect proxy. As such,
they can help to attenuate, but not eliminate, any bias that would arise
from omitting expectations from the regression.
In the last two cases, where the problem is that measured expecta-
tions capture other variables, problems could be solved by controlling
fluctuate yearly and are strongly correlated among all respondents. Nonetheless,
comparing expectations of experienced migrants to historical realizations suggests
that they overestimate the probabilities of earning very low and very high amounts
and underestimate probabilities to get amounts in between. This corresponds quite
well to the way mining is perceived: An all or nothing activity. Nonetheless, all this
tells us little about the quality of the data.
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for these variables. For instance, in a regression studying the decision
to migrate, we could control for experience in migration. The key here
is that we should control for factors that correlate with the anchoring
effect and explain the outcome of interest, even if they do not correlate
with the “true" expectations themselves. Anchoring effects typically cor-
relate strongly with knowledge about the answers and it is well worth
trying to control for such factors (e.g., for migration this could be having
experience, knowing people with experience or having a network at the
destination). When such variables are not available, one can also ask
respondents if they are “confident" about their answer. This has been
shown to correlate with the anchoring effect (Chapman & Johnson 1994),
and controlling for it could alleviate the bias.
Anchoring effects can thus pose problems, even when only a proxy for
expectations is needed. While some of these problems appear relatively
innocent, it is important to keep in mind that anchoring effects can be
very big, as they are for inexperienced respondents in this study14. In
this case, the variation induced by anchoring can be much larger than
the variation in expectations itself and these problems should not be
ignored.
4.6 Factors (not) contributing to anchoring
Since anchoring effects cause problems when analyzing expectations data,
there are two key questions. First, in which situations can we expect an-
choring effects? Second, can we make methodological choices that avoid
(or reduce) anchoring effects?
To answer these questions, we will address in this section different
factors that contribute to anchoring effects.
Using a self-anchored support. The anchoring effect arose in this
experiment because respondents anchored to the amounts proposed to
them. A common alternative is to avoid proposing amounts by asking
the respondent’s expectations of his minimum and maximum income.
Based on these amounts one can then come up with a set of amounts
in between this minimum and maximum and elicit expectations at these
amounts.
Some authors believe that using such self-anchored support allows to
reduce anchoring problems. Morgan & Small (1992) argue that amounts
proposed by the interviewer might be considered “objectively reason-
14Kahneman (2011) argues that the “anchoring effect" is typically around 55%.
This implies that increasing the anchor by 100 increases the answer by 55.
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able" and so influence the respondent. However, anchoring happens
equally well (and equally strongly) for self-generated or obviously non-
informative anchors (Furnham & Boo 2011). Hence, this does not seem
to be a reason why anchoring might be reduced using this methodology.15
Nonetheless, this methodology might still reduce anchoring for other
reasons. Delavande et al. (2011a) use it and show convincingly that
which number is asked for first (the minimum or the maximum) does
not influence answers. Hence, people do not seem to anchor to the first
amount they have to come up with, suggesting that there might not
be any anchoring problems at all. Intriguingly, however, they find that
standard deviations are higher when using this methodology. This could
be compatible with people anchoring on both amounts (the minimum and
the maximum) and overestimating the probability of extreme events. So,
using self-anchored supports might not remove all anchoring effects, but
it is a promising method to reduce them as much as possible.
Choices when using a pre-determined support. When using the
method of pre-determined support, as we do, there are still methodolog-
ical issues to resolve. One is the number of amounts (or intervals) to use.
We used a relatively small number of amounts (5) and it is possible to
use more intervals. Additionally, how amounts are spread out over the
entire support also matters. Should they be equally spaced or organized
differently?
To assess the impact of such choices, it’s useful to consider the mech-
anism through which anchoring works. A leading explanation is that
people use an “anchoring and adjustment heuristic" which states that
the anchor is used as an initial answer which is then moved towards the
range of plausible answers (Tversky & Kahneman 1974). The bias arises
because one stops adjusting “too early" upon reaching a first reasonable
value. For instance, in estimating the number of african countries when
the anchor is 200, one would first evaluate 200 as a possible answer. One
would then start to decrease it steadily until reaching the first value that
15We can also test for this using our data. If anchoring occurs because people
believe there is information in the amounts presented to them, then people should
update their income expectations based on these amounts. People presented the
higher expectations should then have higher expectations and be more likely to actu-
ally leave for the mines the following year. However, we do not observe this. In fact,
if anything, people presented higher amounts are less likely to leave to the mines.
Though the results are estimated too imprecisely to draw strong conclusions, this
“wrong" sign does allow us to reject what needed to be tested: We can reject (at the
95% level) that being presented the higher amounts increases by 2 percentage points
or more the probability to leave to the mines. So, it does not seem that people have
actually updated their expectations by being presented the higher amounts.
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looks reasonable.
In our context, spreading probability mass equally over all amounts
first, and then adjusting away from this answer would be one way to im-
plement this heuristic. If this is true, it would be mainly the distribution
of amounts that would influence answers. For instance, using multiple
high amounts (instead of just one) would lead to an initial answer that
puts weight on each of these amounts and thus much weight on high
amounts. Adjusting away from these high expectations, but stopping
too early, would still lead to reporting high expectations. If this is cor-
rect, the answers could be biased towards the true distribution by picking
for instance the deciles of the true distribution as the amounts.
Note, however, that to set up experiments in this way, researchers
need to know the true distribution before conducting the experiment,
which requires investing resources. While knowing the true distribution
does not in itself solve the anchoring the problem, it might nonetheless
allow to set up the expectation question in such a way as to minimize
biases because of anchoring and to know the likely direction of the biases.
As is clear from the discussion, we are far from understanding how
different methods induce (or not) anchoring. While the psychological
literature can tell us a lot on when anchoring might be relevant, it typi-
cally deals with anchoring on a single number, rather than the multiple
amounts needed to elicit expectations. While some first steps have been
taken (e.g., Delavande et al. 2011a show that it does not matter which
amount is elicited first), there is definitely much scope for methodolog-
ical research on which methods least induce anchoring. In this respect,
experiments that compare self-anchored supports with different ways of
using pre-determined supports would be particularly interesting.
Context of the interview Anchoring effects, while robust, do vary
with circumstances. Respondents who are less tired or in a better mood
(Bodenhausen et al. 2000), seem to be less affected by anchoring. This
suggests that if expectations are being measured as part of a long ques-
tionnaire, these questions should come early on in the questionnaire.
Unfortunately, some other potential strategies to mitigate anchoring
effects do not seem to work. Warning people upfront about the risks of
anchoring or given them incentives to answer correctly, do not seem to
cause big decreases in the anchoring effect (Tversky & Kahneman 1974;
Furnham & Boo 2011).
Knowledge about the distribution. As mentioned before, respon-
dents who are less knowledgeable about the returns have bigger anchoring
effects. While the researcher can, of course, not affect this parameter, it
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does allow to assess whether anchoring problems are likely to be big.
In this paper, respondents had personally seen very few realizations
of the distribution: Some never went mining and the others only observed
a realization once per year. Moreover, the form of the distribution also
matters. Here the distribution was strongly skewed with few people earn-
ing big amounts. Undoubtedly, it is more difficult to assess expectations
over such a distribution than over a simple symmetric distribution.
In this sense, it is perhaps unsurprising that we find big anchoring
effects. Likewise, Delavande et al. (2011a) work with boat owners who
see daily realizations of their symmetric income distribution and are very
knowledgeable about the distribution. Accordingly, they do not find
anchoring effects. An interesting question is how big anchoring effects
are in more intermediate cases.
4.7 Conclusion
We conducted an experiment on eliciting expectations and find strong
anchoring effects: Expected median incomes increase up to 4-fold when
higher amounts are used to elicit expectations. This effect is mainly
concentrated on people with no experience in mining, who are least likely
to be knowledgeable about the income distribution.
These results suggest that caution is needed when using expectations
data elicited from people with little knowledge about the issue, even when
the data is to be used as a simple proxy for expectations.
However, more research is needed on determining when anchoring
effects arise and what can be done to reduce them. The current set-
ting, where the income distribution is skewed and with much uncer-
tainty about this distribution, is particularly challenging. Anchoring
effects might be smaller in other settings. Additionally, other elicitation
methods might suffer less from anchoring. To shed light on this, ex-
periments comparing self-anchored supports with different ways of using
pre-determined supports would be particularly interesting.
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Appendix: Robustness tests
Adding controls
We redo the regressions on heterogeneous effects while adding controls.
While the main causal effect (the framing effect) should be well-identified,
the heterogeneous effect with respect to having experience is not. If, for
instance, educated people are less affected by the framing and educated
people have less experience in mining, we would see the same pattern of
results.
To control for such confounding factors, we redo the analysis by sub-
group based on the controls. For instance, to control for the ability to
read and write, we separately do the analysis for people who can read
and write and for those who can’t. We then also take the averages of
these estimations. These averages are the closest in spirit to a normal re-
gression with controls for confounding factors and we will focus on these
averages.
Table 4.6 reports the results controlling for the ability to read and
write, having formal education, wealth and age. Here, the difference
between the ability to read and write and having formal education lies in
following alphabetization courses. The wealth variable is a consumption
proxy based on the Progress out of Poverty Index (PPI), which combines
different wealth proxies.
Despite the limited numbers of observations, the heterogeneous re-
sults with respect to experience hold up very well when controlling for
these variables. Inside each subgroup we consider, the framing effect is
bigger for people without experience than it is for people with experience.
Moreover, the “average" framing is never significant for people with
experience and consistently significant for respondents without experi-
ence. The only exception to the latter is when separating respondents
based on formal education. This is unsurprising given the very small
number of respondents without experience and with formal education
(10). For the ones without formal education and without experience the
framing effect is significant and even for the 10 respondents without for-
mal education the framing effect is big (2448 vs 19794). When using
the more balanced (and thus more powerful) measure for education “can
read and write", the average framing effect for respondents without ex-
perience is significant again. The heterogeneous effects thus seem to be
robust to controlling for levels of education.
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Varying assumptions on interpretation of the question
The results in Section 4.3.3 rely on a particular assumption of how re-
spondents interpret the expectations question. Recall that respondents
are asked about the probability to earn “about 0", “about 400" and so
on, and they need to settle on a particular interpretation to say what
“about 0" and “about 400" exactly mean.
In Section 4.3.3 we have assumed that the respondent assigns the
probability to earn a certain amount to the proposed amount that is
closest to it. For instance, earning 150 is considered “about 0" and not
“about 400", while earning 250 would be considered “about 400". This
implies that the cut-off points between the amounts are exactly in the
middle between two subsequent amounts: For the very low amounts, the
cut-off point between 0 and 400 is at 200 and the cut-off point between
400 and 1000 is at 700.
To test the robustness of our results to this assumption, we redo
the analysis imposing different assumptions. Our assumption was that
the cutoff falls in the middle of the interval between two subsequent
amounts. Our alternative assumptions will be that the cutoff point is at
other places in the interval. That is, we will still assume that the same
“rule" is applied to every interval, but we will assume different rules.
Concretely, we assume that the cutoff point falls either (a) completely
to the left of the interval (b) at 25% (c) in the middle (d) at 75% and
(e) to the right of the interval. If we take the example of the amounts 0
and 400, this implies that the cutoff points fall at (a) 0, (b) 100, (c) 200,
(d) 300 and (e) 400. Note that the assumption we imposed in Section
4.3.3 is assumption (c) here, i.e., that the cutoff is in the middle of the
interval.
In Figure 4.8 and Table 4.7 we report the results of imposing these
different assumptions. These figures and tables are identical to Figure
4.7 and Table 4.4 in the body of the paper, except for the alternative
assumption. We can see that moving the cutoff points to the left (a
and b) reduces expectations while moving them to the right increases
expectations (d and e).
However, the anchoring effect is highly robust to varying these as-
sumptions. Under all assumptions, reported expectations are substan-
tially higher when elicited over the higher amounts. Moreover, these
differences are significant under all assumptions and at all places in the
distribution, except for the first quartile under assumptions (a) and (b).
However, even in these cases the reported expectations under the higher
amounts are almost 3 times higher (539 against 175 and 520 against
189) and these differences are almost significant. Overall, the results
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seem robust to these alternative assumptions.
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(d) Cutoff 75% of interval
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(e) Cutoff right of interval
Lower (low and very low) amounts
Higher (high and very high) amounts
Figure 4.8: Comparison of reported expectations using different assump-
tions on how respondents interpreted the expectations quesion. Figure
(c) replicates Figure 4.7. The other figures impose alternative assump-
tions. Table 4.7 tests whether these differences are significant.
Introducing bias against the results
In the previous section, we used different assumptions on how respon-
dents interpret the expectation question. Moreover, we imposed the
same assumption on all respondents, no matter which set of amounts
they were presented. While this makes intuitive sense, different respon-
dents are presented different amounts and so do not necessarily need to
interpret question in the same way.
For this reason, we will test now if the results are robust to imposing
different assumptions for different respondents. In particular, we will do
this in such a way that biases the results against our finding that higher
amounts lead to higher expectations. A measure of the robustness of our
results is then how much of this bias these results can withstand.
To bias the results against the finding we proceed as follows. For the
lower amounts, we impose assumptions that increase expectations. For
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the higher amounts we do the opposite and decrease expectations. To
do this, note that level of expectations depends on the place of the cutoff
point in the interval. Moving the cutoff point completely to the left of the
interval (assumption (a) above) gives the lowest possible expectations
compatible with the answers. On the other hand, moving the cutoff
completely to the right gives the highest possible expectations.
To bias the results against us, we start again from the central as-
sumption that the cutoff point is in the middle of the interval, and this
for all respondents. Next, we simultaneously move the cutoff points to
the left for respondents given the higher amounts and to the right for
the ones given the lower amounts. The extreme case is where we assume
the cutoff point is completely to the right for the higher amounts and
completely to the left for the lower amounts. We will say that this is
a 100% bias against our results. However, there are also intermediate
cases. For instance, assuming that the cutoff point is at 25% of the in-
terval for the lower amounts and at 75% of the interval for the higher
amounts is a 50% bias against our results. More precisely, for a level of
bias b ∈ [0, 100], the cutoff point cL between two amounts x and y when
using the lower amounts is
cL =
x+ y
2
+
b
200
(y − x)
while for the higher amounts the cutoff point cH is
cH =
x+ y
2
− b
200
(y − x) .
The results of systematically increasing the amount of bias against
our results is shown in Figure 4.9. Introducing more and more bias sys-
tematically increases expectations for the lower amounts and decreases
it for the higher amounts.
How much bias can the results withstand? Up to 25% bias the differ-
ence remains statistically significant at several points in the distribution
(median and 3th quartile). After this, the difference becomes insignifi-
cant but remains there up to 75% of bias, at which point the two dis-
tributions coincide. At the maximal level of bias the pattern is inversed
and respondents presented higher amounts would report somewhat lower
expectations.
Overall it thus seems that the results withstand a fair amount of
bias and that one needs to introduce quite a bit of bias to remove it
completely. As an example, consider again the intervals used in Section
4.3.2: 4000-20000 for the very low amounts and 5000-20000 for the high
amounts. One would expect respondents to report expectations at a
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Figure 4.9: Comparison of reported expectations when introducing in-
creasing levels of bias against the results. Up to 25% of bias, the results
remain significant. To completely eliminate the differences in reported
expectations, we need to introduce 75% bias against the results.
quite similar point in the distribution. However, when imposing 75%
bias we would assume that he reports expectations at 18000 for the very
low amounts and at 6875 for the high amounts. This is a very strong
violation of the monotonicity assumption we presented in that section.
This thus seems to be a very strong bias.16 We thus need quite a big
bias against the results to completely remove the anchoring effect, which
suggests that the results are quite robust.
Methodology for Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
One of the tests we use in this paper is a Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S)
test (Kolmogorov 1933; Smirnov 1933). Given that we could not ap-
ply the test in the simplest way, we lay out here the choices made in
implementing this test.
16For a 25% bias, the cutoff point would be 14000 for the very low amounts and
at 10625 for the high amounts, which is a smaller but still substantial violation of
monotonicity.
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The test-statistics of the K-S test, denoted k, to compare two distri-
butions with CDFs F̂1 and F̂2 is the maximal distance between the two
CDFs:
k = max{F̂1(x)− F̂2(x) | x ∈ R}
In a normal application this test statistic needs to be compared to
the critical values supplied by Smirnov (1933) in his original article to
determine a p-value and significance of this test.
We could not apply this procedure for two reasons. First, we do
not have data over the entire support of the distribution. In particular,
we did not ask respondents about the probability of earning extremely
big payouts. It would thus be inappropriate to compare fitted distri-
butions at points for which no data was collected. Second, the critical
values provided by Smirnov (1933) are based on a DGP in which all
data points were generated independently from the CDF. In our case we
get 4 data points from each respondent, and these points are clearly not
independent. We can thus not use the usual critical values.
To solve the first problem, we will restrict the analysis to the part
of the support over which we elicited expectations: between 1000 and
3000017. The test statistic will thus be
k = max{F̂1(x)− F̂2(x) | 1000 ≤ x ≤ 30000}
To solve the second problem, we will simulate the critical values. To
avoid having to guess an appropriate DGP for our problem, we sim-
ulate these critical values in a non-parametric way using a bootstrap-
like procedure. Concretely, we follow the following procedure to do the
kolmogorov-smirnov test. For each individual i, we have four points
k = 1, 2, 3, 4 in his CDF, where yi,k denotes the probability to earn at
most the amount xi,k.
To calculate the test-statistic k:
1. Fit a log-normal distribution F̂H using the sample (yi,k, xi,k) for
the sample of individual presented high amounts
2. Fit a log-normal distribution F̂L using the sample (yi,k, xi,k) for
the sample of individual presented low amounts
3. The test-statistic is: k = max{abs(F̂H(x) − F̂L(x)) | 1000 ≤ x ≤
30000}
171000 is the lowest amount presented used for the respondents presented the
higher amounts; 30000 is the highest for the ones presented the lower amounts
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To simulate the critical values and calculate an associated
p-value:
1. Fit a log-normal distribution F̂0 using all observations. Under the
null of no differences between FH and FL, the distribution F̂0 is a
consistent estimate of these distributions.
2. Calculate the predicted values: ŷi,k = F̂0(xi,k)
3. Calculate the residuals: ̂i,k = ŷi,k − yi,k
4. Repeat the following 1000 times:
(a) Draw an independent random variable ui with a Rademacher
two-point distribution: ui = 1 with probability 0.5 and ui =
−1 with probability 0.5.
(b) Define the bootstrap sample y∗i,k = ŷi,k + ui · ̂i,k
(c) Fit a lognormal distribution F̂ ∗H using the bootstrap sample
(y∗i,k, xi,k) for the sample of individual presented high amounts.
(d) Fit a lognormal distribution F̂ ∗L using the bootstrap sample
(y∗i,k, xi,k) for the sample of individual presented low amounts.
The bootstrapped test-statistic is: k∗ = max{abs(F̂ ∗H(x) −
F̂ ∗L(x)) | 1000 ≤ x ≤ 30000}.
5. The p-value associated to the kolmogorv-smirnov test is the pro-
portion of bootstrapped test-statics k∗ that is bigger than the test
statistic k.
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Lower Higher Difference (p-value):
amounts amounts Framing effect
Can read and Median 2554 3463 0.788
write (N=18) K-S test 0.566
Has experience Can not read Median 2043 4129 0.257
mining and write (N=51) K-S test 0.310
Average of above Median 2298 3796 0.436
Can read and Median 2210 13431 0.236
write (N=18) K-S test 0.170
No experience Can not read Median 3265 13084 0.084
mining and write (N=25) K-S test 0.052
Average of above Median 2738 13257 0.017
Has formal Median 1927 1376 0.712
education (N=12) K-S test 0.914
Has experience Has no formal Median 2280 4613 0.242
mining education (N=57) K-S test 0.306
Average of above Median 2103 2995 0.448
Has formal Median 2448 19794 0.569
education (N=10) K-S test 0.390
No experience Has no formal Median 3010 12616 0.040
mining education (N=33) K-S test 0.032
Average of above Median 2729 16205 0.333
Is wealthier than Median 1864 7124 0.175
median (N=30) K-S test 0.132
Has experience Is less wealthy than Median 2485 2854 0.815
mining median (N=39) K-S test 0.938
Average of above Median 2175 4989 0.177
Is wealthier than Median 2988 13657 0.226
median (N=24) K-S test 0.140
No experience Is less wealthy than Median 2649 12792 0.027
mining median (N=19) K-S test 0.074
Average of above Median 2818 13224 0.007
Is older than Median 1952 488 0.274
median (N=26) K-S test 0.214
Has experience Is less old than Median 2312 9472 0.019
mining median (N=43) K-S test 0.000
Average of above Median 2132 4980 0.109
Is older than Median 2370 5418 0.272
median (N=26) K-S test 0.364
No experience Is less old than Median 4941 40856 0.070
mining median (N=17) K-S test 0.036
Average of above Median 3655 23137 0.034
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the respondent. The p-value of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is
based on simulated critical values. The line “average of above" contains the average of the preceding two lines.
The p-value on this line thus refers to the average of the differences in medians between the two frames, i.e., it
measures the significance of the average framing effect.
Table 4.6: Comparison of fitted distributions, separating respondents
with and without experience mining and separating respondents by level
of education, age and wealth.
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Lower Higher Difference
amounts amounts (p-value)
Median 1059 3280 0.020
First Quartile 175 539 0.157
Third Quartile 6406 19958 0.004
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 0.018
(a) Cutoff points to the left of the interval
Lower Higher Difference
amounts amounts (p-value)
Median 1624 4425 0.033
First Quartile 189 520 0.113
Third Quartile 13976 37672 0.026
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 0.014
(b) Cutoff points at 25% of interval
Lower Higher Difference
amounts amounts (p-value)
Median 2406 6862 0.020
First Quartile 306 903 0.081
Third Quartile 18928 52145 0.020
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 0.004
(c) Cutoff points in the middle of the interval (central assumption)
Lower Higher Difference
amounts amounts (p-value)
Median 3173 9167 0.017
First Quartile 413 1245 0.073
Third Quartile 24387 67479 0.019
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 0.014
(d) Cutoff points at 75% of interval
Lower Higher Difference
amounts amounts (p-value)
Median 3934 11426 0.016
First Quartile 516 1571 0.070
Third Quartile 30020 83122 0.019
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 0.010
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the respondent. The p-value
of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is based on simulated critical values.
(e) Cutoff points at the right of the interval
Table 4.7: Replication of Table 4.4, but with alternative assumptions on
how respondents interpreted the expectations quesion.
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Category Am. 1 Cutoff 1 Am. 2 Cutoff 2 Am. 3 Cutoff 3 Am. 4 Cutoff 4 Am. 5
Very low amounts 0 200 400 700 1000 2500 4000 12000 20000
Low amounts 0 500 1000 1750 2500 6250 10000 30000 50000
High amounts 0 1000 2000 3500 5000 12500 20000 60000 100000
Very high amounts 0 5000 10000 17500 25000 62500 100000 300000 500000
Table 4.8: Amounts used to elicit expectations and cutoff points in the
middle between subsequent amounts.
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Chapter 5
Time efficient algorithms for
robust estimators of location,
scale, symmetry and tail
heaviness1
1This chapter is co-authored with Vincenzo Verardi and Catherine Vermandele.
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Abstract
The analysis of the empirical distribution of univariate data often in-
cludes the computation of some location, scale, skewness and tails heav-
iness measures which are estimates of specific parameters of the under-
lying population distribution. Several measures are available but they
differ in terms of Gaussian efficiency, robustness with respect to out-
liers, and meaning in case of asymmetric distributions. We first briefly
compare, for each type of parameter (location, scale, skewness, and tail
heaviness), the "classical" estimator based on (centered) moments of the
empirical distribution, an estimator based on specific quantiles of the
distribution, and an estimator built on the basis of pairwise comparisons
of the observations. This last one always performs better than the other
estimators, namely in terms of robustness, but requires at first sight a
heavy computation time of an order of n2. Fortunately, as explained
in Croux & Rousseeuw (1992), the algorithm of Johnson & Mizoguchi
(1978) allows to substantially reduce the computation time to an order
of n log n and, hence, allows to use the robust estimators based on pair-
wise comparisons even in very large datasets. This has motivated us
to program this algorithm and make it available in Stata: we describe
in this paper the sketch of the algorithm and the associated Stata com-
mands. Finally, we illustrate on real data the interest of the computation
of these robust estimators by involving them in a normality test of the
Jarque-Bera form (Jarque & Bera (1980); Brys et al. (2004b)).
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5.1 Introduction
When analyzing univariate data, a key task is to estimate location, scale,
skewness and tails heaviness parameters of the underlying distribution.
These will together provide a very good characterization of this distri-
bution. Several estimators for these parameters are available but they
do not all share the same properties; they differ in terms of Gaussian ef-
ficiency, robustness with respect to outliers, smoothness of the influence
function and meaning in case of asymmetric distributions.
In this paper, we will systematically compare, for each type of param-
eter (location, scale, skewness and kurtosis), three estimators of different
natures. The first one, generally considered as the "classical" estimator,
is based on the first, second, third or fourth (centered) moment of the
empirical distribution; the second one is defined on the basis of specific
quantiles of the distribution; the third one is built on the basis of pair-
wise comparisons of the observations. They will be compared in terms of
breakdown point (i.e., maximal outlier contamination they withstand),
Gaussian efficiency (i.e., relative asymptotic variances) and smoothness
of the influence function (i.e., relative sensitivity of the estimator to
changing a fraction of points in the sample).
As will be explained in the paper, the estimators of the third category
perform very nicely, both in terms of efficiency and robustness. This
contrasts with the other estimators. The classical estimators of the first
category are highly efficient, but not robust to outliers. The quantile-
based estimators of the second category have the opposite property: they
are very robust, but not efficient. The pairwise-based estimators of the
third category, however, are typically as robust as the quantile-based
ones, but more efficient (though not always as efficient as the classical
estimators). In this sense, these pairwise-based estimators combine the
best of two worlds.
However, because these estimators are based on pairwise compar-
isons, it is often thought that the heaviness of their computation makes
them unfeasible in practice. To overcome this apparent excessive com-
putational complexity, we follow the idea already developed in Croux
& Rousseeuw (1992) which consists in applying the very efficient deter-
ministic algorithm of Johnson & Mizoguchi (1978) that allows to reduce
the computation time from an order of n2 to an order of n log n. Stata
commands are programmed to make the estimators of the third type
available for applied researchers.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 5.2, we introduce var-
ious estimators for the location, scale, skewness and tails heaviness of
the distribution from which the data have been generated and compare
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their (asymptotic) Gaussian efficiency and robustness properties. In Sec-
tion 5.3, we show how these estimators may be used in practice to test
the normality of the distribution, following the idea of the Jarque & Bera
(1980) statistical test even when outliers are present. This motivates the
presentation, in Sections 5.4 and 5.5, of the sketch of an efficient algo-
rithm and of the associated Stata commands. Section 5.6 is devoted to
an example and Section 5.7 concludes.
5.2 Estimators of location, scale, skewness and
heaviness of the tails
Many measures of location, scale, skewness and kurtosis or heaviness
of the tails have been proposed and studied in the statistical literature.
This section is devoted to the comparison of the (asymptotic) Gaussian
efficiency and robustness performance of three different types of estima-
tors: (i) the "classical" estimators, based on (centered) moments of the
distribution; (ii) the estimators built from specific quantiles of the distri-
bution; (iii) the estimators defined on the basis of pairwise comparisons
or combinations of the observations.
5.2.1 Definitions
The different estimators will be compared in terms of breakdown value,
Gaussian efficiency and influence functions.
The asymptotic breakdown value is the maximal outlier contamina-
tion an estimator can withstand before breaking down, that is, leading
to arbitrary values.
Gaussian efficiency is related to the asymptotic variance of the esti-
mator under a Gaussian distribution. The lower the asymptotic variance,
the more efficient the estimator.
The influence function at a point x measures the effect on the estima-
tor of a perturbation of the distribution by adding a small probability
mass at point x. We are mostly interested in whether the influence
function is bounded and smooth. When it is unbounded, the effect of
an outlier on the estimator can be arbitrarily large. This implies that
the estimator is not robust to outliers. When the influence function is
smooth, a small change in a data point only has a small effect on the
estimator. For this reason, smoothness of the influence function tends
to improve efficiency.
Finally, note that the influence function can also be used to obtain
asymptotic confidence intervals (see Hampel et al. (1986), p. 85 and 226).
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Type ASV(·,Φ) Asymptotic Boundedbreakdown val. IF?
x¯ Classical 1 0% NO
Q0.5 Quantile-based pi/2 50% YES
HL Pairwise-based pi/3 29% YES
Table 5.1: A comparison of the three location estimators’ performance
with respect to Gaussian efficiency, asymptotic breakdown value, and
boundedness of the influence function. HL is less robust but more effi-
cient than its robust alternative, the median.
Alternatively, jackknife can also be used to obtain confidence intervals.
5.2.2 Location estimators
There is apparently a consensus in applied statistics about the fact that
the sample mean (x¯ = 1n
∑n
i=1 xi) and the sample median (Q0.5 =
F−1n (0.5)) are two complementary location estimators: the mean is very
efficient in case of Gaussian data but fragile to outliers (and meaning-
less in case of highly asymmetric data) while the median is very robust
(and meaningful in case of asymmetries) but rather inefficient. Both are
extensively used in practice.
Less well-known is the midpoint estimator based on pairwise compar-
isons introduced by Hodges & Lehmann (1963). The Hodges-Lehmann
estimator is defined by HL = med
{
xi+xj
2 ; i < j
}
.
In terms of robustness, the HL, like the median, outperforms the
mean. Figure 5.1 shows the influence functions under the standard Gaus-
sian distribution Φ. The influence function of the HL and the median,
in contrast to the mean, are bounded. As a consequence they both have
positive asymptotic breakdown values (see Table 5.1). The median, with
a breakdown value of 50%, is more robust to outliers than HL.
In terms of efficiency, the mean is known to be the most efficient lo-
cation estimator. Among HL and the median, HL comes out as the most
efficient one, with an asymptotic variance under the standard Gaussian
distribution of pi/3 against pi/2 for the median (see Table 5.1). This is
also illustrated by the influence functions, where the influence function
of the HL appears as a smooth version of that of the median.
Although the HL has nice properties, being based on pairwise com-
parisons, it seems to have a high computational complexity and not
to be usable in big samples. However, as will be explained in Section
5.4, a simple algorithm proposed by Johnson & Mizoguchi (1978) al-
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Figure 5.1: Influence functions of the location estimators under the stan-
dard Gaussian distribution. The influence function of HL is bounded and
appears as a smooth version of that of the median.
lows to substantially reduce this computational complexity from O(n2)
to O(n log n). We programmed this estimator in Stata and describe the
associated command in Section 5.5. We nevertheless do not believe that
it brings enormous advantages with respect to the median and therefore
do not strongly advice to use it systematically instead of the median.
5.2.3 Scale estimators
To estimate the scale parameter of the underlying distribution, the clas-
sical estimator is the standard deviation: s =
[
1
n
∑n
i=1(xi − x¯)2
]1/2. It is
the most efficient estimator of the scale parameter σ in case of Gaussian
data. But, like the mean, it completely lacks robustness: its influence
function is unbounded (see Figure 5.2) and, as a consequence, it has an
asymptotic breakdown value of 0% (e.g., Rousseeuw & Croux (1993), p.
1275).
There are however several robust alternatives to the standard devia-
tion. First, there are two alternatives based on quantiles. A commonly
used one is the interquartile range: IQR = d × (Q0.75 − Q0.25) where
setting d = 0.7413 ensures consistency for σ at Gaussian distributions.
A second one is the MAD = b × medi|xi − medjxj | where b = 1.4826
makes it consistent for σ at Gaussian distributions. As discussed below,
the MAD is very robust, but has the downside that it aims at symmetric
distributions only: it essentially finds the symmetric interval (around the
median) that contains 50% of the data, which does not seem to be a nat-
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Type ASV(·,Φ) Asymptotic Boundedbreakdown val. IF?
s Classical 0.5 0% NO
IQR Quantile-based 1.3605 25% YES
Qn Pairwise-based 0.6077 50% YES
Table 5.2: A comparison of three scale estimators’ performance with
respect to Gaussian efficiency, asymptotic breakdown value, and bound-
edness of the influence function. Qn is more robust and more efficient
than its robust alternative, IQR.
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Figure 5.2: Influence functions of the scale estimators under the standard
Gaussian distribution. The influence function of Qn is bounded and
appears as a smooth version of that of IQR.
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ural approach at asymmetric distributions. The interquartile range does
not have this problem, as the quartiles need not be equally far away from
the median. Because the MAD has this problem of assumed symmetry,
we focus mainly on IQR from now on.
Finally, a very interesting but relatively unknown scale estimator is
the Qn statistic of Rousseeuw & Croux (1993): Qn = d× {|xi − xj |; i <
j}(k), where d = 2.2219 ensures consistency for Gaussian distributions
and k =
(
h
2
) ∼= (n2)/4 with h = [n/2] + 1. In other words, the statistic
Qn corresponds approximately to the 25th percentile of the
(
n
2
)
distances
{|xi − xj |, i < j}.
The Qn estimator generally outperfoms the other robust estimators,
both in terms of efficiency and robustness. First, its Gaussian efficiency,
at 83%, is surprisingly high and substantially higher than that of IQR
and MAD (see Table 5.2).
Also in terms of robustness, Qn outperforms the other estimators. It
has an asymptotic breakdown value of 50% which is higher than that of
IQR. Finally, Qn is also applicable to assymetric distributions and its
influence is smooth, in contrast to that of IQR (see Figure 5.2).
Despite its very nice statistical performances, it seems at first sight
difficult to use Qn in practice because of the high computational com-
plexity needed to compute it. Indeed, according to its definition, we
have to determine an order statistic of
(
n
2
)
pairwise differences. How-
ever, as for the midpoint estimate the algorithm proposed in Johnson
& Mizoguchi (1978) can be used. We programmed the Qn estimator
in Stata with this efficient algorithm and called the command sqn. A
detailed description of this command is available in Section 5.5.
5.2.4 Skewness estimators
Skewness is often measured by the Fisher estimator: γ1 = 1n
∑n
i=1
(
xi−x¯
s
)3.
Since this skewness measure relies on the mean and the standard devi-
ation, it is not surprising that its resistance to outliers is null. More
precisely, its asymptotic breakdown value is equal to 0% and its influ-
ence function is unbounded (see Figure 5.3 and, for example, Groeneveld
(1991)). Alternative estimators of skewness, such as x¯−modes and
x¯−Q0.5
s
proposed by Pearson, still rely on the standard deviation and are thus
just as fragile with respect to outliers as the classical skewness estimator.
Fortunately, there again exist several robust alternatives. First, Hink-
ley (1975) proposed the quantile-based estimator
SKp =
(Q1−p −Q0.5)− (Q0.5 −Qp)
Q1−p −Qp =
Qp +Q1−p − 2Q0.5
Q1−p −Qp ,
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Type ASV(·,Φ) Asymptotic Boundedbreakdown val. IF?
Fisher Classical 6 0% NO
SK0.25 Quantile-based 1.8421 25% YES
MC Pairwise-based 1.25 25% YES
Table 5.3: A comparison of three skewness estimators’ performance with
respect to Gaussian efficiency, asymptotic breakdown value, and bound-
edness of the influence function. The Medcouple is as robust and more
efficient than its robust alternative, SK0.25.
where 0 < p < 0.5. This is in fact a generalization of Yule and Kendall’s
skewness estimator which can be obtained by setting p equal to 0.25:
SKYK = SK0.25.
An alternative robust skewness operator, called medcouple, has been
proposed by Brys et al. (2004a). It is based on pairwise comparisons
and replaces the quantiles Qp and Q1−p in SKp by actual data points.
More precisely, let x(1) ≤ x(2) ≤ . . . ≤ x(n) denote the n order statistics
associated to the sample, then
MC = medx(i)≤Q0.5≤x(j)h
(
x(i), x(j)
)
where, for all x(i) 6= x(j), the kernel function h is given by
h
(
x(i), x(j)
)
=
(
x(j) −Q0.5
)− (Q0.5 − x(i))
x(j) − x(i)
·
For the special case x(i) = x(j) = Q0.5, we define the kernel as follows:
let m1 < . . . < mk denote the indices of the order statistics that are tied
to the median Q0.5 (that is x(ml) = Q0.5 for all l = 1, . . . , k). Then,
h
(
x(mi), x(mj)
)
=

−1 if i+ j < k + 1
0 if i+ j = k + 1
+1 if i+ j > k + 1.
Because of the denominator, it is clear that h
(
x(i), x(j)
)
, and hence MC,
always lies between −1 and +1 (like SKp). The medcouple is 0 for
symmetric distributions while it is positive and negative for respectively
right and left tailed distribution.
Overall, the medcouple outperforms Yule and Kendall’s skewness es-
timator. In terms of robustness they are comparable: they both have an
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Figure 5.3: Influence functions of the skewness estimators under the
standard Gaussian distribution. The influence function of the Medcouple
is bounded and appears as a smooth version of that of SK0.25
asymptotic breakdown value of 25%2 (see Table 5.3) and have bounded
influence functions. The influence function of the medcouple is however
smoother than that of SKp.
The big difference between the medcouple and SKYK lies in efficiency.
The Gaussian efficiency of the former is substantially higher than that
of SKYK. In fact, the Gaussian efficiency of these robust estimators is
even better than that of the classical Fisher estimator of skewness.
As for Qn, at first sight, the computational complexity of MC is of
the order of O(n2). As for HL and Qn, the Johnson and Mizoguchi al-
gorithm can be used to compute MC with a complexity of O(n log n).
We programmed this skewness estimator in Stata and describe the com-
mands in Section 5.5.
5.2.5 Tails heaviness estimators
Tail heaviness is often measured using kurtosis: γ2 = 1n
∑n
i=1
(
xi−µn
σn
)4
.
The parameter γ2 is equal to three for distributions with tails similar
to the normal, bigger than three for leptokurtic distributions (i.e., with
heavier tails than the normal) and smaller than three for platokurtic
distributions (i.e., with lighter tails than the normal). However, this pa-
rameter also measures the peakedness of a distribution and it is difficult
2The asymptotic breakdown value of SKp is 100p% and is thus bigger than 25%
when setting p higher than 0.25 (the value used in SKYK). Doing this however also
reduces efficiency.
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Type ASV(·,Φ) Asymptotic Boundedbreakdown val. IF?
γ2 Classical 24 0% NO
LQW0.25 (RQW0.25) Quantile-based 3.71 12.5% YES
LMC (RMC) Pairwise-based 2.62 12.5% YES
Table 5.4: A comparison of the tail heaviness estimators’ performance
with respect to Gaussian efficiency, asymptotic breakdown value, and
boundedness of the influence function.
to grasp what kurtosis really estimates. Another disadvantage of the
kurtosis is that its interpretation and consequently its use is restricted
to symmetric distributions. Moreover, as usual for estimators relying
on the mean and the standard deviation, the kurtosis coefficient is very
sensitive to outliers in the data (0% asymptotic breakdown value and
unbouded influence function3; see Figure 5.4 and Ruppert (1987))
To overcome these problems, Brys et al. (2006) have proposed two
measures of left and right tail weight for univariate continuous distribu-
tions. These measures have the advantage that they can be applied to
symmetric as well as asymmetric distributions that do not need to have
finite moments; moreover, they unambiguously measure tail heaviness
(not peakedness) and they are robust against outlying values.
More precisely, Brys, Hubert and Struyf defined left and right tail
measures as measures of skewness that are applied to the half of the
probability mass lying to the left, respectively to the right, side of the
medianQ0.5. As measures of skewness they use the two robust estimators
presented in the previous section: SKp (0 < p < 0.5) and MC.
Concretely, applying the medcouple to each side of the distribution
we get the Left Medcouple and the Right Medcouple: LMC = −MC(x <
Q0.5) and RMC = MC(x > Q0.5). Similarly, using the SKp skewness esti-
mator leads to the Left Quantile Weight and the Right Quantile Weight:
LQWp = −SKp/2(x < Q0.5) and RQWp = SKp/2(x > Q0.5). Thus,
LQW0.25, for instance, considers the quantiles Q0.125 and Q0.375 around
the center of the left side of the distribution (Q0.25). For these estimators,
a higher value of these estimators means a fatter tail. For comparison,
note that the tail weights of the normal distribution are 0.2.
The performance of these robust measures of tail heaviness is strictly
connected to the performance of their underlying estimators (Medcouple
3The form of this influence function shows that contamination at the center has
far less influence than that in the extreme tails; this suggests that γ2 is primarily a
measure of tail behavior, and only to a lesser extent of peakedness.
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Figure 5.4: Influence functions of the tail heaviness estimators under the
standard Gaussian distribution
and SKp) and so follows the same pattern as in the previous section.
The Left and Right Medcouple have a higher Gaussian efficiency than
LQW0.25 and RQW0.25 (they are also more efficient than the classical
kurtosis for Gaussian data). In terms of robustness, all their influence
functions are bounded (see Figure 5.4 and Brys et al. (2006) (p. 740–
741)) and the asymptotic breakdown value is the same for Left and
Right Medcouple and LQWp and RQWp when p = 0.25. For the latter
estimators increasing p increases robustness, but decreases efficiency;
decreasing p does the opposite. This, in fact, points at another advantage
of the Left and Right Medcouple: it does not require to (somewhat
arbitrarily) fix a value for p.
To conclude, note that the efficient algorithm of Johnson and Mi-
zoguchi allows once again to substantially reduce the computational com-
plexity needed to compute LMC and RMC. These tail weight measures
have been implemented as separate options in the medcouple code in
Stata (see Section 5.5).
5.3 Normality test based on skewness and tails
heaviness estimators
As stated above, these descriptive statistics can be used to characterize
the underlying distribution. In particular, they can be used to test for
normality. For example, the Jarque & Bera (1980) test relies on the
classical skewness and kurtosis coefficients to test for normality. More
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precisely, under the normality assumption (γ1 = 0 and γ2 = 3), we can
write √
n
(
γ1
γ2 − 3
)
d→ N
((
0
0
)
,
(
6 0
0 24
))
,
which leads to the Jarque-Bera test statistic:
T = n
(
γ21
6
+
(γ2 − 3)2
24
)
≈ χ22.
The Jarque-Bera test is a very popular and interesting test for nor-
mality: it has been shown that, for a wide range of alternative distri-
butions, it outperforms such tests as the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, the
Cramér-von Mises test and the Durbin test. Unfortunately, despite its
good power properties and computational simplicity, the Jarque-Bera
test is highly sensitive to outliers because it is constructed from the
moment-based skewness and kurtosis measures.
Robust alternatives to the Jarque-Bera test have been proposed and
studied in Brys et al. (2004b). These authors start from the fact that the
Jarque-Bera test can be seen as a special case of the following general
testing procedure. Let θ̂ = (θ̂1, . . . , θ̂k)′ be a vector of estimators of
θ = (θ1, . . . , θk)
′ (a vector of characteristic parameters of the underlying
distribution) such that, under the null hypothesis of normality,
√
n
(
θ̂ − θ
)′ d→ N (0,Ω);
then, the general test consists in rejecting, at level α, the null hypothesis
of normality if
T = n
(
θ̂ − θ
)′
Ω−1
(
θ̂ − θ
)
> χ2k;1−α,
where χ2k;1−α is the (1 − α)-quantile of the chi-square distribution with
k degrees of freedom. Brys et al. (2004b) then propose to use, in this
general testing procedure, the robust skewness estimator MC and/or the
tails heaviness estimators LMC and RMC.
Three tests have been studied. The first one is only based on the
skewness estimator MC (the medcouple): in this case, k = 1, θ̂ = MC
and Ω = 1.25. The second one is based on the left and right tail heaviness
estimators LMC (left medcouple) and RMC (right medcouple): in this
case, k = 2, θ̂ = (LMC,RMC)′, θ = (0.199, 0.199)′ and
Ω =
(
2.62 −0.0123
−0.0123 2.62
)
.
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The third test combines MC, LMC and RMC: in this case, k = 3,
θ̂ = (MC,LMC,RMC)′, θ = (0, 0.199, 0.199)′ and
Ω =
 1.25 0.323 −0.3230.323 2.62 −0.0123
−0.323 −0.0123 2.62
 .
This last test seems to have the best overall performance.
5.4 Efficient algorithm
The key to efficiently implementing the different estimators based on
pairwise combinations described above, is a simple algorithm by John-
son & Mizoguchi (1978). Given a number k and an n × q matrix M
with sorted (non-increasing) rows, this algorithm finds the kth maximal
element of M in time O(n log n). In this section, we give a sketch of this
algorithm.
The algorithm proceeds by repeatedly guessing a new candidate for
the kth maximum of M . After every such guess, it discards some of the
elements ofM (because they can not be the kth maximum). In this way,
it systematically reduces this set of candidates until it guesses the kth
maximum of M . The key to the efficiency of the algorithm is that, at
every guess, it (efficiently) discards many elements of M . In this way,
the algorithm only needs few attempts before finding the kth maximum.
The algorithm is sketched in somewhat more detail below.
1 mat excludeleft = J(n,1,1) // length-n vector with value 1 everywhere
2 mat excluderight = J(n,1,q) // length-n vector with value q everywhere
3 while kth maximum is not found {
4 scalar m = new guess for kth maximum using non-excluded elements of M
5 scalar nrbigger = number of elements a in M with a > m
6 scalar nrsmaller = number of elements a in M with a < m
7 if nrbigger >= k // kth maximum is bigger than m 7
8 excluderight[i] = pos. smallest element bigger than m in row i
9 elseif nrsmaller >= (n*q)-k // kth maximum is smaller than m
10 excludeleft[i] = pos. biggest element smaller than m in row i
11 else // kth maximum equals m
12 m is the kth maximum element of M
13 }
In Lines 1 and 2 the algorithm initializes the data structure which
maintains which elements have already been discarded. At any time, for
any row i, all elements to the left of position excludeleft[i] are discarded.
E.g., if excludeleft[1] is 4, the first three elements in row 1 are discarded.
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Similarly, excluderight[i] contains the position in row i to the right of
which all elements have been discarded.
The loop on Line 3 continues until the kth maximum has been found.
It first makes a new guess m for the kth maximum (Line 4) and then
calculates the number of elements in M which are bigger and smaller
thanM (Lines 5 and 6). This can be done efficiently because each of the
rows is sorted. Then, if there are more than k elements which are bigger
than m (Line 7), we know that the kth maximum must be bigger than
m. We can thus discard all elements smaller or equal than m (Line 8).
Similarly, we can discard all elements bigger or equal than m if there are
more than (n ∗ q) − k elements strictly smaller than m. Finally, if the
kth maximum is neither among the elements strictly bigger nor those
strictly smaller than m (Line 11), m must be the kth maximum and we
have found the kth maximum.
This algorithm requires timeO(n log n) (Johnson &Mizoguchi (1978)).
Note, however, that one should not explicitly calculate the entire matrix
M (which would be of complexity O(n2)). Indeed the algorithm only
needs to inspect some of its elements, and only those elements should
be calculated. This substantially reduces the running time of the algo-
rithm. To illustrate the time saving this algorithm achieves, we show
in Table 5.5 a comparison of the running time4 of the different estima-
tors based on pairwise comparisons when using this algorithm, and when
using standard algorithms.
5.5 Commands in Stata
We programmed the following commands in Stata to estimate the de-
scribed statistics using the efficient algorithm of Johnson & Mizoguchi
(1978).
• For the HL statistic of Hodges & Lehmann (1963), the command
is “mhl varname [if] [in]”.
• For the Qn statistic of Rousseeuw & Croux (1993), the command
is “sqn varname [if] [in]”.
• For the medcouple, the command is “medcouple varname [if] [in]”
and three options are available. The first is lmc which asks Stata
to calculate the medcouple only using observations smaller than
the median. This gives a measure of the flatness of the tail on the
4We used Stata/SE 12 and a computer with a 2.66 GHz Intel dual-core processor
and 2GB of RAM.
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HL HL Qn Qn Medcouple Medcouple
n efficient naive efficient naive efficient naive
500 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
1000 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.5
2000 0.9 2.9 0.9 2.6 0.7 2.0
5000 2 23 3 22 2 15
10000 6 113 7 117 5 72
50000 46 / 44 / 33 /
100000 105 / 108 / 74 /
Table 5.5: Running time (in seconds) of the implemented estimators (HL,
Qn and Medcouple) using the efficient Johnson and Mizoguchi algorithm
(left) and using standard algorithms (right). When n is bigger than
10000, the running time of the standard algorithm is not reported as it
took too long to compute.
left of the distribution. The rmc option does the same for the right
tail by focusing on observations larger than the median. Finally,
the nomc option asks Stata not to calculate the medcouple.
• For the robust test of normality we created the command “robjb
varname [if] [in]”. This command implements the test consider-
ing both skewness and heaviness of tails by default. Two mutually
exclusive options are available: skewness and kurtosis. If the for-
mer is used, a test based exclusively on the skewness is performed
while if the latter is called, a test based exclusively on the heaviness
of the tails is performed.
5.6 Example
To illustrate the usefulness of the estimators, we will analyze the body
weight of 64 different animal species. The dataset we use is available
online and have been made available by Rice University, University of
Houston Clear Lake and Tufts University.
To start the analysis, we first calculate the classical, quantiles based
and pairwise based estimates of location, scale, skewness and heaviness of
the tails (see Table 5.6). The classical and quantiles based estimates can
easily be calculated using the formulas provided in the theoretical section
and using the standard summarize and centile Stata commands (see
the do-file relative to the example for further details). To compute the
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pairwise based estimates, we have to use the commands we programmed
as follows:
mhl body
sqn body
medcouple body, lmc rmc
Classical Quantiles based Pairwise based
Location x¯ : 3 111 355.5 Q0.5 : 3 500 HL : 94 307.5
Scale s : 13 033 900 IQR : 166 221.28 Qn : 6 665.438
Skewness γ1 : 5.461 SK0.25 : 0.976 MC : 0.985
Tails γ2 : 32.770 LQW : −0.052 LMC : −0.090
RQW : 0.883 RMC : 0.915
Table 5.6: Classical, based on quantiles, and based on pairwise combi-
nations estimates of location, scale, skewness and tails heaviness.
If we would only look at the classical estimators, we would conclude
that the average animal weight is very high but with a huge dispersion.
The asymmetry is large and positive and tails are very heavy. When we
look at the equivalent robust statistics, we see that the median weight
is much lower than the mean weight. The robust dispersion is also much
smaller than that suggested by classical estimators and right skewness is
extreme. As far as the heaviness of the tails is concerned, the right tail is
extremely heavy while the left one is slightly lighter than the left tail of
the normal (recall that the normal has tail weights of 0.2 and that higher
values indicate heavier tails). When looking at the difference between
classical and robust estimators, it is evident that outliers are present in
the dataset.
A first thing that we could do to tackle this problem is to transform
the data to reduce the excessive importance of very big animals (such as
dinosaurs). Given that weights are strictly positive, we consider a loga-
rithmic transformation and re-do the above descriptive statistics analysis
(see Figure 5.5 and Table 5.7):
gen lbody = ln(body)
mhl lbody
sqn lbody
medcouple lbody, lmc rmc
When we do this transformation, we see that the differences between
classical and robust estimators become much smaller. Indeed the mean
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Figure 5.5: Logarithm of the body weights of 64 animal species, in in-
creasing order
Classical Quantiles based Pairwise based
Location x¯ : 9.313 Q0.5 : 8.161 HL : 9.289
Scale s : 4.135 IQR : 4.207 Qn : 4.281
Skewness γ1 : 0.304 SK0.25 : 0.465 MC : 0.386
Tails γ2 : 2.192 LQW : 0.499 LMC : 0.515
RQW : 0.241 RMC : 0.241
Table 5.7: Classical, based on quantiles, and based on pairwise com-
binations estimates of location, scale, skewness and tails heaviness for
transformed data.
is only slightly larger than the median, the dispersion estimate is very
similar for all the methods and the skewness estimate only points towards
evidence of moderate positive skewness. As far as the heaviness of the
tails is concerned, the classical estimator is close to 3 which is the value of
the kurtosis for the normal and therefore points towards standard tails.
Nevertheless when we look at the robust estimator for the latter, there is
evidence of a heavy left tail. Indeed, the left tail weights of about 0.5 are
substantially above 0.2, the tail weight of normal tails. This last point
is very important.
Indeed, let us imagine that we want to test for the normality of
the log(body) variable. The classical and the robust estimators lead to
different results. The standard Jarque-Bera statistic is 2.726 which is
much smaller than the critical value of χ22;0.95 = 5.99. This implies that
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the standard Jarque-Bera test would not reject the null hypothesis of
normality. On the other hand, we can also calculate the robust test
statistic involving MC, LMC and RMC:
robjb lbody
We see that this robust test statistic is equal to 9.266 which is larger than
the critical value of χ23;0.95 = 7.815. This would therefore point towards
the rejection of the null hypothesis of normality. This means that even
though the logarithmic transformation substantially reduced the effect of
atypical individuals, outliers still bias the classical estimations. In par-
ticular, we believe that the heaviness of the left tail is not satisfactorily
identified by the classical kurtosis coefficient, and this affects the result
of the normality test.
5.7 Conclusion
Different statistics are available to estimate the location, the scale, the
skewness and the tails heaviness of a distribution. Some of these es-
timators are based on pairwise comparisons of the observations; these
estimators, apparently much more heavy and complex to compute, per-
form better, namely in terms of robustness and efficiency. The algorithm
of Johnson & Mizoguchi (1978) allows to substantially reduce the com-
putation time of these robust estimators from an order n2 to an order of
n log n; this makes it possible to determine these estimators even in very
large datasets. In order to make these interesting estimators available for
applied researchers, we have programmed them in Stata, following the
efficient algorithm of Johnson and Mizoguchi. We have also programmed
a robust version of the Jarque-Bera test of normality, for which the test
statistic involves some of these estimators of skewness and tails heaviness.
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